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Chapter 1 – Why studying party leaders and their selection rules? 
 
‘Leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life’ (Michels, 1915, p. 240). 
If I had to synthetically answer the question reported in the chapter's title, I would probably rely 
on this quote by Robert Michels. Moreover, not only is (political) leadership important from a 
general viewpoint, but several crucial transformations have been also taking place in Western 
Europe in the last 30 years or so: from the increasing individualisation of society to the 
emergence and consolidation of post-materialist values, to the increasing pervasiveness of media 
in societal and political matter (see the discussion in Inglehart, 1977; Flinders, 2012, pp. 1–36; 
Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel, 2014, p. 243; Tormey, 2015, pp. 59–82). While this is not the place 
to in-depth analyse these processes, one of their possible consequences might be related to 
another important phenomenon of contemporary politics: the rise of what has been wittily called 
‘personality politics' (Costa Lobo and Curtice, 2015). In other words, a growing importance of 
single persons at the expenses of the structures they might lead or to which they might be 
connected. One of the most major arenas where such phenomenon has taken place is the 
political party. 
In this dissertation, I deal with a specific aspect of the growing importance of ‘personalities': 
the determinants behind the openings of party leader selection rules in Western Europe between 
the mid-1980s and the mid-2010s. Before describing the plan of this dissertation, it might be 
useful to extensively answer the two-fold question in the chapter's title: why is it relevant to 
study party leaders and their selection rules? Section 1.1 directly tackles the importance of party 
leaders for contemporary politics. Then, Section 1.2 deals with the rules to select them, while 
Section 1.3 is devoted to the exploration of the plan of the dissertation. 
 
1.1 The decline of parties and the centrality of leaders 
 
As already argued in the introductory paragraphs, party leaders are more and more crucial 
from several viewpoints. This process is even more important if it is analysed vis-à-vis another 
vis-à-vis another phenomenon: the decline of political parties. Given the extremely high number 
of contributions dealing with a (real or alleged) decline of parties especially in Western Europe, 
in this subsection, I deal with just a handful of aspects of this second important process, and 
then I turn to party leaders.  
To begin with, some critical readers might point out that parties have not been experiencing 
a real decline. At best, they would continue, it is mass parties that have been crumbling. Indeed, 
	 8 
as I extensively discuss in this dissertation, but especially in Section 4.2, Western European 
political parties have been losing members for some decades, both from an absolute and a 
relative viewpoint, as shown in a very recent – and rich – dataset released by Van Haute, Paulis 
and Serens (Van Haute and Paulis, 2016; Van Haute, Paulis and Sierens, 2017). Yet, this 
constitutes a sign of decline only if we assume that mass parties are the ‘reference point' for 
contemporary political organisations. Indeed, a numerous membership constitutes one of the 
classical features of mass political parties, which have (had) a ‘thicker' organisational extent 
(borrowing the categorisation by Gunther and Diamond 2003, p. 173). Therefore, our critical 
reader might continue, why should we argue that there is a decline for parties at large? It is not 
the party which is dying, but just the mass party (see also Tormey, 2015, p. 90).   
Even if we consider a second possible aspect, the decline in parties’ responsiveness, only 
would mass parties be affected by this phenomenon. More specifically, the account by Mair 
(2009, 2013) argues that political parties are less and less prone to take into consideration 
members’, voters’, or citizens’ preferences1. So, our sceptical reader would say, why should we be 
worried about this ‘responsiveness crisis'? If (some) parties are less and less responsive, then 
citizens, as ‘absolute sovereign' in general elections (Manin, 1997, pp. 135–138), could take this 
element into account when casting the ballot. And, in any case, maybe we are just witnessing a 
new phase of the historical evolution of parties, especially with regards to responsiveness and 
responsibility (Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel, 2014, pp. 237–243). So, there should be nothing to 
worry. 
Nonetheless, I do believe this is a very optimistic account of the current state of the art of 
political parties in Western Europe. Even if I could share the ‘skeptical’ or ‘critical’ view sketched 
above, there are two final elements of party decline that should be considered with great 
attention: the decreasing autonomy of the party government, and the declining legitimacy of 
political parties. The former is a well-known issue for political scientists, for instance with 
regards to the increasing supranational constraints, like those imposed by EU institutions for 
Eurozone countries (Laffan, 2014; Rose, 2014). All in all, parties have less and less grip over the 
set of policies to choose from and over the precise policies to implement. And this is a crucial 
point to understand the decline of the party government (see considerations in Mair, 2013). 
                                                
1 Mair argues that a clear distinction should be made between parties in government and those 
outside the government: there are ‘parties which claim to represent but don’t govern and those 
which govern but no longer represent’ (Mair, 2009, p. 17). Nonetheless, it might be even 
possible that also parties who mainly (only) represent and do not govern might be affected by 
this ‘responsiveness' crisis. Future empirical research might further explore this road. 
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Then, the latter phenomenon, the waning of parties' legitimacy is more interesting for this 
dissertation. Dealing with declining and dying roots with the society around them, showing less 
and less responsiveness towards (sectors of) such society, and less and less able to properly 
structure a (much) autonomous party government, political parties are also, maybe not 
surprising, less and less legitimate at the eyes of citizens2.  
What is of interest here is that if a specific structure is declining (in our case, the party in 
Western Europe), there is someone at the intra-party level who has, at the same time, particular 
prominence: the party leader. Clearly, the presence of central figures within political parties is not 
a new phenomenon for comparative politics: let us just think about Michels'  (1915) classical 
account of intra-party oligarchies, or Duverger’s partially similar discussion about the oligarchical 
tendencies of party leadership (1964, pp. 151–182). 
What marks a clear difference with the past is that the structures which somewhat could 
balance the power of party leaders in the past (i.e., party organisations themselves) have become 
more and more similar to ‘empty vessels’, following the argument by Katz and Kolodny (1994). 
This is just a part of the discussion: party leaders have been left with a weaker and weaker 
organisation around them. The other side of the coin is understanding whether party leaders 
themselves have become more and more central to democratic politics. Enter the personalisation 
of politics, a crucial theme in this dissertation. 
This phenomenon is extensively analysed and discussed in different parts of this work (e.g., 
see Sections 2.3, 4.3, 4.4, and 5.4), but some crucial points can be already anticipated here: first, 
the personalisation of politics is a very complex phenomenon, made of several transformations. 
For instance, the increasing centrality of leaders in electoral campaigns and general elections, the 
growing power of leaders within political parties, the stronger and stronger grip of Prime 
Ministers within governments, and the like. 
Second, being a very complex phenomenon, the personalisation of politics has been analysed 
from various points of view3, and some authors have even coined a new – and also contested – 
concept, the presidentialisation of politics, to describe the rise of leaders in contemporary 
democratic politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005a). One of the consequences of this theoretical – 
and also empirical – fragmentation has been the absence of a cross-country and diachronic study 
                                                
2 See, for instance, Eurobarometer’s data available at http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice 
/publicopinion/index.cfm/Archive/index .  
3 E.g., see the different accounts in Blondel and Thiébault (2010), Balmas et al. (2014), and 
Musella (2018) 
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tackling the personalisation of politics at the party level – which is one of the areas where alleged 
transformations reinforcing the role and the power of leaders should have happened.  
 
Maybe, the renewed interest towards the personalisation of politics happening in the past 
few years has also been caused by this lack of comparable data in a crucial field of research like 
intra-party politics. Let us just briefly mention the works quoted in a review article by Costa 
Lobo (2017), the analyses, based on the existence of ‘leadership-dominated’ parties, by 
Schumacher, De Vries and Vis (2013) and Schumacher and Giger (2017), and the book by 
Musella (2018) on the personalisation of political parties itself4. Last, but not least, to have in-
depth and comparable data on the personalisation of politics in Western Europe in the past three 
decades, I have devised, along with Nicola Martocchia Diodati and Luca Verzichelli, the 
Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017). In 
this expert survey, we have asked country experts questions related to several aspects of the 
personalisation of politics, including the party-related one. Starting from Chapter 4, I discuss the 
importance of this expert survey for this dissertation. 
All in all, I would like to draw the reader’s attention on a crucial point: despite time- and 
country-related differences, in the past few years, party leaders have become more and more 
central objects of study. This does not necessarily mean that party structures have become entirely 
irrelevant5, but that party leaders have transformed into powerful and central actors for the 
comparative political scholarship.  
This section has provided a – necessarily – short but hopefully convincing answer to the first 
sub-question of this chapter: why should we focus on party leaders? Then, the second sub-





                                                
4 From a partially different viewpoint, even data collected for the Political Party Database Project 
(PPDB) (Poguntke, Scarrow and Webb, 2016a, 2016b) and presented in a recently published 
book (Scarrow, Webb and Poguntke, 2017) include some questions on party leaders’ power in 
drafting party manifestos and the level of intra-party leader accountability.  
5 Some authors would even argue that some parts of the party have become more powerful (e.g., 
see data collected by the PPDB project in Poguntke, Scarrow and Webb, 2016), albeit parties 
themselves are less and less legitimate (Ignazi, 2014). 
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1.2 The importance of party leader selection rules 
 
Addressing the question on why devoting some attention to party leader selection rules 
requires a multi-faceted answer. A first reason is connected to the increasing centrality of party 
leaders, possibly at the expenses of parties themselves. Indeed, the previous section has shown 
that two crucial processes have been intertwined in the past few decades. On the one hand, the 
demise of political parties and, on the other hand, the growing importance of party leaders. The 
first process is evident even if we do not see the process from a mass-party viewpoint: in other 
words, even assuming that contemporary political parties are very different from mass parties, 
there are some evident signs of decline that affect political formations at large (like their 
shrinking policy-making and governmental autonomy, the decrease in their legitimacy, and so 
forth).  
These are signs of decline that constitute severe problems for political formations even if we 
accept that contemporary political parties are less strong and with fewer roots within society than 
mass parties of the past. The second process briefly touched in the previous section is the rise in 
the importance of party leaders. So, understanding the rules (and their determinants) governing 
the selection of more and more crucial actors (party leaders), who also operate in less and less 
central organisations (parties) is a task worth performing. Mutatis mutandis, we can draw a 
comparison with candidate selection rules. One of the reasons why several scholars investigate 
the modes of selection of parties’ candidates for general elections6 is that these people, once 
elected and having become MPs, are crucial actors in the parliamentary arena. Similarly, party 
leaders, as pivotal actors from many viewpoints, bring about the necessity to study the way in 
which they are selected, and also the determinants of these modes of selection. 
A second reason why it is important to study party leader selection rules is that, while we 
have certain knowledge on the precise rules presiding over party leader selection, we have a 
substantially less clear picture of the determinants of openings of these rules7. At this point, a 
counterargument would be that maybe openings of party leader selection rules are not a very 
diffuse phenomenon. Why should we study them? The answers to this critique are simple: first 
of all, in the past few decades, more and more parties have opened the rules to select their 
leaders, allowing a potentially wider set of people to have a say in the selection of this organ (e.g., 
                                                
6 Two excellent pieces of research serving as an introduction to this field of research are surely 
the books by Gallagher and Marsh (1988) and by Hazan and Rahat (2010). 
7 This is extensively analysed in Chapter 2. 
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see Cross and Pilet, 2014). Several reasons might be connected to the decisions to intervene in 
the party leader selection area. I would argue, partly in line with Gauja (2016), that there might 
be the necessity to show to members and the electorate at large that some messages (or shocks8), 
be them internal or external, have been ‘heard' within the party, thus showing party organisations 
are not completely impermeable and unreformable institutions. Secondly, a substantial number 
of openings of party leader selection rules has involved the empowerment of party members or 
even of party sympathisers or voters (as shown in Chapters 2 and 3). So, we are dealing with an 
important intra-party phenomenon. 
A third reason behind the focus on party leader selection rules directly tackles the alleged 
determinants behind their opening. This dissertation revolves around the idea that two areas of 
research are of great importance to understand why parties open the rules to select their leaders. 
I am referring to party change and the personalisation of politics. Concerning the latter one, I 
argue that the personalisation of politics – for instance concerning the influence of party leaders 
in general elections or the control of party organisations by their leaders – are important 
elements one should consider to properly tackle the determinants of openings of party leader 
selection rules. Moreover, I also put forward a series of hypotheses, related to the party change 
framework, connecting some alleged determinants of changes within parties (e.g., electoral 
defeats or the organisational contagion) to the openings of party leader selection rules. In other 
words, studying the rules to select the top party heads – and their determinants – is also useful to 
bring together two important frameworks, like the party change and the personalisation of 
politics ones, and allow for potentially fertile contaminations between them.  
A fourth and final reason is connected to the consequences that more open party leader 
selection rules might have within and outside political parties. According to Marsh (1993a), more 
open selection rules might have consequences for the features of the elected leaders, for parties’ 
cohesion, and for parties’ electoral fortunes. But the possible influence of more open party 
leader selection rules goes beyond these three areas. To begin with, Kenig (2009b) and Kenig, 
Rahat and Tuttnauer (2015) discuss the proposition that more open party leader selection rules 
might bring about a higher competition in party leadership races. Then, Bernardi, Sandri and 
Seddone (2017) analyse members’ view on their membership and intra-party activism within the 
Italian Democratic Party (which is one of the Western European parties with the widest party 
leader selectorate9). More on membership, Carty and Blake (1999) analyse the possible effect of 
more open leader selection rules on Canadian parties’ membership figures, and Wauters (2015), 
                                                
8 On this specific point, see Section 3.1. 
9 On party leaders’ selectorate, see the discussion in Section 3.2. 
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analysing the selection by members of party leaders in Belgium, Israel, and Canada, focuses on 
participation rates. From a more general viewpoint, Lisi (2010), in his analysis of the openings of 
leader selection rules of Portuguese parties, tackles the effect that such processes might have on 
– say – the change in the internal distribution of power within parties, modifications in parties’ 
policy proposals, and so forth. 
Despite this rich and thriving literature, there are three consequences of the adoption of 
more open party leader selection rules that have been (partially or totally) overlooked: the 
representation styles of party leaders, the change in the responsiveness and responsibility of party 
leaders, and, finally, the legitimacy of political parties. In the concluding chapter of this 
dissertation, I expand the discussion on these three consequences, which could be interesting 
from several viewpoints. 
So, the importance of studying party leader selection rules goes well beyond the mere 
understanding of an important intra-party process (despite being a respectable aim in itself). 
Several consequences, both internal and external to political parties, are brought about by the 
adoption of more open party leader selection rules. Now, before delving deeper into the 
dissertation, the final section of this chapter briefly discusses the contents of each chapter of this 
work. 
 
1.3 Plan of the dissertation 
 
 In this final section, I present the central theme and arguments around which each chapter 
of this work revolves, to give the reader a possibly useful reading guide. In Chapter 2, I deal with 
the presentation of what the scientific literature has produced so far on party leader selection 
rules and its determinants, by focusing, among other things, on the possible importance of the 
personalisation of politics and the party change framework.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the presentation of the research design. In this chapter, I put forward 
the research question and the general framework of analysis. I investigate why parties open their 
leader selectorate from a more general viewpoint (thus considering all openings as equal), and 
why parties adopt a specific selectorate for the party leader selection. While most comparative 
analyses have merely focused on the former, this dissertation also focuses on the latter, thus 
allowing for a more detailed explanation of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the general 
framework of analysis of this work is based on a combination of insights coming from the party 
change literature, from the party leader selection literature, on an original implementation of 
factors related to the personalisation of politics, and, when necessary, on the original devising of 
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specific factors and specific variables’ operationalization. Then, in Chapter 3, I also deal with my 
dependent variable: I analyse the existing operationalizations of the selectorate, discuss their 
strengths and weaknesses, and present my operationalization of the concept. Finally, I put 
forward the original dataset I have built by collecting data on party leader selectorates between 
1985 and 2015 for the most important parties in ten Western European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the analysis of the possible factors behind the openings of 
party leader selectorates, and also to the related hypotheses and variables’ operationalization. 
Chapter 4 focuses on intra-party factors, while Chapter 5 tackles the external determinants. More 
specifically, Chapter 4 deals with leadership changes, decline in parties’ membership levels, and 
with two factors related to an original expert survey on the personalisation of politics in Western 
Europe I have contributed devising (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017). More 
specifically, given the possible importance of the personalisation of politics in fostering openings 
of party leader selectorates, and also given the lack of comparative and diachronic data on the 
topic, the expert survey has allowed me to test the impact of two personalisation-related factors: 
leaders’ effect in general elections, and the control of party organisations by their leaders.  
Finally, Chapter 4 also investigates the possible impact of parties’ ideological family on the 
openings of their leaders’ selectorates. 
While internal factors are at the centre of Chapter 4, Chapter 5 focuses on the external 
determinants of the phenomenon under study. More into detail, I deal with electoral setbacks 
(also including a novel hypothesis connecting party size and the effect of electoral setbacks on 
the openings of party leader selectorates); with the possible opposition status of political parties; 
with the ‘contagion' effect (that is, an imitative pattern of opening of party leader selectorates 
triggered by a previous opening by another party in the same system); and, finally, with a general 
effect of the personalisation of politics. By recurring to the already-mentioned expert survey on 
the personalisation of politics, Chapter 5 includes a discussion about the possible influence on 
the openings of leader selectorates of an increase in the impact of the personalisation of politics 
in a given party system. 
After having presented the possible determinants behind the openings of party leader 
selectorates in Western Europe, Chapter 6 is devoted to the empirical analysis. More into detail, I 
analyse the determinants of general openings of party leader selectorates (where all openings are 
treated as equal); then, I put forward the analysis of the determinants of the adoption of specific 
selectorates (where openings are ordered on an inclusiveness/exclusiveness continuum). Dealing 
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with a time-series cross-sectional analysis, a random-intercept logistic regression and a random-
intercept ordered logistic regression are implemented. 
Finally, Chapter 7 connects the findings emerging in Chapter 6 with the three broader 
consequences of the adoption of more open party leader selection rules discussed in the previous 
section of this chapter: possible changes in leaders’ representation styles, then the imaginable 
modification of the responsiveness and responsibility of party leaders, and, finally, the effect on 





Chapter 2 – Theoretical starting points 
 
Despite the growing academic interest towards party leader selection rules, the number of 
contributions directly focusing on their determinants is quite limited. Maybe, to have a more 
encompassing view of these factors – and also of the process of openings of party leader 
selection rules – we need to widen our scope of analysis, by including other strands of research, 
like the ones dealing with party change, or with the personalisation of politics. In this chapter, I 
set out the theoretical background of this dissertation. In other words, in this chapter, I aim at 
answering the following question: what do we already know about the changes, and the 
openings10, in party leader selection rules in Western European countries? The answers to this 
question pave the ground for the subsequent chapters, where I present the dependent variable, 
my hypotheses, the data I work with, and the empirical analysis. 
This chapter is organised as follows: in the first section, I tackle a mostly neglected but 
necessary starting point to analyse changes in party leader selection rules: the party change 
framework. Then, in the second section, the analysis of early and more recent works more 
connected to party leader selection rules is put forward. The third section, instead, deals with 
even more systematic and focused analyses of the changes (openings) in party leader selection 
rules. Finally, in the fourth section, I take into consideration a supposedly significant but 
somewhat widely speculative determinant of changes (openings) in party leader selection rules: 
the personalisation of politics. 
 
2.1 Party change and party leader selection rules 
 
‘Party change (in the broadest sense) is any variation, alteration or modification in how parties 
are organized, what human and material resources they draw upon, what they stand for and 
what they do […] Our interest is in explaining party change that comes directly from a group 
decision or from action taken by a person authorized to act for the party in that sphere. 
Examples are changes in party rules, structures, policies’ (Harmel and Janda, 1994a, p. 275).  
                                                
10 In this chapter, I use the concepts of ‘changes in party leader selection rules’, ‘openings’ of 
such rules, and ‘democratisation’ of such rules as done in the pieces of work I comment. All of 
them are supposed to have a similar meaning, although it is possible to trace some fundamental 
differences among them, as shown in the subsequent Chapter 3. For this chapter, these three 
concepts can be considered as synonymous.  
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This definition of party change fits well with the topic of this dissertation. Indeed, changes, 
and openings, in how party leaders are selected deal with some of the most important party rules, 
namely, those concerning the selection of the top official of a party. 
As a consequence, because the theoretical and empirical party change framework constitutes 
the starting point from which the analysis in this dissertation departs, this section has started 
with a quotation from the seminal contribution by Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda. 
The party change framework is the result of an effort encompassing more than ten years of 
academic production. The book Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey (Janda, 1980) directly 
deals with party leader selection rules in a broad number of political parties all over the world in 
the 1950s, early 1960s, and in 1978. Interestingly, these rules are not studied as a stand-alone 
concept or framework. On the contrary, the selection of the national leader is just one of the 8 
‘basic' variables included in the broader ‘cluster' of the centralisation of power in political parties 
(Janda, 1980, pp. 108–117). Moreover, the book by Janda comprises eleven other ‘clusters', and 
therefore we might ask ourselves why leader selection rules are not considered as a primary topic 
to investigate. In my view, the book by Janda, but also the party change framework in general, 
have a sort of ‘holistic' view of political parties: party organisations are seen as complex 
structures, and a deep, complex, and fine-grained analysis is needed to analyse such structures. 
Therefore, party leader selection rules are just one of the elements to be considered from a 
broader viewpoint. This seems confirmed by Janda himself, in the introductory part of the book, 
which directly deals with party leader selection rules (Janda, 1980, p. xii):  
 
‘[t]his work was intended to impose intellectual order upon the mass of facts about political 
parties […] Thus, the conceptual framework offered herein is as important as the facts 
amassed under it. Indeed, the data that issue from this study are the joint products of the 
conceptual framework and the factual information that it interprets. For example, the specific 
procedure used by a party for selecting its national leader is simply a fact until it is interpreted 
in the context of a continuum of variation in party practice that suggests the centralisation of 
power within the party. Thus, we assign quantitative scores to each party for many "basic" 
variables (e.g., "selecting the national leader") that serve as indicators of a smaller number of 
broader concepts (e.g., "centralization of power") that are crucial to evaluating the character of 
political parties.' (text in italics in the original version). 
 
A follow-up conundrum would, therefore, be related to understanding why party leader 
selection rules were not considered as important as today. My proposal to solve this puzzle has 
already been given in Chapter 1: just to reiterate it, the point is that, up to recent years, party 
	 18 
leaders (and political leaders in general) were not as important as today for democratic politics 
and, therefore, for comparative political analysis. 
In a subsequent book, Harmel and Janda (1982) directly deal with party change, and also 
with the ‘centralisation of power’ cluster, where party leader selection rules are located. In this 
contribution, the two authors underline that the ideology, cohesion, organisation, and 
decentralisation of the political parties included in their study can be explained by three sets of 
factors: individual-level ones (e.g. the features and the actions of political leaders), party-level 
ones (e.g. a party's ideology), and, finally, system-level factors. These latter factors can, in turn, be 
physical (like the size of a country), socioeconomic (i.e. the degree of urbanisation of a polity), 
and, more crucially for this dissertation, political ones (e.g. the structure of party competition).  
Two chapters of the Harmel and Janda's book are of interest here: firstly, the one where 
party organisational structure (also called ‘party complexity') is causally connected to a series of 
factors (more noticeably, the electoral system and the degree of party competition). Secondly, the 
chapter linked to party decentralisation, which is thought to be influenced by some factors, such 
as the size of a country, the federal-unitary institutional setting or the federal-unitary nature of 
the system. Despite the presence of factors which are not (or are seldom) considered as drivers 
of changes in party leader selection rules (e.g. the degree of party competition or the electoral 
system), Harmel and Janda's book is extremely interesting because it is one of the first major 
contributions where the determinants of party change are extensively analysed.   
A second valuable, albeit largely neglected, pioneering contribution for the party change 
framework is the paper by Janda (1990), which anticipates some of the themes later subsequently 
analysed by many scholars: the idea is that ‘defeat is the mother of party change’ (Janda, 1990, p. 
6). This is not entirely new, Janda himself acknowledges the importance of previous works in 
this regard, like the ones by Mair (1983) and Panebianco (1988). Nonetheless, this paper is 
extremely relevant because it sets out some crucial elements that will become classical in later 
analyses of party change and of party leader selection rules. For instance, the idea that party 
change is ‘asymmetrically' related to electoral changes: electorally successful parties rarely change, 
while the harder the electoral setback (either in terms of loss of votes or seats, or in terms of lack 
of control/participation in government), the more likely a change; furthermore, parties, possibly 
after an electoral setback, may imitate what other parties do in the same system. Apart from 
these propositions, Janda sets out some other possible independent variables, along with 
electoral setbacks and ‘imitation strategies', that may explain party change: shifts in the political 
system (e.g. electoral systems), a party's institutionalisation, changes in party leadership. This is 
just the start of the development of a more complex framework of analysis, put forward in two 
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popular subsequent journal articles: the one by Harmel and Janda (1994a) and the one by Harmel 
et al. (1995). 
Let us start with the article by Harmel and Janda published in 1994. Here, the two authors 
lengthily describe the architecture of their party change framework. The main argument is that 
party change can be driven by external or internal factors. Then, three general premises are put 
forward (Harmel and Janda, 1994a, pp. 265–266). Firstly, each party has a primary goal: 
maximising the votes; maximising the offices; advocating specific policies and (or) ideologies; 
fostering intra-party democracy11. Secondly, a party experiences the strongest changes when an 
external shock hits it. This does not mean that only external shocks trigger party changes, but that 
the deepest changes are driven by something happening outside of the party. Thirdly, an external 
shock is a stimulus impacting the primary goal of a party. Different external shocks are related to 
different primary goals. 
Moreover, two additional main points of their theory must be recalled: first, parties are 
conservative organisations, that do not change just for the sake of it and, second, party change is 
imposed on the party by its dominant coalition (Harmel and Janda, 1994a, pp. 261–262). Before 
delving deeper into the discussion, the reader may have noticed that there are clear resemblances 
with Panebianco's framework of analysis (1988). This is not an accident: Harmel and Janda 
themselves recognise such similarities (1994a, pp. 262–265), and one of the reasons they put 
forward to justify their systematisation of party change vis-à-vis Panebianco’s scheme is 
convincing: external stimuli must be adequately and carefully devised (and analysed, I would 
add). Given they devote quite some space to this topic, this is why their framework of analysis is 
carefully considered in this chapter.  
It has just been underlined that, in Harmel and Janda’s framework, different party goals are 
related to different external stimuli. In other words, not all parties have the same aims, and even 
the stimuli to which they strongly respond to are different. In particular, Harmel and Janda 
connect the four ‘ideal-types’ of parties to four different kinds of external stimuli (1994a, pp. 
269–271). Firstly, for parties mainly interested in obtaining votes in general elections, the clear 
external shock is an electoral failure, albeit the authors do not set precise thresholds to define a 
loss of votes as a ‘failure’. Secondly, for those parties whose primary goal is obtaining seats in 
general elections, an external shock is losing executive positions, measured in the number of 
ministries or the percentage of cabinet positions lost. Thirdly, if a party wants to put forward 
specific policies or ideologies, a different type of external shock must be considered; specifically, 
                                                
11 This is also in line with other approaches in political science and comparative politics (e.g. see 
Riker, 1962; Strøm, 1990). 
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one that makes party members, activists and elites questioning the possibility to put forward the 
same policies or ideologies in the future. The authors make explicit reference to the fall of the 
Soviet Union for Communist parties or the reduction in nuclear weapons for Green parties. 
Finally, if the primary goal of a party is representing members’ views (and therefore, they argue, 
fostering intra-party democracy), then an external shock is a profound societal change that brings 
members’ view to be modified, or a sharp decline in party membership figures. 
Nevertheless, in Harmel and Janda's framework, there are also non-external stimuli. In 
particular, two ‘internal stimuli', or intra-party independent variables, are added: leadership 
change and the age of a party (1994a, pp. 266–267). This theory is quite complex, and it is 
carefully developed by the authors12. It is tested in a subsequent contribution (Harmel et al., 
1995), which analyses party changes in six parties, three British ones13 and three German ones14, 
between 1950 and 1990. Here I am specifically interested in the hypotheses put forward by the 
authors. They are related to three distinct areas of research: electoral performance, leadership 
change, and shifts in a party’s dominant faction. Specifically, the authors posit that party change 
is ‘proximally preceded by poor electoral performance’ (Harmel et al., 1995, p. 3)15, and that a 
poor electoral performance has a wider impact on larger parties than on smaller ones – thus 
assuming, following Harmel and Janda (1994a), that bigger parties are more leaning towards the 
‘vote-seeking’ primary goal category. Moreover, a change in a party’s leader ‘is proximally 
followed by party change’ (Harmel et al., 1995, p. 5), and this effect is stronger for more 
centralised parties, i.e. where party leaders have more power (Harmel et al., 1995, p. 7), while, 
concerning the changes in a party’s dominant faction, they are associated with party change 
(Harmel et al., 1995, p. 8).  
Surprisingly, the results of the empirical analysis seem not to confirm the fundamental role 
played by external factors, as previously argued by Harmel and Janda (1994a): electoral 
performance does indeed play a role, but the influence of changes in party leaders and a party’s 
dominant faction should be carefully considered as well (Harmel et al., 1995, p. 18). Similar 
conclusions are reached by Müller (1997) in his analysis of the Austrian SPÖ between the mid-
                                                
12 More than 20 specific propositions are reported by the authors, here I have just reported the 
bulk of Harmel and Janda’s theory. 
13 The Conservative party, the Labour party, and the Liberal Party. 
14 The German Christian Democratic Union (the CDU), the Social-Democratic Party of 
Germany (the SPD), and the Free Democratic Party (the FDP). 
15 Where ‘proximally’ means two years before the year of the party change (Harmel et al., 1995, 
pp. 20–21). 
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1940s and 1970: leadership change is a crucial factor to understand party change, while the role 
of electoral setbacks should be downplayed. On the contrary, a more reductionist approach 
concerning the effect of leadership change is put forward by Bille (1997) in his analysis of the 
Danish Social-Democratic Party. All in all, this matter clearly requires further empirical 
investigation.  
There are a series of considerations that can be drawn from this analysis of the party change 
framework. This scheme is of paramount importance to analyse party leader selection rules, 
because it sets a clear, logical and coherent path through which empirical tests of the 
determinants of party change (and therefore of openings of party leader selection rules) can be 
performed16. Many subsequent works, dealing with party leader selection rules, widely use of this 
framework of analysis, either in an explicit or in an implicit way, as seen later on. 
Nonetheless, the party change framework presents some issues that require further 
discussion as well: for instance, one crucial problem is how to understand which specific primary 
aim a party has. This is an important task to be performed if someone wants to empirically 
employ this section of the party change theory17. A second, albeit minor, problem is related to 
the identification of the dominant faction within a specific party in a particular period. A third 
issue is the ‘balance of power' between internal and external factors: in the 1994 contribution, 
                                                
16 A small digression is needed: the reader may have noticed the absence of references to another 
strand of the party change framework, the one connected to the study and the devising of 
existing and new party models (or party families). The classical references here are the works by 
Duverger (1964), Kirchheimer (1969), Panebianco (1988), Katz and Mair (1995, 2009), Carty 
(2004), and so forth. Useful rejoinders and more recent theorisations can be found in Krouwel 
(2012) and Lisi (2015). The reason for this lack of discussion is that these works analyse general 
models of party organisations, where the (lack of) changes in party leader selection rules – or, 
more generally speaking, these rules per se – are only a part of a more general framework of 
analysis. The presence, or the dominance, of a particular party model, instead of another one, is 
simply thought to bring about (or to be associated with) the existence of specific configurations 
of party leader selection rules. In other words, the general aim of these works is understanding 
why some party organisational models are more or less successful in specific countries or historical 
periods; on the contrary, the purpose of this dissertation is understanding why the openings of party 
leader selection rules happen or not. This is why the models mentioned in this footnote are not 
lengthily discussed in this work. 
17 For a discussion of the strategies of the so-called ‘niche parties’, see Meguid (2008) and 
Adams, Ezrow and Leiter (2012). 
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Harmel and Janda seem to give more importance to the latter ones while, conversely, the 1995 
article by Harmel et al. appears to attribute a higher rank to internal factors. In this section, but 
more importantly in the subsequent ones, the matter of the importance of internal vs external 
factors in driving changes in party leader selection rules is a central one. Moreover, another 
confirmation of the centrality of this debate is given by the fact that this is one of the starting 
points of a significant contribution: the recently published book by Anika Gauja on 
organisational reforms in Australia and the UK (2016). 
The book of Gauja represents a very stimulating approach to party change: she analyses the 
reforms in four intra-party areas (membership, candidate selection, leader selection, policy-
making) in six Australian and British parties18. Her analysis, relying on the framework by Barnea 
and Rahat (2007) is divided into two main steps: identifying the main drivers of the reform at 
different levels, and the alignment or de-alignment of such drivers, which can facilitate or hinder 
the reforms. Finally, she also considers the role of actors within the party in ‘manipulating’ the 
alignment/de-alignment of factors. 
Focusing on the first step, three levels of analysis must be considered: firstly, the intra-party 
one, where the more important factors explaining party reform are the willingness to increase or 
give more power to party members, the necessity to take away power from intra-party groups, 
and the respect of the ideology and organisational tradition of the party. The second level of 
analysis is the ‘competitive’ one, namely the party system one: here, for Gauja, the most 
important drivers for reform are the possibility to obtain electoral benefits, the organisational 
contagion19, and the reaction to political scandals. The final level of analysis is the systemic one: 
reforms are made to cope with general societal trends, such as the decline in political ideologies 
or parties' membership, and the changes in political participation. 
The book by Gauja is extremely helpful to consider for many reasons. To begin with, she 
puts forward the internal and external drivers for party reform (party change), in some cases with 
                                                
18 In some specific parts of the book, a slightly wider comparison – which also includes the 
Social-Democratic parties of Germany and New Zealand – is put forward. 
19 The ‘contagion effect’ is a well-known concept in party politics: according to Duverger (1964), 
left parties’ organisational structures would have been eventually imitated by other parties 
coming from different parts of the political spectrum; from the exactly opposite viewpoint, 
Epstein (1967) writes about a contagion from the right concerning the right parties’ renewed 
organisational and electoral structures. The concept is subsequently used and expanded by other 
authors, more noticeably Panebianco (1988) and, with a perspective which is closer to the one 
adopted in this dissertation, by Janda (1990), Cross and Blais (2012), and Pilet and Cross (2014b). 
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very compelling intuitions or operationalizations, that somewhat include the most important 
determinants the scholarship has devised so far (and are extensively analysed in this chapter). 
Secondly, she shows – either from an exclusively theoretical or also relying on her analysis – that 
some alleged crucial determinants of party change (and of changes in party leader selection 
rules), like party age, the personalisation of politics, or the ‘Americanization' of politics, have a 
quite modest – if any – impact on the party reforms she analyses. This is a quite surprising result, 
and is extensively discussed in the fourth section of this chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5 as well. 
Moreover, Gauja's considerations must also be read in light of the facts that she does not 
exclusively analyse changes in party leader selection rules, and that she performs a qualitative, in-
depth analysis on a small number of parties. Whether these conclusions also hold for party leader 
selection rules in a bigger number of Western European parties is something that requires a 
careful empirical analysis. 
The party change framework is a valuable starting point for the analysis of party leader 
selection rules. Nonetheless, it is not the only strand of research that this dissertation considers: 
many works have more directly dealt with party leader selection rules. Given their non-
systematic nature (most of such works analyse just one country, or more than one country but 
without a truly comparative perspective), I have decided to tackle them after having presented 
the more coherent and encompassing party change framework. Therefore, these works 
constitute the bulk of the next section. 
 
2.2 The origins of the species: non-systematic studies on party leader selection 
rules 
 
In this section, I deal with both earlier and more recent non-systematic works on party 
leader selection rules. In some cases, party leader selection rules only constitute a small portion 
of a wider framework of analysis. In other situations, just a single case or a limited number of 
cases of party leader selection rules are considered, often without a comparative or a diachronic 
perspective. Yet, it is worthy to devote some space to such studies, both because they have 
influenced more systematic analyses on party leader selection rules (that constitute the core of 
Section 2.3), and also because such non-systematic studies are related to my hypotheses and 
empirical analysis. 
Tracing the roots of the scholarship devoted to the study of party leader selection rules is 
not an easy task. A good starting point could be an excerpt from Duverger’s book on parties and 
party systems (1964, p. 135): ‘Officially the party leaders are almost always elected by the 
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members and given a fairly short period of office, in accordance with democratic rules’. 
Duverger himself recognises this is not always true, especially for Fascist parties and for those 
parties whose internal organisation resembles a ‘disguised autocracy’, like the Gaullist party at 
that time. Nonetheless, this signals that the selection of party leaders by the congress (assuming 
Duverger is not referring to direct leadership election by party members, which appears in 
Europe only in the early 1970s) is thought to be a sort of ‘standard’ procedure, notwithstanding 
all the possible exceptions. Duverger does not devote much space in his book to the analysis of 
party leader selection rules, and that is why we have to travel forward in time to find more 
substantial and organic analyses. 
Indeed, I have already lengthily analysed the framework devised by Janda (1980, 1990), 
Harmel and Janda (1982, 1994a), and by Harmel et al. (1995): in those cases, party leadership 
selection rules constitute just one variable within a cluster of analysis (parties’ centralisation of 
power). No specific hypotheses or assumptions on party leader selection rules are brought about 
in these contributions, but the data collected for these works signal a slight increase in scholars’ 
interest towards party leader selection rules. 
Going forward in this quest, two important events shape the analysis of the selection of 
party leaders at the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s: the publication of series of stand-
alone contributions stemming from a Workshop held at the 1989 ECPR Joint Sessions in Paris, 
and the appearance of the books edited by Katz and Mair (1992, 1994) on party organisations in 
Europe between 1960 and 1990.  
More specifically, after the above-mentioned ECPR Workshop, a series of journal articles 
are published between 1991 and 1993. In these contributions, the authors analyse the existing 
rules, the possible changes in such rules, the characteristics of the leadership races and the party 
leaders, and, finally, the consequences of rules' changes. Following a chronological order, the 
first contribution is the article by Müller and Meth-Cohn (1991) on party leader selection in 
Austria: the analysis focuses on leader selection rules in the three most important Austrian 
parties at that time: the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ), the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), and 
the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) between the end of the Second World War and the late 
1980s. The authors start by analysing the ‘democratisation’ of party leader’s ‘selectorate’20 in the 
SPÖ in 1967: in that year, a reform empowered the party congress with the power to ratify the 
choice of the party leadership made by the party executive, allegedly with the aim of giving more 
power to the regional branches of the party (Müller and Meth-Cohn, 1991, p. 42). It is also 
                                                
20 The selectorate is the group of people that elects the party leader. Its operationalization is 
extensively discussed in the next chapter.  
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worth noticing that in this article there is one of the first discussions of the ‘democratisation’ of 
party leadership selection rules, which the authors connect to the degree of inclusion of party 
members and activists in the selection of the party leader (Müller and Meth-Cohn, 1991, p. 55)21.  
After this stand-alone contribution, the other articles from the ECPR Workshop are 
published in a special issue of the European Journal of Political Research in 1993. While some 
contributions do not directly tackle the reasons behind the (lack of) changes in party leader 
selection rules (Colomé and Lopez Nieto, 1993; Strøm, 1993; Thiebault, 1993), the remaining 
articles are of interest for this dissertation. To begin with, De Winter (1993) deals with party 
leader selection in Belgian parties: some of the conclusions of his work are that factional 
struggles and country-specific features (i.e. the necessity to manage post-electoral coalitions in 
‘smoke-filled rooms' without the possible disruptions caused by leaders elected by a wider 
selectorate) may help to explain the (lack of) openings of party leader selection rules.  
A different road is taken by Punnett (1993) who, analysing party leaders in the United 
Kingdom, concludes that three mains reasons are behind the openings of the rules to select the 
party leader in the Labour party: an ideological conflict between more democracy-leaning 
activists and more ‘conservative’ cadres, a factional conflict between the more leftist and the 
more rightist factions within the party, and, finally, a modification in the composition of the 
parliamentary party; finally, Marsh’s analysis (1993b) considers other possible causes for the 
changes in party leader selection rules in the Irish Labour party: the dislike of the coalition 
governments by party activists and the example set by the British Labour party (which changed – 
and opened – its leader selection rules in 1981). It is very engaging to notice that a broad range 
of possible causes for the openings of party leader selection rules is considered by different 
authors, and that different weight is given to external and to internal factors: basically, up to 
now, there is not a single study that includes the same determinants (and that gives them the 
same importance) to explain the opening of the rules to select party leaders. This might be clearly 
                                                
21 Interestingly, Müller and Meth-Cohn explicitly posit that the democratisation of the party 
leader’s selectorate excludes the expansion of the right to select the party leader to party voters. 
In authors’ own words, ‘[t]urning to the actual practice of leadership selection, it is clear that the 
observation Duverger made almost forty years ago is still valid today […] This is so even in the 
narrow definition of intra-party democracy in which the leadership selection process is deemed 
to be the more democratic the more it encourages the participation of members and activists 
(i.e., excluding the electorate as a whole), and to be the more oligarchical, the more party 
members and activists are excluded from leadership selection’ (Müller and Meth-Cohn, 1991, p. 
55).  
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related to the fact that the analysis of party leader selection rules is a quite recent topic in 
comparative politics and political science.   
A very partial exception, and only limited to a theoretical discussion, is the introductory part 
of the book by Punnett (1992) on the selection of party leaders in the United Kingdom. 
According to the author, the ‘leader-selection method that a party uses at any particular time will 
be a product of broad historical, constitutional, organizational and ideological factors that have 
been modified by immediate practical considerations’ (Punnett, 1992, p. 20): more specifically, 
younger parties, parties in a presidential system (US or France), parties in opposition22, parties 
with many members, and parties more linked to ‘new politics’ may have more open selection 
procedures. Unfortunately, the book does not further discuss the role of these determinants in a 
comparative perspective – and we should not be surprised, given Punnett’s analysis focuses on 
British parties.  
A further step towards a comparative analysis of Western European parties’ leader selection 
rules – and, more generally speaking, of Western European party organisations – is the project 
led by Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, which results in two seminal contributions. The first one 
is the 1992 book (Katz and Mair, 1992) which collects data on party organisations in a wide 
number of Western European democracies between 1960 and 1990. This book deserves a brief 
mention because, for the first time, three decades of data on party leader selection rules for many 
Western European parties are collected and made available to researchers23. This remarkable 
effort leads to the subsequent book, edited by Katz and Mair themselves (1994), which analyses 
the data presented in the previous contribution. The 1994 book is relevant for the aims of this 
dissertation for a number of reasons: not only does it include many country-specific analyses on 
                                                
22 In a similar vein, Davis (1998, pp. 92-93-100), analysing the openings of party leader selection 
rules in the UK, posits that a factional struggle is at the base of the openings of the Labour party 
in the 1980s and in the Conservative party in 1990s, but such conflict is crucially fostered by 
electoral setbacks; conversely, in the German case a series of electoral setbacks alone are 
considered as important to trigger the short-lived change in party leader selection rules within 
the SPD in 1993 (Davis, 1998, pp. 120–121). 
23 Notice that Janda’s data are available only for a more limited number of countries and years, 
and party leader selection rules only constitute a variable within a quite wider ‘cluster’ – as seen 
before. On the contrary, not only are Katz and Mair’s data available for more countries and 
parties, but there is also more information available to researchers (in most cases information on 
who can put himself/herself as a candidate is available, along with the more common 
information on who can select the party leader). 
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who the party leader is and how he/she is selected, but the introductory chapter by Mair (1994) 
also prepares the ground for many subsequent contributions on party organizations and party 
leader selection rules. Indeed, this chapter starts by recalling and summarising the discussion by 
Katz and Mair (1993) on the three faces of party organizations (the Party on the Ground, or 
POG, the Party in Public Office, or PPO, and the Party in Central Office – PCO)24: the first 
signs of shrinking membership figures for Western European parties, and the fact that party 
activists are increasingly ‘atypical’, non-representative of the party at large25, may foster a reduced 
legitimacy for the PCO, and therefore also of the party leader (Katz and Mair, 1993, p. 615).  
Alongside this trend, Mair explores the expanding selection power given to party members 
in the party leader selection process: ‘more and more parties now seem willing to allow the 
ordinary members a voice in the selection of party leaders’ (1994, p. 15). It is the first time that a 
significant contribution in comparative politics posits a ‘trend’ towards more open party leader 
selection rules can be detected in Western Europe. Such proposition is subsequently confirmed 
by Hazan (2002) and by Pilet and Cross (2014b). Mair also puts forward a tentative explanation 
for this trend: the necessity to take away power from ‘troublesome’ activists in favour of more 
docile and less organised rank-and-file: a ‘façade’ democratisation, in order to let the PPO and 
the PCO have more room for manoeuvre (Mair, 1994, p. 16)26. Unfortunately, Mair does not 
further develop this point, and neither does he devotes a lot of space to a wider analysis, for 
instance by tackling the role of declining party membership figures in fostering the opening of 
party leader selection rules27.  
                                                
24 Unnecessary though it sounds, the Party on the Ground is made by party members – for 
parties with formal ‘mass’ membership (Katz and Mair, 1993, p. 597) - while the Party in Public 
Office consist of MPs and members of a government (Katz and Mair, 1993, p. 594), and, finally, 
the Party in Central Office corresponds to the ‘national executive committee or committees, and 
the central party staff or secretariat’ (Katz and Mair, 1993, pp. 598–599). 
25 On the differences one can expect to find among party activists, party members, and party 
voters, between party elites and party’s lower strata, and between party selectors and party 
voters, see Key (1956), Butler (1960), May (1972), Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006) and 
Martocchia Diodati and Marino (2017).  
26 A similar line of reasoning is subsequently put forward by Faucher and Treille (2003) in their 
analysis of the patterns of leadership selection in the British Labour party and in the French 
Socialist party between the early 1990s and early 2000s.  
27 It is Tan (1997) who directly analyses the relationship between changes in membership figures 
and parties’ changes in their organisational complexity and centralisation of power; let us recall 
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Nonetheless, Mair’s analysis must be carefully considered for another reason: the attention 
devoted to the different faces of party organisations underlines that different party faces can 
have different fates. In other words, not only should we carefully consider the role of the party 
faces in analysing intra-party phenomena, including the modifications of party leader selection 
rules, but we should also bear in mind that a declining party membership (that is, a declining 
Party on the Ground) can go hand in hand with a rising Party in Public Office or, more 
importantly for this work, with an increasingly powerful Party in Central Office (viz. more 
powerful party leaders). The point here is not that parties are non-unitary actors: this has been a 
well-known proposition in comparative politics for many decades (Belloni and Beller, 1976; 
Laver and Benoit, 2003; Ceron, 2012). Rather, it is possible to separately consider the role of 
different party faces in trying to explain the openings of party leader selection rules. Indeed, 
while Katz and Mair’s thesis (1993, 1995) is that of a more and more powerful PPO and a 
substantially declining PCO, in more recent years, many scholars have underlined that party 
leaders have become more and more central from the electoral, governmental, and party-related 
viewpoint, and this may be connected to party leader selection rules, as I show in Section 2.4 
later in this chapter.  
Going forward, one does not find substantial works on party leader selection rules for some 
years, with some notable exceptions. For instance, in the book by Davis (1998) on leadership 
selection in six Western countries (US, Canada, the UK, Germany, France, and Australia), the 
discussion on the determinants of changes in party leader selection rules is quite limited (see 
footnote 13); then, the articles by Carty and Blake (1999), Kenig (2009b), and Seddone and 
                                                                                                                                                  
Tan follows the framework devised by Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, and therefore party 
leader selection rules constitute a variable within the ‘centralisation of power’. Nonetheless, to 
find an explicit link between changes in membership figures and party leader selection rules we 
have to travel towards the 2010s. Indeed, the well-known contribution by Van Biezen, Mair and 
Poguntke (2012, pp. 39–40), devoted to the analysis of the then-evident decline in party 
membership figures, underlines that the spread of more open procedures to select party leaders 
and candidates for general elections may be related to the changing membership patterns in 
Western European parties in the 1980s and 1990s and to the necessity to have more chances to 
get votes coming from a less encapsulated electorate. Then, Scarrow (2014) explicitly posits that 
declining membership figures may push parties to open their leader selection rules to make party 
membership more appealing for foreseeable future members or for existing ones. On the 
relationship between party membership decline and openings of leader selection rules, see also 
Wauters (2014) in the upcoming Section 2.3 and, for a detailed analysis, Section 4.2. 
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Venturino (2013) are totally devoted to the consequences of openings of party leader selection 
rules, while in the contribution  by LeDuc (2001) only a brief point on the importance of 
electoral setbacks in fostering openings of party leader selection rules is brought about.  
Nonetheless, in 2010, Marco Lisi publishes an article on the determinants of the 
‘democratisation’ of party leader selection rules in Portuguese parties. This contribution is 
stimulating because it sets out a partly new framework of analysis28. Three levels (or arenas) are 
thought to be crucial to analyse the openings of these rules: the political system one, the party 
system one, and the party organisation one (Lisi, 2010, pp. 129–132). More specifically, at the 
political system level, three determinants are considered: firstly, the necessity to increase a party’s 
legitimacy and to introduce collective incentives, so as to increase satisfaction with political 
parties and to raise participation in intra-party decision-making processes; then, the 
presidentialisation of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005a), in the sense that the aim is to foster 
leader-oriented electoral campaigns; finally, the need for increase intra-party democracy so as to 
give more power to party members.  
Going downwards, at the party system level, two factors are included: firstly, the necessity to 
reshuffle party policies towards party voters and members, to: bring about a policy change, make 
governments more efficient, and increase party leaders' responsiveness. Secondly, the willingness 
to fight an electoral setback to have more chances of a future electoral success. 
Finally, at the party organizational level, we find, firstly, the necessity both to increase 
leaders’ autonomy, especially in a cartel party framework (Katz and Mair, 1995), and to reduce 
the power of middle-level activists, so as to foster power centralisation and the de-mobilisation 
of such activists, as previously seen in Mair (1994); secondly, Lisi considers the necessity to 
decrease party fragmentation, thus limiting intra-party conflicts. Some considerations can be 
easily drawn. First of all, it is very hard to test the influence of some specific factors (e.g. the 
necessity to increase intra-party democracy by empowering party members) in a more-than-small 
number of parties, given the very in-depth analyses that would be needed. Secondly, some 
determinants seem to work in opposite direction: how to reconcile the presidentialisation of 
politics (which shall include an increase in leaders' power and/or autonomy) with both the factor 
aiming at increasing the leader's autonomy and reducing the power of middle level activists, and 
also with the factor according to which the openings of party leader selection rules may 
                                                
28 The framework partly resembles that of Barnea and Rahat (2007), which I have decided not to 
extensively analyse here because it specifically deals with changes (openings) in candidate selection 
rules. Nonetheless, when specific reference is made to some determinants of openings of party 
leader selection rules that resemble those in Barnea and Rahat, it is clearly acknowledged. 
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empower party members? Are we sure that both the party leaders and the party members can be 
empowered, also given the increasing importance of leaders in contemporary parties? Despite 
these issues, the article by Lisi (2010) is extremely helpful, also considering his findings: the 
‘direct' leadership selection (that is, the selection of the party leader by party members – or even 
by party voters) is driven by a strategic calculus of party elites and by imitative patterns 
(contagion), mainly to increase parties' electoral fortunes.  
Along with the contributions analysed in this section, the study of party leader selection 
rules (and of their determinants) has also significantly benefitted from three books published in 
the early- and mid-2010s. Indeed, the works by Cross and Blais (2012), Pilet and Cross (2014b), 
and Cross and Pilet (2015) constitutes the ‘final wave’ of studies concerning party leaders and 
their selection rules. Given the importance of these contributions, and their more systematic 
nature, they are the core of the next subsection. 
 
2.3 The ‘final wave’ of studies on party leader selection rules 
 
‘What is missing [from the existing literature] is a systematic, cross-national examination of 
the ways in which parties select and remove their leaders’ (Cross & Blais, 2012, p. 5). This quote 
from the book Politics at the Centre by Andrè Blais and William P. Cross explains why in a three-
year span, from 2012 until 2015, three books on party leader selection rules are published. Apart 
from the 2012 book, two subsequent works are published: a book edited by Jean-Benoit Pilet 
and William P. Cross on country-specific analyses of party leader selection rules in a wide 
number of Western democracies (Pilet and Cross, 2014b), and a book edited by William P. Cross 
and Jean-Benoit Pilet, particularly focusing on the causes and consequences of different party 
leader selection rules (Cross & Pilet, 2015). Let us start with the 2012 book. 
The work by Blais and Cross (2012) deals with party leader selection rules in the most 
important parties of five Anglo-Saxon democracies (the UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand) between 1965 and 2008. This book is of interest for some reasons, some of which 
are evident in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, but primarily because an extremely wide 
variety of data is collected, and some tentative explanations for long-term (lack of) openings of 
party leader selection rules are put forward. Concerning the first point, the book provides data 
on a wide array of rules: who selects the party leader, on the determinants of the changes in party 
leader selectorate, on the requisites for putting forward a candidacy for this chair, on the features 
and rules of party leadership races, on the ending of party leaderships (thanks to retirements, 
resignations, or removals). Unfortunately, such information is scattered throughout the book, 
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and no online or printed appendix is available, but this is just a small problem, given the 
noticeable amount of data available: for the first time, the Katz and Mair's dataset (1992) is 
extended towards present days, at least concerning party leader selection rules in two Western 
European countries, the UK and Ireland. Secondly, the book provides some descriptive evidence 
as an attempt to explain why parties expand their leader selectorate: parties in the five above-
mentioned countries open their selectorate after an electoral setback and while being in 
opposition, while limited evidence is available for the hypothesis according to which there is a 
‘contagion effect’ at work; conversely, no evidence is found in support of another hypothesis, 
according to which newer parties are more likely to adopt a wider selectorate than older parties.  
The conclusions by Cross and Blais (2012) are tested by Meyer and Odom (2016), whose 
article focuses on the five countries included in the book by Cross and Blais, and by Wauters 
(2014) who analyses the party leader elections in Belgium where party members are allowed to 
select the party leader. Starting from the former article, the analysis on the most important 
parties in the UK, Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, brings about the conclusion that 
the expansion of the selectorate for the party leadership is mainly driven by the levels of electoral 
regionalisation of a party (given this would signal a reduction in the national appeal and scope of 
a party, and so it could be easily related to a strong electoral setback, in turn fostering an intra-
party process of change), while a ‘normal’ electoral setback and opposition periods play a smaller 
role.  
Passing to Wauters’ article, he interestingly recalls a point made by Scarrow, Webb and 
Wattenberg (2000): when party elites are pushed to give away the power to select the party 
leader, they tend to do so by avoiding party conferences (i.e. party congresses) and directly 
empowering party members, thus avoiding the middle-level activists (recalling the now-well-
known argument by Mair (1994). Whether this is true or not is a question left to the subsequent 
chapters of this work. The point here is that Wauters tests whether the empowering of party 
members follows the framework devised by Cross and Blais (2012). The author, therefore, 
studies the role of the opposition status of a party, of its age, of the contagion effect, and, 
interestingly, of electoral setbacks, connecting them to a logical but hitherto neglected argument: 
the importance and the size of the parliamentary party may be deeply affected by an electoral 
setback (thus updating the argument set out in the party change framework). As a consequence, 
the power of the parliamentary party in retaining its (possible) power in selecting the party leader 
may be shrunk by unsatisfactory electoral setbacks. Finally, Wauters adds a fifth determinant: the 
decline in party membership figures, which may affect party leader selectorate given that the 
party may want to fight such decline or keep old members in by giving them more power in an 
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allegedly crucial intra-party arena. The main results of his analysis are somewhat surprising: while 
electoral setbacks seem not to play a role, in some cases electoral victories may be important in 
fostering the openings of party leader selection rules towards party membership's selection of 
leaders. On the contrary, the contagion effect seems to be a strong determinant of these 
openings, while this cannot be said with regards to declining membership figures, which only 
have a secondary role. Wauters conclude by positing that such allegedly deviating results may be 
related to specific features of Belgium (namely, its consensual framework and the already-weak 
power of parliamentary parties). These two articles, that somewhat ‘stem' from Cross and Blais' 
work, remind us of the importance of considering both internal and external factors in 
explaining party leader selection rules. 
After the analysis of party leader selection rules in the five Anglo-Saxon countries 
performed by Cross and Blais (2012), a step forward towards an encompassing collection of data 
on these rules in Western Europe is represented by the book edited by Jean-Benoit Pilet and 
William P. Cross (2014b), The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary Parliamentary 
Democracies. It analyses party leaders’ features and the rules for their selection and deselection in 
13 democracies (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Norway, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, and the UK) between 1965 and 2012. This marks a discontinuity with 
the preceding work by Cross and Blais (2012): indeed, in Pilet and Cross’ book, each chapter 
follows a similar structure, with a description of who the party leader is29, followed by a 
description of the party leader selectorate and of its changes over time, the features and the 
dynamics of party leadership races, and the demographics and tenure of party leaders. The book 
also has a very detailed online appendix, which provides a lot of information on party leadership 
selection rules and races. These data confirm two pieces of evidence already put forward in 
preceding contributions: there is surely a trend towards more open party leader selection rules in 
Western countries, but the scope of this trend and number of parties involved greatly varies30.  
Nonetheless, the importance of this book is not limited to the richness of data; on the 
contrary, in the final chapter of the book, Pilet and Cross put forward some tentative 
explanations to understand why parties adopt more open party leader selection rules (2014a): 
political parties in the 13 countries considered seem to open their leader selection rules when 
they are in opposition, or after an electoral setback, while a minor and less decisive role seems to 
be that of the age of parties, their political orientation, and the ‘contagion effect'. Nonetheless, 
                                                
29 This issue is far from being trivial in some Western European parties, as seen in the next 
chapter. 
30 In some countries, like Norway, no change at all can be detected in the period under study. 
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these explanations are simply put forward via a descriptive analysis. Therefore, clear causal 
patterns cannot be detected.  This issue is dealt with in the subsequent book edited by the two 
scholars. 
Indeed, in the book edited by Cross and Pilet (2015), The Politics of Party Leadership: A Cross-
National Perspective, some authors try to propose detailed analyses to understand why parties have 
(or have changed) their leader selection rules.  
To begin with, Lisi, Freire and Barberà (2015) try to understand the relationship between, 
on the one hand, changes in party leader selectorate and, on the other hand, some organisational 
and ideological party characteristics. They bring about six hypotheses to be tested via bivariate 
correlations: first, starting from previous studies (e.g. see Astudillo Ruiz, 2012; Krouwel, 2012), 
‘radical left/libertarian parties are more likely to adopt more inclusive rules of leadership 
selection, while communist, conservatives/ Christian democrats, and radical right parties have 
more centralized and restricted methods’ (Lisi, Freire and Barberà, 2015, p. 15); second, being a 
regionalist party does not affect the type of selection method used; third, from the mid-1950s 
until 2012, parties tend to have more inclusive party leader selection rules, apart from the 
communists and those on the radical right which, on the contrary, tend to have less inclusive 
rules (even in this case the insights come from Krouwel, 2012); their fourth hypothesis is slightly 
more complicated than the first three, arguing that left-leaning and centre-leaning parties should 
be more likely to give their congresses, members, or voters the power to select the party leader, 
while right-leaning parties should be more likely to have more exclusive rules to select this organ 
(this insight comes from Astudillo Ruiz, 2012); the fifth hypothesis argues that left-leaning 
parties should be more likely to change their leader selection rules than right-leaning ones; 
finally, and this is the sixth hypothesis, parties in newer democracies should present more 
exclusive rules to select the party leader.  
The empirical analysis, performed on the data already presented in the book edited by Pilet 
and Cross (2014b), finds empirical confirmation for the first three hypotheses, only partial 
confirmation for the fourth and fifth ones, and no confirmation at all for the last hypothesis. For 
the first time, there is a test of a very detailed set of hypotheses related to parties’ ideological 
positioning, albeit the sixth hypothesis and, at least partly, the second one, seem not very in line 
with a study focusing on the ideological standing of a political formation. There is surely much 
food for thought here: the relationship between a party’s ideological family and its rules to select 
the party leader is a road worthy exploring, as I show in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, the use of 
bivariate correlations to empirically test the six hypotheses only allows for a preliminary 
confirmation/disconfirmation: to reach a more detailed and solid explanation, a multivariate 
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regression would be needed. 
The second chapter of the book edited by Cross and Pilet (2015) does implement such 
methodological tool; nonetheless, there are other issues to deal with. Going into detail, the 
chapter by Chiru et al. (2015) aims at explaining a wide number of changes in party leader 
selection rules: changes in the composition of the body that selects the party leader, in the rules 
to allow someone to put forward his/her candidacy, in the voting method, in the party leader 
removal procedures, in the term length, and in the maximum number of terms allowed for a 
specific leader.  
All these different changes are thought to be explained by six hypotheses. Firstly, parties in 
opposition, left-leaning ones, younger parties, those that have experienced a leadership change, 
parties coming from an electoral setback, and parties with a more inclusive body that selects the 
party leader should be more likely to change their leader selection rules. 
The reader may have recognised the influence of several strands of research and several 
contributions hitherto analysed. It should not be surprising: one of the pros of the article by 
Chiru et al. (2015) is that, being published in a very recent book, can benefit from the now-
encompassing existing literature and scholarship on the topic. A logistic regression finds 
empirical confirmation for all the hypotheses, apart from that related to the ideological 
positioning of parties. These results are quite noticeable, for a number of reasons: to begin with, 
it is the first time, to the best of my knowledge, that patterns of party leader selection rules are 
empirically analysed with a multivariate regression model; moreover, the results show that 
investigating the opening of party leader selection rules by adapting the framework devised in 
several contributions by Janda, Harmel, and other scholars can be very fruitful: a number of 
hypotheses in the book chapter by Chiru et al. (2015) are indeed related to the party change 
framework.  
Nonetheless, some issues rise some questions as well: why jointly considering very different 
rules concerning party leadership? Are we sure we can put together in a single analysis not simply 
the body that selects the party leader and the requisites for being a party leader candidate31, but 
also the rules to deselect the party leader and the regulations on party leaders’ terms in office? Most 
importantly, are we sure that we can put them all together32 and analyse them by using exactly 
the same variables? All these different components of rules to select and deselect the party leader 
                                                
31 As already, and very convincingly, done by Rahat and Hazan (2001), Hazan (2002) and many 
subsequent contributions on candidate and on leader selection. 
32 The empirical analysis is a classical logistic regression, therefore all changes in party leader 
selection rules contribute with the same value – 1 – to the dependent variable. 
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have an equal weight in the dependent variable. It follows the influence of the independent 
variables on what can be defined as the party leader selection rules33 or on what can be safely 
defined as the party leader de-selection rules34 may have been hidden (or, on the contrary, 
inflated) by the presence of many different elements within the same dependent variable. Finally, 
some other allegedly valuable explanations of the changes (openings) in party leader selection 
rules are ruled out: I am not simply referring to party membership decline, or to the contagion 
effect, but to another factor that deserves to be carefully analysed: the influence of the 
personalisation of politics. This phenomenon is examined in the next, and final, section of this 
chapter.  
 
2.4 A foggy connection: the personalisation of politics and party leader selection 
rules 
 
Tackling the concept of the personalisation of politics is not an undemanding task. Indeed, 
many different definitions have been proposed. Here, I depart from the Karvonen’s one (2010, 
p. 4), according to which ‘[t]he core of the personalisation hypothesis is the notion that 
individual political actors have become more prominent at the expense of parties and collective 
identities’. Obviously, a first difficulty is understanding what precisely ‘being more prominent’ 
mean. For the moment being, let us assume this means that political leaders – for this 
dissertation, leaders of political parties35 – have acquired more power, or autonomy36. This being 
said, a second problem requires a lengthier discussion: in which fields have individual political 
actors allegedly become more prominent, whatever meaning the word ‘prominent’ has?  
A first distinction can be drawn between an electoral-related personalisation and a party-
related one. A classical definition of the former can be found in Stokes, Campbell, and Miller 
                                                
33 Which can include, at best, only the body that selects the party leader, the rules to allow 
someone to put forward his/her candidacy, the voting method and maybe, albeit this might be 
disputable, the rules on party leaders’ terms. 
34 Which can only include the party leader’s removal procedures and, again with a disputable 
reasoning, term-related rules. 
35 In this work, I am only interested in the political leadership that finds expression either in 
parties, or in general elections. That is why the main focus is on leaders of political parties. 
36 A more detailed discussion of what I precisely mean by using the concept of ‘personalisation 
of politics’ can be found in Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 5.4. 
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(1957, p. 378) who, referring to the second successful presidential campaign by Dwight 
Eisenhower, state that ‘[i]t was the response to personal qualities—to his sincerity, his integrity 
and sense of duty, his virtue as a family man, his religious devotion, and his sheer likeableness—
which rose sharply in the second campaign’. This underlines a key concept of the electoral-
related personalisation of politics: the ability of party leaders to rally popular support around 
them. On the other hand, Duverger (1964, p. 168) writes about ‘two essential facts [that] seem to 
have dominated the evolution of political parties since the beginning of the century: the increase 
in the authority of the leaders and the tendency towards personal forms of authority’. This does 
not mean that nowadays party leaders are as powerful as they were in the 1950s and 1960s: on 
the contrary, these quotes simply show the long-standing importance and growth of this 
phenomenon in Western democracies. Indeed, Duverger writes about the increasing power of 
leaders within political parties (1964, pp. 168–182), a topic which will become increasingly 
important in the comparative political scholarship in the subsequent decades. 
Up to now, the connection between the personalisation of politics and party leader selection 
rules may seem, at best, blurred. Nonetheless, already in early 1980s, Harmel and Janda (1982, 
pp. 10–12) in the preliminary theorisation of the party change framework, write about the 
influence of the features and the decisions by party leaders on political parties’ ideology, 
organisation, decentralisation and cohesion (therefore, following their framework, on party 
leader selection rules as well). Unfortunately, they do not further develop this interesting hint, 
but this signals that the connection between party leaders and party change is far from being 
trivial, as also shown in Janda (1990), Harmel and Janda (1994a), and in Harmel et al. (1995), 
where leadership change, as also seen before, is thought to be a powerful drive for party change 
(and, therefore, for party leader selection rules as well). A further connection can also be drawn 
with a more rational-choice-related strand of research (e.g. see the discussion in (Strøm, 1990) on 
the importance of party leaders in driving changes in parties’ behaviour).  
The study of the personalisation of politics is clearly influenced by the publication of a book 
edited by Thomas Poguntke and Paul D. Webb (2005a): The Presidentialization of Politics. In this 
widely cited – and widely criticised37 – book, the authors collect a series of contributions by 
country experts on the alleged rise of the so-called presidentialisation of politics, which is 
thought to be composed by three ‘faces': the executive one, the party one, and the electoral one. 
The central idea of the book is that party leaders have become more powerful and autonomous 
in these three areas. Here the authors introduce the study of the autonomy and power of leaders 
                                                
37 For instance, see the article by Dowding (2013b), the reply by Webb and Poguntke (2013) and 
the rejoinder by Dowding (2013a). 
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within governments, and it is probably the main difference with respect to the hitherto studies 
on the personalisation of parties and elections (being the other two faces of presidentialisation, 
the party one and the electoral one, partly or even totally compatible with the concepts of 
personalisation within parties and elections).   
Regardless of the specific operationalization and analysis, a fair conclusion would be that, in 
the past few decades, there has been a trend towards an increase in the presidentialisation of 
parties, elections, and governments. Nonetheless, this trend has been neither homogeneous nor 
unidirectional, both concerning the presidentialisation of politics itself and even partly regarding 
the influence of leaders on voting behaviour (Karvonen, 2010, pp. 10–14, 101–107)38. A partially 
different conclusion is reached in the book edited by Passarelli (2015): where some party features 
that favour it are present, the presidentialisation of politics is a phenomenon that can be 
empirically verifiable, albeit constitutional-related (that is, institutional-related) differences can be 
easily noticed. 
Despite this blurred picture, the analysis of the personalisation of politics has not stopped. 
On the contrary, many studies have recently been published. For instance, the remarkably rich 
study edited by Dowding and Dumont (2009) is a useful starting point for the analysis of the 
increased power of party leaders in the selection and deselection of ministers in Western 
Europe39. On the voting behaviour side, one should certainly quote the ‘reductionist’ view put 
forward in the volume edited by King (2002), the personalisation-pushing book by Garzia (2014) 
and, finally, the recently published book edited by Marina Costa Lobo and John Curtice (2015) in 
which the chapter by Curtice and Lisi (2015), even if it is recognised that leaders’ traits have an 
impact on individual voting behaviour, underlines that there are still relevant differences between 
the explanatory capacity of leadership effect in presidential and in parliamentary elections, and 
therefore this stresses the limits of the ‘Presidentialisation hypothesis’.  
Finally, from a hitherto partly neglected viewpoint, the book by Renwick and Pilet (2016) 
explores the personalisation of electoral systems, which is thought to be composed of two 
dimensions, namely the extent to which electoral systems allow voters to express preferences and 
the degree of influence of voters’ decisions on who will be elected. This last work signals the 
interest towards the personalisation of politics – however we define it – is far from experiencing 
a sharp decline. 
Going closer towards the topic of this dissertation, Blondel et al. (2010) argue that a general 
                                                
38 For a direct reply to Karvonen’s statements, see Webb, Poguntke and Kolodny (2012). 
39 See also the analysis by Poguntke and Webb (2015) on the increment in the power of party 
leaders in German and British executives.  
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trend towards an increase in the personalisation of politics and party leadership can be detected 
in some Western European countries. From a broader and comparative viewpoint, Musella 
(2015) posits that ‘personal leaders’ have become more and more important in Western Europe 
from the late 1980s until the early 2010s, thanks to three transformations: more direct selection 
of party leaders by party members or even by party voters, an increase in the centralisation of 
power within parties, and a stronger role of party leaders in the legislatures and in governments40. 
It is quite interesting to notice that the here the opening of party leader selection rules is thought 
to be a component – and not a consequence – of the personalisation of politics: the scholarship 
is quite divided on this topic, as it has been already seen and as we also notice in this concluding 
section. As shown in the following chapters, I follow the strand according to which the opening 
of party leader selection rules cannot be seen as an element of the personalisation of party 
leadership; rather, it should be considered as a possible consequence of it. 
After having taken into consideration all these works, a logical question arises: has someone 
explicitly linked the personalisation of politics to the changes (or the openings) of party leader 
selection rules? Despite the rise in the interest towards the increased power of leaders in parties, 
electoral campaigns, and governments, this issue has seldom been addressed in the existing 
literature. A first important reference is surely the already quoted article by Lisi (2010), where 
one the political-system level variables that are considered as pushes for the ‘democratisation’ of 
party leader selection rules in Portugal is the personalisation of party leadership, given that such 
‘democratisation’ should foster leader-oriented electoral campaigns41. Unfortunately, the author 
does not devote much attention to this element – also given the richness of his framework of 
analysis.  
A second contribution worth mentioning is again an already-quoted one: the article by 
Wauters (2014), where an explicit and carefully-explained link between the personalisation of 
politics and the opening of party leader selection rules is put forward. Specifically, according to 
                                                
40 A partly different framework is put forward by Musella in a recently published book (2018), 
where three dimensions of analysis concerning the personalisation of political parties: the direct 
elections of party leaders, the intra-party leaders’ personal power, and the features of leaders’ 
careers. 
41 This line of reasoning, as already seen in the discussion of the contribution by Gauja (2016), 
resembles that of Barnea and Rahat (2007), who argue that one of the relevant factors explaining 
the changes in the body of people that selects a party’s candidates for general elections is the 
‘personalisation’ [of politics, probably]. Even in this case, the authors do not devote much space 
to a discussion of the alleged influence of this factor. 
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the author, such opening might be influenced by the necessity to increase the legitimacy and the 
position of the party leader, and given the increasing role of party leaders in elections and in 
shaping parties’ policy stances, it could be reasonable to hold him/her more accountable by 
means of party primaries42 (Wauters, 2014, p. 73). Alongside this internal reason, an external 
reason is put forward as well: ‘a legitimised and strong party leader can take tough decisions quite 
autonomously, because he or she is backed by the rank and file’ (Wauters, 2014, p. 73). These 
two reasons are interesting, because they connect the personalisation of politics and the openings 
of party leader selection rules in an explicit and testable way. On the other hand, they seem to 
contrast a bit with one another: on the one hand, more open rules seem to be implemented in 
order to cope with an already-existing phenomenon (the increasing power of party leaders); on 
the other hand, it seems that to foster an increasing power of party leaders, it is necessary to 
implement more open rules. A careful empirical testing of the role of the personalisation of 





In this chapter, I have tackled the existing literature on party leader selection rules and its 
alleged determinants. After having analysed the importance of the party change framework for 
this dissertation, I have assessed the importance of early or non-systematic studies on party 
leader selection rules and their determinants. Then, the chapter has focused on the three books 
published in early- and mid-2010s on party leader selection rules: the one by Cross and Blais 
(2012), then the contribution by Pilet and Cross (2014b), and finally the book by Cross and Pilet 
(2015). Finally, a seldom addressed but crucial issue for party leader selection rules has been 
considered: the personalisation of politics.  
After this review, I can delve deeper into the analysis which is put forward in this work. To 
begin with, two tasks shall be deal with: first, it is necessary to precisely define the research 
question at the centre of this study; second, it is necessary to carefully tackle the object of study, 
that is, operationalise the dependent variables. Chapter 3 is devoted to these tasks. 
 
  
                                                
42 Let us recall Wauters’ main interest lies in explaining the adoption of ‘one-member-one-vote’ 
systems in party leader selection rules. 
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Chapter 3 – The research design 
 
A fundamental problem of empirical research is defining the phenomenon under 
examination. Another task, which usually is thought to be easier but actually requires a careful 
crafting, is related to devising the research question and the related general framework of 
analysis. In other words, it is necessary not simply to define what I am going to study in the next 
chapters, but also the precise question I deal with, to be as scientifically clear as possible and give 
the reader a useful reading guide.  
In this chapter, I indeed deal with the research question and with the general framework 
within which my work moves (section 3.1). After having set the ground and presented these 
fundamental elements, I turn my attention to the definition of the dependent variables, party 
leader selectorates: in Section 3.2, I first present existing operationalisations of this concept and, 
after having discussed their strengths and weaknesses, put forward my operationalisation. 
Section 3.3 is devoted to a comparison between party leader selection rules and the Dahl’s box 
for the different roads to polyarchy; such comparison is made to draw a clear line between 
openings of party leader selection rules (selectorates) and their alleged democratisation. Finally, 
Section 3.4 deals with the selection of the cases at the centre of my attention and with the precise 
features of leader selectorates for the parties included in the empirical analysis. 
 
3.1 The research question and the general framework of analysis 
 
The research question at the base of this work is the following: why do parties open their leader 
selection rules? More specifically, in line with the operationalisation of the dependent variables I 
present in Section 3.2, it can be reformulated as follows: why do parties open their leader selectorate? 
Indeed, the focus of my work is on the party leader selectorate (i.e., on the body of people that 
selects the party leader). This research question can also be seen from two different viewpoints: 
the first one is related to why parties open their selectorate from a general standpoint; the second 
is, instead, connected to understanding why parties adopt (move towards) a specific party leader 
selectorate.   
The difference between these two perspectives is not a trivial one: in the first case, the focus 
is on the simple presence/absence of an opening of party leader selectorates, while the second 
one differentiates among different party leader selectorates. The classical concern in the 
scholarship for the past few years has been that of explaining the simple presence/absence of 
openings of party leader selection rules. Indeed, basically all of the authors studying this matter 
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with a quantitative methodology have focused on this task. The decision to focus on the first 
perspective has been therefore driven by the idea of empirically testing the propositions put 
forward by many authors (in different fashions, as seen in Chapter 2) and also adding some 
possible original crucial determinants to the discussion. Let us for a moment postpone the 
definition of ‘opening’ (which is done in Section 3.2), and let us focus on its presence (or 
absence). If an opening can simply be present or absent, it follows all openings shall be treated as 
equal. And this consideration is of paramount importance not simply for building the related 
dependent variable, which will evidently be a dichotomous one (1 meaning opening and 0 
otherwise) but also for the analysis that is required to tackle it. This discourse is expanded in the 
empirical Section 6.1.  
On the other hand, the second perspective focuses on the fact that parties move towards 
(adopt) a specific selectorate. Even in this case, the precise operationalization of the party leader 
selectorate is put forward in the next section, but let us anticipate that different party leader 
selectorates can be identified in Western European parties. Moreover, it is possible to study the 
passage from one specific selectorate to the next one (usually, the most contiguous one). In this 
case, all openings are not treated as equal. Only are openings moving towards the same 
selectorate considered as equal. For instance, if two parties move towards a leader selection by 
the party congress (meaning this organ is the party leader selectorate), these two parties will 
receive the same value for the dependent variable related to the second perspective to tackle the 
research question. Conversely, if they move towards different selectorates for party leader, they 
will have different values for this second dependent variable. In this sense, this standpoint to 
analyse openings of party leader selection rules is remarkably different from the first one, and, to 
the best of my knowledge, has never been the subject of an empirical testing with a quantitative 
methodology. In other words, scholars analysing party leader selection rules have solely focused 
on the simple presence/absence of openings, while little if none attention has been devoted to 
the fact that parties move towards specific selectorates, as I have extensively shown in Chapter 2. 
This is extremely surprising, given that addressing the latter point can be quite interesting, in that 
it can reveal peculiar patterns followed by parties adopting different party leader selectorates. 
Therefore, performing this task can bring about interesting innovations and findings for the 
literature on party leader selection rules.  
 How to tackle the two standpoints to analyse openings of party leader selectorates? More 
specifically, how to analyse the two dependent variables stemming from them? In this study, I 
adopt a framework which partly builds on the party change framework, in the sense that both 
external and internal party-related factors (or, possibly, ‘shocks') are considered. By internal 
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factors I consider those possible determinants related to an ‘intra-party' matters (or shocks), 
widely understood: a leadership change, a change in membership figures, leaders' features and 
autonomy. Conversely, external factors are those alleged determinants related to external events, 
shocks, or changes: poor electoral performance, participation in a government, and so forth.  
 
Figure 3.1 General framework of analysis 
 
Figure 3.1 above shows the general framework of analysis of this dissertation. As already 
explained in this section, I focus on two sets of factors, an internal one and an external one. 
Within the former, one might find some ‘classical’ determinants of party change and, more 
importantly, for this work, for openings of party leader selection rules: changes in a party’s 
leadership, membership decline, party family. Moreover, two factors, related to the 
personalisation of politics, a possible yet hitherto neglected explanans, are also put forward. These 
two latter factors are related to two aspects of the multi-faceted concept we call ‘personalisation 
of politics': the effect of party leaders in general elections, and the control by leaders themselves 
of their parties. All these internal determinants are in-depth analysed in Chapter 4. 
Yet, we also know that changes in party organisations, and also openings of party leader 
selection rules, might also be influenced by external factors. Among these, I focus on three 
determinants already tackled by the existing literature: an electoral setback, the opposition status 
of a political formation, and the contagion effect. Finally, a general effect of the personalisation 
of politics at the party system level is also included within the external factors. Such factors are 
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It shall be underlined that the determinants already considered by the existing literature (say, 
membership decline or electoral setback) do not always receive a fair amount of space in the 
theoretical part of many pieces of work. In other words, the fact that some determinants have 
been already put forward in the literature does not mean that such factors have been thoroughly 
explored. One of the aims of Chapters 4 and 5 is also that of expanding and systematising the 
discussion on the existing determinants of openings (changes) in party leader selection rules 
included in this dissertation. 
Figure 3.1 shows that both internal and external factors are considered and analysed in this 
work. While certain discussion43 has been going on in the literature concerning the primacy of 
internal or of external determinants in explaining party change, here I would take a more 
agnostic position. In other words, I do not have expectations concerning the greater importance 
of internal or, conversely, of external factors in driving openings of party leader selection rules. 
On the contrary, I do believe some words shall be spent on the fact that parties shall be 
considered as conservative organisations: this idea has been already put forward by many 
scholars (Michels, 1915; Panebianco, 1988; Janda, 1990), but an interesting addendum might be 
that parties open their leader selection rules only when they have a compelling reason to do so. I 
am not simply referring to (external) ‘shocks’ theorised by Harmel and Janda (1994a), but also to 
a series of events, which might have, for different reasons, an effect on the fact that parties open 
(or not) their leader selection rules. These events shall have a certain impact on parties given they 
do not resort to opening their leader selection rules for the sake of it: as shown in Sections 1.2 
and 3.3, opening party leader selection rules (or selectorates) is not a decision that can be light-
heartedly taken, for the consequences it might bring about for political parties. There must be a 
good reason to do so, and exploring these ‘good reasons’ is exactly one of the tasks of this study.  
After having set the ground of the empirical framework at the basis of my work, the next 
section directly focuses on the object of study: the dependent variables, namely, the selectorate 
of party leaders.  
 
3.2 The dependent variables: the selectorate of party leaders 
 
I now turn to the operationalization of the dependent variables. As we have already seen, 
the focus of this dissertation is on party leader selection rules. Before going into detail, two 
                                                
43 See for instance Mair (1994), Harmel and Janda (1994a), Harmel et al. (1995), Katz and Mair 
(2002), Gauja (2016). 
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preliminary questions should be answered: who is the party leader? And which rules are we 
discussing? 
Starting from the former one, understanding who is the party leader might seem trivial, but 
it can actually be extremely important in some parties or countries. Among other cases, Punnett 
(1992, pp. 4–8) underlines that such problem exists for Green parties (where, at best, just a 
collective of people can be identified) and for Dutch parties (where a difference can be drawn 
between the leader of the extra-parliamentary organisation and the electoral/parliamentary 
leader). This suggests to distinguish between two different issues: on the one hand, there are 
parties that, mostly during their early years, do not have a clear leadership position. On the other 
hand, the second issue is that there are parties where more than one position can be deemed to 
be the most important one. In both cases, it might not be clear who the leader is (or who the 
leaders are). 
The first matter usually concerns extreme left and green parties: for instance, the Austrian 
Greens did not have a party leader position until the early 1990s (Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 
2014, p. 64), and this ambivalent, if not hostile, position towards (monocratic) party leadership 
positions can also be detected in other Green parties (Faucher, 1999; Van Haute, 2016) and in 
some ‘new left’ parties (e.g. see Lisi, 2015, p. 106) in Western Europe. Nonetheless, in basically 
all left and green Western European parties under scrutiny here, it is possible to identify a clear 
position of party leadership44. 
The second issue is trickier: it involves parties that have more than one position that can be 
deemed as overlapping with that of party leader. For instance, Dutch parties normally have two 
positions: the leader of the extra-parliamentary party (a sort of ‘party chairman’) and the so-called 
‘political leader’ (Lijsttrekker), who is the top-candidate in his/her party’s list and whose role can 
also be thought of as compatible with that of leader of the parliamentary party. Nonetheless, 
both Koole (1994) and Van Holsteyn, Koole and Den Ridden (2014) show that the most 
important position in Dutch parties is that of the political leader, and therefore, for Dutch 
parties, this figure is the one considered in this dissertation. In all the other countries or parties, 
the situation is much clearer, in that a clear apical political figure can be easily identified. 
Moreover, it has been shown the top candidates for general elections outside the Netherlands 
(e.g. in Spain, Germany, or Italy) cannot be considered as equally powerful as the party chairmen 
                                                
44 With the sole exception of the already-mentioned Austrian Greens up to 1994. So, this party 
appears in the analysis only from 1994 onwards. 
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(Barberà et al., 2014; Detterbeck and Rohlfing, 2014; Sandri, Seddone and Venturino, 2014)45. 
Despite the fact that, in some cases, the party’s top candidate (or the candidate for the head of 
the government) and the party leader might be the same person, for theoretical and clarity-
related reasons, I focus on the party chairman for Spanish, German, and Italian parties46. 
After having addressed the definition of the party leader, the second preliminary question is 
ahead of us: tackling the rules to select the party leader. In the literature, a clear distinction can 
be drawn between two groups. Scholars belonging to the first group consider several dimensions 
to operationalize party leader selection rules. Conversely, the second group is made by scholars 
who deal with a specific dimension: the selectorate. The operationalization of the dependent 
variables in this work is done by following the second group of scholars. The next subsection 
(3.2.1) starts with the first group of scholars, that is, with those operationalising party leader 
selection rules by taking into consideration more than one dimension of analysis. Moreover, the 
next subsection also shows the problems related to this ‘multidimensional' approach. In this way, 
it is possible to more clearly move, in Subsection 3.2.2, to the presentation of the selectorate as 
the dimension operationalising party leader selection rules. 
 
3.2.1 The multidimensional approach to party leader selection rules and its problems 
 
Let us then start with the group of scholars having a multidimensional approach to the 
operationalization of party leader selection rules. Punnett (1992, pp. 13–24) considers three 
aspects of the party leader selection: ‘the ease and frequency with which a contest can be 
initiated’ (Punnett, 1992, p. 13); the ‘candidature', intended as the understanding of who can 
stand as a candidate for the party leadership and whether there are additional requirements that 
perspective candidates must satisfy (e.g. reaching a certain number of signatures or the support 
by a certain percentage of party members or party MPs); the selectorate, operationalized via four 
categories, each having two possible means of selection, for a total of eight different ways of 
operationalizing the selectorate. The four categories correspond to four possible selectorates, 
                                                
45 On the more general topic of primary elections to select either the party chairman or the 
party’s top candidate for general elections, see Sandri, Seddone and Venturino (2015). 
46 A similar problem involves French parties. In this case, it is difficult to precisely identify a 
party leader without ad hoc distinguishing among Presidential candidates, heads of the extra-
parliamentary organisation, Presidents of the Republic and the like. It is interesting to notice that 
also French scholars have differentiated views on the matter (Thiebault, 1993; Knapp and 
Wright, 2006; Ivaldi, 2007). This problem is further analysed in Section 3.4 below.  
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ranked according to a ‘participation' order: the least participatory selectorate is made by party 
notables (who can, in turn, decide via an informal discussion, in the famous ‘smoke-filled rooms', 
or via a ballot); by party MPs (who, again, can either select the party leader in an informal 
discussion or with the means of a ballot); by party activists (either in a party conference or in a 
special party convention); or, finally, by party members (who can select their leader with a postal 
ballot of with a ‘turn-out' election). 
We see later why this operationalization is problematic, but the point to underline here is 
that Punnett's framework is useful because it stresses two relevant aspects: firstly, several 
selectorates can be found in a diachronic or in a synchronic perspective, and, secondly, an order 
among such selectorate can be identified. These two elements are also recurrent in all the ways of 
operationalizing the selectorate we consider. Indeed, already does Marsh (1993a) recognize that 
several dimensions are important in understanding the selection of party leaders: the 
inclusiveness of the selectorate (which ranges from a low-inclusiveness extreme made by a party 
elite to a high-inclusiveness made by party members or supporters), the competitiveness of the 
party leadership race, and the frequency of this race.  
A further step towards a clearer definition of the different rules involved in party leader 
selection is taken by Kenig (2009a) who, building on the framework devised by Rahat and Hazan 
(2001) for the selection of candidates for general elections, proposes a classification of party 
leader selection rules in parliamentary democracies based on four dimensions. They are: the 
selectorate, the candidacy, the voting method, and, finally, the de-selection rules (i.e. the rules to 
remove a party leader from his/her office).  
The selectorate, the candidacy, and the de-selection are thought to compose an 
openness/closeness classification. Let us focus on each of these four dimensions: the selectorate 
for party leaders can be made by a single individual (as in cases of self-appointed leaders who 
also coronate their successors), a party elite (e.g. the central committee in communist parties), 
party MPs, a selected party agency (e.g. a party congress), party members, and, finally, the 
electorate47. Moving to the second dimension, the candidacy is interestingly divided into two 
components: who can put forward himself/herself as a candidate for party leadership, and 
whether there are additional requirements to comply with (a clear echo of Punnett's ‘candidature' 
classification is detectable). Therefore, on a closeness/openness continuum, we find 
                                                
47 This continuum is partly modified by Kenig et al. (2015), according to whom the three most 
inclusive categories - party members, the new category of supporters (which is not present in the 
original Kenig’s classification) and party voters - can be categorised under the encompassing 
umbrella of primary zone. 
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parliamentarians (with or without additional requirements), party members (with or without 
additional requirements), and citizens (with or without additional requirements). The voting 
method can instead be: a majority runoff, an ‘exhaustive/eliminative ballot', or a preferential vote 
(also called alternative vote for its resemblance to the Alternative Vote's method). Finally, de-
selecting mechanisms, on the now-familiar closeness/openness continuum, can be: absent (in the 
sense that there are no formal mechanisms to remove a party leader); related to a ‘direct 
challenge' at the end of a long fixed term; connected to a ‘direct challenge' at the end of a short 
fixed term; can be a leadership review at the end of a leader's term (where the party can ‘evaluate 
its leader by a formal vote, without requiring a specific challenger to step forward' (Kenig, 2009a, 
p. 443); or, finally, they can be a no-confidence vote that can be cast even during the leader's 
term. The latter mechanisms are evidently more open (in the sense that fewer requirements are 
required to be put forward), while the former ones are less open. 
Finally, let us deal with two contributions, already encountered in this dissertation, that 
focus on several dimensions of analysis concerning party leader selection rules: the book by 
Cross and Blais (2012) and the edited book by Pilet and Cross (2014b). The former contribution 
tackles some aspects of party leader selection rules, including the candidacy (called ‘eligibility'), 
the selectorate, the electoral rules, and leaders' de-selection rules. Starting from the candidacy 
(Cross and Blais, 2012, pp. 77–83), the authors focus on the necessity of being an MP to run for 
party leadership and on the possible presence of additional requirements (which are normally 
either the support of some MPs, or of some party members, or of a combination of both groups 
of people). It shall be noticed that a clear continuum of the candidacy dimension is not 
presented, unlike Kenig’s presentation of his framework of analysis. Passing to the selectorate, 
Cross and Blais do not present a clear continuum of inclusiveness/exclusiveness48, but put 
forward a scheme of the selectorates involved in picking the party leader in the parties under 
consideration (Cross and Blais, 2012, pp. 17–33): party MPs, party members, the party 
conference (i.e., the party congress), the ‘central party board’, trade unions, subnational elected 
party officials, and affiliated groups. Cross and Blais devote some attention to a crucial problem 
that is also dealt with in the final section of this chapter: the mixed selectorates, whose typical 
example is the electoral college that was the selectorate for the British Labour Party’s leader from 
early 1980s until 2014. Then, they focus on the electoral rules to select the party leader (both 
tackling the specific electoral formula and the body of people that is allowed to change such 
                                                
48 Apart from stating that the two poles of the continuum are represented by voters and by a 
single person (Cross and Blais, 2012, pp. 16–17). 
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rules) (Cross and Blais, 2012, pp. 61–77), and on the de-selection rules to remove a leader from 
his/her office (Cross and Blais, 2012, pp. 100–111).  
This quadripartite scheme (candidacy, selectorate, electoral rules, de-selection norms) is 
substantially similar to that followed by the authors contributing to the edited book by Pilet and 
Cross (2014b). The introduction by the two editors underlines that each chapter – devoted to a 
specific country in a specific period – focuses on the candidacy, the selectorate, the voting 
procedures, and the de-selection of party leaders. Interestingly, and again partly following Cross 
and Blais (2012), only is the selectorate dimension linked to a specific scheme of analysis, which 
is an exclusiveness/inclusiveness continuum. Indeed, according to the authors, party leaders can 
be selected by a single person, by a party council, by party MPs, by delegates to a party 
convention, by party members or, finally, by voters. Notice that the electoral college cases (the 
already mentioned British Labour party case and the British Conservative Party case from the 
late 1990s onwards49) are categorised under the label ‘party members'. 
After this excursion of the pieces of research where several dimensions of analysis are 
considered to tackle party leader selection rules, it is useful to recap the most important points of 
these studies. First, apart from the very recent contributions by Cross and Blais and by Pilet and 
Cross, different authors focus on distinct dimensions; second, even if the same dimension of 
analysis is considered, the selectorate is the sole dimension whose operationalization is shared 
with little or no differences by several authors. 
From these two points, a more encompassing discussion can be started. To begin with, the 
fact that different authors focus on different aspects of party leader (de-)selection rules is 
extremely problematic, given that this poses a serious problem. Let us say that author A focuses 
on the selectorate, the candidacy, and leaders’ term length and author B on the selectorate, the 
de-selecting mechanisms and the voting method. How can the scholarship put forward 
progressive innovation, especially from a cross-country and diachronic perspective, if there is not 
an agreement on the dimension(s) one should investigate?  
Moreover, a second issue relates to the fact that some authors put together some 
dimensions that can be hardly considered as equivalent (or as possibly overlapping). For 
instance, the selectorate dimension by Punnett (1992) is related both to the body of people that 
selects the party leader and to the possible existence of a formal vote: it is unclear why these two 
aspects should be put together, since the presence (or the absence) of an explicit vote to select 
the party leader can hardly be considered as so important to require a further differentiation. 
                                                
49 In Section 3.4 I show why I do not consider the British Conservative Party’s case from 1997 
onwards as an ‘electoral college’ case. 
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Indeed, in Austria and Norway, it is common to find parties that coronate their future leader (for 
instance via a party congress election by acclamation) (Allern and Karlsen, 2014; Ennser-
Jedenastik and Müller, 2014): why should we consider such elections different from the 
contested party congress leadership selections in other Western European countries? Would it 
not be more useful to separate the selectorate and the voting method, as convincingly done by 
other authors?  
A third problem concerns the importance of these different dimensions of analysis. Even if 
the indicating portion of these dimensions is similar for all the authors (e.g. for almost all authors 
the selectorate dimension operationalizes the body of people that selects the party leader), are we 
sure that they should have the same importance from a comparative viewpoint? For instance, 
shall we devote the same space and attention to – say – the selectorate and to the voting 
method? Shall we equally focus on the rules related to the selection and on those connected to the 
deselection of party leaders? Finally, shall we use the same framework of analysis to tackle the rules 
governing party leader selection and the consequences of such rules (regarding competitiveness, 
leaders' gender, participation, and the like)? The comparative scholarship on party leader 
selection rules has given a convincing answer, which is shared by a noticeable number of 
scholars (who focus on a single dimension): it is the selectorate for party leadership that shall be 
considered as a crucial dimension of analysis. These scholars form the second group of 
researchers of party leader selection rules, and are also at the centre of the second subsection, 
where I also present the operationalization of the dependent variables.  
 
3.2.2 The operationalization of the selectorate for party leaders 
 
A good starting point to tackle the analyses of scholars focusing only on party leaders’ 
selectorate is surely LeDuc’s work (2001) on the US Democratic Party, the British Labour Party, 
and the Canadian Progressive-Conservative Party. He proposes an exclusiveness/inclusiveness 
continuum made by: party MPs, an electoral college, party conventions, ‘local caucuses’, closed 
primaries (where only people ‘registered’ for a party can vote), and open primaries (where any 
voter can select the party leader). This is one the earlier attempts to create an explicit and, more 
importantly, encompassing party leader selectorate continuum. The importance of this point 
should not be underestimated, if one considers that a contribution (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 
2000), which is just one year older that than by LeDuc, has a very different four-point 
exclusiveness/inclusiveness continuum that considers party MPs, party elite, party congress (that 
also includes the electoral college), and party members/party primaries.  
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A similar road is taken by Kenig (2009b), who presents a four-point 
exclusiveness/inclusiveness continuum, made by four ‘pure' types: party MPs, a ‘selected party 
agency' (e.g. a party congress or a convention), party members, or the electorate. The reader 
should have noticed the differences with the other operationalization of the selectorate by the 
same author presented above. Some points are of interest here: Kenig correctly underlines that 
mixed selectorates (like the electoral colleges) should be considered as more exclusive than those 
granting the power to select the party leader to party members with the formula ‘one member 
one vote' (OMOV); moreover, and this is more disputable, even the procedure for the selection 
of the leader of the British Conservative Party (a first selection by party MPs is followed by a 
run-off race where party members select the future leader) should be considered as a ‘non-pure' 
selectorate, and therefore more exclusive than an OMOV procedure. 
A more convincing road is the one taken by Lisi, Freire and Barberà (2015), whose 
selectorate variable takes five values on the exclusiveness/inclusiveness continuum: party organs, 
party MPs, mixed methods (which are in this specific position given the authors claim such 
methods are often a combination of the two most exclusive selectorates with the two most 
inclusive ones), party conference, and, finally, voters/party members50. Finally, a six-point 
continuum is presented by Kenig, Rahat and Hazan (2015): the most exclusive selectorate is 
represented by the party leader, followed by the party elite, party MPs, party delegates, party 
members, and voters. 
This small excursion in the operationalization of party leaders’ selectorate is useful for two 
reasons: first, to underline the non-negligible differences among scholars regarding the number 
of categories of the selectorate and/or the precise position of some categories (especially party 
MPs vs. the party elite, and the electoral colleges); second, because many of the above-
mentioned authors underline a crucial point: it is the selectorate a fundamental dimension of 
analysis to tackle party leader selection rules. This is a viewpoint shared by most scholars dealing 
with party leader selection rules (LeDuc, 2001; Kenig, 2009a; Cross and Blais, 2012, p. 7; Pilet 
and Cross, 2014b; Kenig, Rahat and Hazan, 2015; Lisi, Freire and Barberà, 2015), and by 
eminent scholars dealing with candidate selection (e.g. see Barnea and Rahat, 2007). This is also 
the road followed by this dissertation. 
                                                
50 This operationalization is also very similar to the one by Chiru et al. (2015), given the only 
difference is these latter present a six-point continuum, where the most exclusive point is not 
represented by party organs, but by an ‘other’ category (which includes self-appointed leaders). 
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In other words, my focus is on the selectorate for party leaders. More specifically, I put forward a 
six-point scale, where lower values correspond to more exclusive selectorates, and vice versa. 
Figure 3.2 below graphically presents it. 
 
Figure 3.2 Party leader selectorates 
 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
As it can be seen by looking at Figure 3.2, some points of the scale are directly taken from 
the literature: obviously, the most exclusive selectorate is represented by a single person (be it the 
party leader or someone else). Passing to the second most exclusive position, it is represented by 
a party's elite, e.g. the central committee of the Portuguese Communist Party, who selects the 
leader of these political formations. Then, we find party MPs (for example, this was the 
selectorate for the leader of the British Conservative Party until 1998). 
It shall be noticed that some authors invert the position of the party elite and of the party 
MPs (therefore considering MPs as a more exclusive selectorate than the party elite). 
Nonetheless, I have taken the opposite decision, following the compelling twofold argument by 
Kenig, Rahat, and Hazan (2015): first, party MPs are directly elected by party voters, while the 
party elites are usually not (let us think about central committees or national executive organs, 
which are mainly selected by party congress delegates, who are, in turn, normally selected by 
party members); second, this mimics the procedures in parliamentary democracies, where MPs 
select (delegate) the Prime Minister. 
The fourth position in my continuum is occupied by the electoral college. This point 
requires some discussion. From a general standpoint, the electoral college is nothing more than a 
combination of different selectorates. For instance, for the British Labour Party until 2014, we 
find party members, party parliamentarians, and members of collateral organisations, like trade 










unions; for the Irish Fine Gael from 2004 onwards, party members, party parliamentarians, and 
local holders of public offices are considered.  
Moreover, in all of the cases considered in this dissertation (the British Labour Party, Fine 
Gael, the Irish Fianna Fáil in 2015 and the Greek Nea Dimokratia between 1985 and 1997), MPs 
always occupy a noticeable position in this combination (ranging from twice the number of the 
local party delegates in the Nea Dimokratia, to the 65% of the Fine Gael, to 40-55% of the Fianna 
Fáil, to the 33% of the British Labour Party from 1993 until 201451). This signals that the 
electoral college is surely more inclusive than the selectorate solely made by party MPs because 
the percentage of final votes of the college given to party members or other groups of people 
should not be underestimated. At the same time, the electoral college is not that inclusive to be 
positioned after the party congress (party convention) delegates, since the role of party MPs shall 
be taken into account as well. Instead, congress delegates occupy the fifth most exclusive 
position (or the second most inclusive one), and this selectorate constitutes by far the most 
common way to select the party leader in Western Europe (Pilet and Cross, 2014a).  
Then, the final position (the most inclusive one) is occupied by the category I call ‘party 
primary’, given it includes the selectorates made by either members or by party voters. In the 
literature, some authors present the two bodies of people as forming two different selectorates 
(e.g., Kenig, Rahat and Hazan (2015). Nonetheless, following Kenig et al. (2015), I have decided 
to classify the selectorates made by members or by voters as falling into the ‘party primary’ 
category, given that I argue a fundamental passage is not that between members and voters, but 
from less inclusive categories (party delegates, party MPs, and the like) to party primaries, be 
them ‘closed’ (i.e. open just to members) or ‘open’ (also open to voters). It shall also be 
considered that it is more and more common for people to enrol as ‘flash members’, that is, just 
a few days before or even on the leadership selection day (Elgot, 2016; Van Bruggen, 2016)52, 
and this is another reason why I have put together party members and party voters53. 
                                                
51 From 1981 until 1993, the share of the electoral college’s votes given to British Labour Party’s 
MPs was equal to 30%. 
52 On the related matter of multi-speed membership, see also Gomez and Ramiro (2017). 
53 Another reason that could have pushed for collapsing the ‘party members’ and the ‘party 
voters’ categories into the ‘party primary’ one is the fact that the latter would have included an 
extremely small number of cases. In any case, all the analyses performed in Chapter 6 have been 
replicated by considering a 7-point scale, and the results are identical to those presented in this 
dissertation. 
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Up to now, I have presented the 6-point scale by ordering it from the most exclusive 
selectorate to the most inclusive one. It is evident that if we follow the 
exclusiveness/inclusiveness logic, this signals that there is an order in the values that the scale 
can take. For instance, value 3 is more inclusive than 2 and less inclusive than 4. This has 
noticeable consequences for a part of the empirical analysis performed in this dissertation (which 
is presented in Chapter 6). For now, suffice it to say that a clear order can be detected. 
Nonetheless, given the aim of this dissertation is on the openings of party leader selection rules, it 
is necessary to define an opening: it is a movement of a party leader’ selectorate from a lower 
point to a higher point on the exclusiveness/inclusiveness continuum. For instance, the opening 
of the Belgian AGALEV in 1995, which results in a change in party leader’ selectorate from 2 to 
6, that is, from the party elite to party primary.  
A logical consequence of this differentiation is that party leader selectorates’ openings can 
be seen from two viewpoints, as already argued in Section 3.1. First, openings can be analysed by 
simply considering the movement from one selectorate to another one. In this case, any change 
from a lower to a higher value on the DV’ selectorate continuum is equally treated, and therefore 
the DV can only assume two values: either 1, when an opening is present, and 0, when an 
opening is absent. Second, openings can be tackled from a more detailed viewpoint, when the 
precise movements from – say – 4 to 5 or from 5 to 6 on the selectorate continuum are analysed. 
Thus, in this latter case, the DV can have a number of values equal to the number of points of 
the exclusiveness/inclusiveness continuum.  
Therefore, there are two different operationalisations of the selectorate: a dichotomous DV 
address the question why parties generally open their leader selection rules; conversely, an 
ordinal DV deals with parties’ adoption of a specific selectorate. Let us reiterate a point raised 
some pages above: these are two different – yet complementary – matters. In the first case, all 
openings are treated as equal, and the focus is on extremely general and encompassing 
arguments that might shed some light on this phenomenon. It is also the road taken basically by 
all scholars analysing party leader selection rules with a quantitative methodology. The second 
case, where openings are differentiated according to the position where a party falls after having 
opened its selectorate, is related to a less general and more in-depth question: why parties adopt 
a specific selectorate? And therefore, as related questions: are there different determinants at work 
in the ‘general' analysis and the more detailed one? Are there different determinants at work when 
parties adopt different selectorates? All these questions, to the best of my knowledge, have been 
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left unanswered by the literature on the topic. This discourse is extensively taken into 
consideration in Chapter 654. 
Before turning our attention to a more precise description of my dataset and of the cases of 
openings that I consider in the empirical analysis, a task that is performed in Section 3.4, there is 
a fundamental yet neglected topic that requires an in-depth discussion: why have I written about 
openings of party leader selection rules and not about the democratisation of such rules? Section 3.3 
below tackles this point, whose importance goes well beyond a mere denomination problem. 
 
3.3 The openings of party leader selection rules: a comparison with Dahl’s paths 
to polyarchy 
 
Many authors dealing with party leader selection rules have written about their 
‘democratisation’. For instance, Müller and Meth-Cohn write about ‘more democratic’ party 
leader selections that more strongly involve party members55, while LeDuc (2001), already from 
the title of his article, writes about the democratisation of party leader selection rules intended as 
an opening of these rules, as seen in the preceding Section. Interestingly, Kenig himself writes 
that ‘[t]he phenomenon of “democratization of party leadership selection” almost always refers 
to the process of opening up the selectorate to a wider range of voters’ (2009a, p. 434).  
Conversely, other scholars draw a clear distinction between openings and democratisation 
of the rules to select the party leader: for instance, Hazan (2002, p. 117) explicitly writes about 
the necessity to open the selectorate and the candidacy (for candidate selection, but the argument 
might be applied to leader selection as well) to talk about a ‘democratisation' of these processes; 
Kenig, Hazan and Rahat (2015, pp. 39–40) posit a ‘democratisation’ of candidate and leader 
selection involves an increased ‘participation’ of party members or even of party supporters; 
                                                
54 From a slightly more general viewpoint, I do not use the term ‘more competitive’ party leader 
selection rules as a synonymous of ‘more open’ party leader selection rules. The reasons behind 
this choice are both theoretical (a race, be it electoral or related to party leader selection, can be 
extremely open but not as much competitive) and empirical, since more open party leader 
selection rules either do not seem to produce more competitive races (Kenig, 2009b), or, at best, 
have a very mixed and not very clear effect on them (Kenig, Rahat and Tuttnauer, 2015). On the 
more general topic of the relationship between selection rules and competitiveness, see the 
discussion in Hazan and Rahat (2010). 
55 See also fn. 12 in Section 1.2. 
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Aylott and Bolin (2017) go further in discussing the overall importance of solely focusing on the 
selectorate in order to understand what ‘democratisation’ means; as an overall sum-up of this 
strand of the literature, Cross and Blais argue (2012, p. 15): ‘[a] more expansive selectorate for 
internal decision-making does not necessarily make one party more democratic than another’. 
Why should it be important to distinguish between the opening and the democratisation of party 
leader selection rules? For many reasons: first, the two words carry with them a very different 
meaning, and using one instead of another, if this change is misplaced, might generate 
confusions among scholars and even among citizens; second, not only do the two concepts have 
a different meaning, but I would argue that they represent two quite different things – and 
processes – in line with the authors mentioned in the previous paragraph. In this sense, after 
having briefly accounted for the confusion that the overlapping of these two concepts might 
generate in the related literature, in this section, I tackle the issue starting by the well-known 
Dahl’s box (Dahl, 1971) and then proceeding by proposing an original ‘Party Leader General 
Inclusiveness’ framework that should help clarifying why using ‘openings’ of party leader 
selection rules might be a more suitable choice than ‘democratisation’ of such rules. 
The fact that an opening of party leader selectorates does not necessarily mean a democratisation 
might seem, for some readers, an intuitively reasonable conclusion. We must still understand the 
reasoning behind such conclusion. Here the framework devised by Dahl might be of some use. 
According to Dahl (1971), there are different roads to polyarchy56, starting from closed 
hegemonies, where there is a low possibility to take part in elections and to have a public office, 
and where there is also a low possibility to publicly ‘contest' the regime (contestation meaning, 
among other things, the possibility to express dissent and freely associate with other citizens). 
Such roads are depicted in Figure 3.2 below. 
  
                                                
56 Polyarchy ‘is a political order distinguished by the presence of seven institutions […] 1. Elected 
officials. 2. Free and fair elections. 3. Inclusive suffrage.4. Right to run for office. 5. Freedom of 
expression. 6. Alternative information. 7. Associational autonomy.’ (Dahl, 1989, p. 221). 
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Figure 3.2 The three paths to polyarchy according to Dahl 
 
Source: author’s elaboration based on Dahl’s Figures 2.1 and 3.1 (1971, p. 7; 34) 
 
The first path is the most common one from the historical viewpoint, and it is characterised 
by an opening of the liberalisation sector (i.e. in the possibility to freely associate and freely 
express dissent towards the regime) (path I in the figure). This gives birth to regimes called 
competitive oligarchies, possibly followed by an increase in the rights to participate in free and 
fair elections (the dashed line in the upper part of the figure). It is the road followed by the 
United Kingdom in its historical democratic development (Dahl, 1971, p. 34). Conversely, the 
second path is reversed: there is a first increase in the ‘inclusiveness’ dimension (path II in the 
figure), creating inclusive hegemonies, followed by an opening of the ‘liberalisation’ dimension 
(the dashed line in the right part of the figure), and it is the path followed by Germany between 
the end of the First World War and the demise of the Weimar Republic (Dahl, 1971, p. 34). 
Finally, the third road (path III in the figure) is the contemporary opening of both dimensions, 
and it is the road taken by Italy, Germany, and Japan at the end of the Second World War57.  
Now, there are some things of interest here. To begin with, the movement on the X and the 
Y axes might vary: some countries might be (have been) very inclusive but not very liberalised, 
or vice versa. Moreover, there are different roads bringing to the same destination (polyarchy), 
and this is shown by the fact that different countries might follow different paths towards the 
upper right part of Figure 3.2. Finally, Dahl underlines that democracy ‘might be conceived of as 
lying at the upper right corner [of Figure 3.2]. But since democracy may involve more 
                                                
57 Albeit Dahl himself (1971, pp. 37–38) recognizes these cases might be too ambiguous to be 
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dimensions than the two […] and since (in my view) no large system in the real world is fully 
democratized, I prefer to call real world systems that are closest to the upper right corner 
polyarchies', and therefore, from a slightly more general viewpoint, ‘[p]olyarchies, then, may be 
thought of as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes' (Dahl, 1971, p. 8). Let us keep 
these three points in mind for a moment and present Figure 3.3 below. 
 
Figure 3.3 The three paths to Party Leader General Inclusiveness 
 
 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
Figure 3.3 above tries to draw a comparison between, on the one hand, the polyarchy-
leaning evolution of political regimes depicted by Dahl and the opening of party leader selection 
rules, which is the centre of this dissertation. The Candidacy axis represents the Liberalisation 
dimension in Dahl’s framework, while the Selectorate axis represents the Inclusiveness 
dimension put forward by Dahl. Finally, the upper-right corner of Figure 3.3 is occupied by 
Party Leader General Inclusiveness in lieu of Polyarchy.  
As a preliminary starting point, some might argue that this comparison cannot be made, 
given that evident differences would exist between a political regime and a political party. 
Nonetheless, Rahat (2013) and Rahat and Shapira (2016) convincingly show how it is possible to 
compare state-level democracy with candidate selection or even with Intra-Party Democracy. I 
would not go that far in the comparison, limiting to try to draw an analogy between the Dahl's 
paths to polyarchy and the party leader selection paths to an outcome I call Party Leader General 
Inclusiveness. When parties reach such end, there is both a high inclusiveness (in the selectorate 



















inclusiveness (in Dahl's words) means that a wide selectorate (a very open selectorate) has the 
right to pick the leader, while high liberalisation (again, in Dahl's words) means a wide group of 
people can put forward their candidacy for this post (i.e. candidacy is very open).  
Turning our attention to Figure 3.3, it depicts three possible paths to Party Leader General 
Inclusiveness. More specifically, the outcome is reached when parties allow at least all of their 
members to select the party leader, and when at least all party members can put forward their 
candidacy for the party leadership. Starting from Duverger’s consideration (1964), according to 
which members constitute the demos of a political party, it descends that a political party reaches a 
very high level of Party Leader General Inclusiveness when both the selectorate and the 
candidacy dimension are very inclusive (when they both reach sufficiently high levels of 
openness). Obviously, parties can also get to other outcomes, from where they can travel 
towards the destination in the upper right corner of the figure. For instance, they can stop in the 
lower right corner or the upper left corner, or in some intermediate position.   
Up to now, the comparison between Figure 3.2 and 3.3 seems weak. Yet, let us recall the 
three points underlined by Dahl that we have discussed some page above. Starting from first 
one, as in the historical evolution of political regimes, parties can differently move on the X and 
the Y axes: in other words, they can have different levels of openness on the selectorate and the 
candidacy dimensions. The chapters in the book by Pilet and Cross (2014b) are very telling in 
this regard.  
Second, again as state-level regimes, and as a consequence of the first point, there are 
different ways to reach (or approach) the Party Leader General Inclusiveness position: parties 
may decide to open both the selectorate and the candidacy dimension, or just the candidacy, or 
just the selectorate. The first path is surely not very frequent (Cross and Pilet, 2014), as well as 
the second one. The most numerous openings solely deal with the selectorate dimension. In 
other words, parties, unlike states in their historical evolution, have mainly moved on the X axis 
(the Selectorate) and, more importantly, almost all movements on this axis have been openings 
(i.e., the selectorate for party leaders has generally been made more inclusive than before), while 
movements, and openings, on the Y axis (the Candidacy) are definitely rarer (Cross and Pilet, 
2014). Reiterating an argument already made in the previous section, it is crucial to focus on the 
selectorate, because analysing its openings and the determinants behind them can tell us very 
important about political parties. 
Nonetheless, following Figure 3.3 and comparing it with Figure 3.2, can we talk about 
‘democratised’ party leader selection rules when just one dimension of analysis (be it the 
candidacy or the selectorate) is open, or very inclusive, while the other one is not as much open 
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as the first one? Let us give a couple of examples: let us imagine party A, which allows all its 
members to put forward their candidacy for party leadership, while only the party elite (e.g. the 
national executive) can select the leader. Conversely, let us imagine party B, where all members 
have the right to select the leader, but where just MPs supported by the 20% of the 
parliamentary party can put forward their candidacy. Would we call party A or B ‘democratised’ 
concerning the selection of their leaders? Probably not58.  
In these two cases, there is, alternatively, a possibility for high ‘contestation’ or for high 
‘participation’ (using Dahl’s concepts), but that there is not a chance to have high contestation 
and high participation. This means that intra-party power-holders would be more likely to have 
more control over the party leader selection process. Indeed, if the candidacy dimension is very 
open, but the selectorate is not, intra-party power-holders would have great power in the selection 
of the party leader. Conversely, if the dimension which is extremely open is the selectorate, but 
the candidacy is not, such power-holders would have a great influence over the candidates for the 
position of party leader. 
Such control would tend to be reduced in case both the candidacy and the selectorate 
dimension were very inclusive. From a theoretical viewpoint, a party might be indeed extremely 
inclusive on both the Selectorate (Inclusiveness) and the Candidacy (Liberalisation) axes. What 
does it mean for the reasoning put forward in this section? In my view, even when both the 
candidacy and the selectorate dimension are very inclusive, it would be better not to use the term 
‘democratisation' of party leader selection rules. Such choice is not simply driven by the fact that 
Intra-Party Democracy is an essentially contested concept, as argued by Cross and Katz (2013), 
but also by the consideration that Intra-Party Democracy and the democratisation of political 
parties have a more complex meaning (e.g., see Marino and Martocchia Diodati, 2017). As 
argued by Dahl concerning the differences between polyarchy and democracy, even if the 
candidacy and the selectorate dimensions are very open, I prefer to talk about a General 
Inclusiveness that can be reached under certain circumstances59. 
                                                
58 This reasoning expands Mair’s point about the fact that ‘intra-party democratisation is often 
meaningless and/or illusory. Thus, for example, while ordinary members may be given the right 
to vote in the leadership selection process, they are nevertheless often offered only a limited or 
constrained choice’ (Mair, 1994, pp. 16–17). It is surprising how such words have received such 
insufficient attention in the comparative scholarship on party leader selection. 
59 On a side note, this discussion has been useful also to mark a distinction between Figure 3.3 
presented in this Section and the figure put forward by Pasquino and Valbruzzi (2016). Indeed, 
the two authors present a figure which is also based on Dahl’s box, and whose X and Y axes are, 
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After having seen that the selectorate is at the centre of party changes in leader selection, 
and at the centre of comparative political scholarship, what does it tell us about political parties 
from a general standpoint? In other words, why do party leader selection rules become a feasible 
area to tackle? Moreover, does this signal that there is not a real willingness by party elites to 
open their political formations, given that the candidacy dimension is seldom opened?  
I do not think so: indeed, opening the selectorate means that party elites lose a certain 
amount of control concerning the selection of party leaders, as also argued by some scholars 
(Marsh, 1993a; LeDuc, 2001). Shall we then conclude that this means that a wider selectorate of 
the party leader has an ‘absolute' power? Again, this might be a hasty conclusion: Mair (1994) 
recalls that openings of party leader selection rules might simply be a way to take away power 
from middle-level troublesome activists and to empower more ‘docile’ and less extreme groups 
of people, like the rank-and-file. This point is also further discussed in Katz and Mair (2002) and 
Scarrow, Webb and Farrell (2000), and shows that even the second ‘extreme’ conclusion might 
be misplaced. A middle-of-the-road interpretation of the openings of the selectorate of party 
leaders is that intra-party power-holders might want to signal something both inside and outside 
the party. In other words, and already recalling the general argument made in Chapter 1, party 
leader selectorate becomes an area where it is useful to intervene in order to underline that 
internal or external ‘messages’ (i.e. shocks) or pressures do have an effect on political parties, and 
have an effect on the selection of party leaders, who have been allegedly become more and more 
important from several viewpoints. A possible addendum to this point is that by reforming 
(opening) party leader selection rules, parties might appear as more flexible and more able to 
efficiently cope with internal or external challenges60. 
                                                                                                                                                  
respectively, inclusiveness and competition, while the upper right corner is labelled ‘Intra-Party 
Democracy’. My conception of the application of Dahl’s box with respect to party leader 
selection rules differs from that by Pasquino and Valbruzzi in two fundamental points: first, I do 
not have a competition-like (or contestation, as explained by the authors) Y axis, given my Y axis 
is related to the candidacy dimension of party leader selection rules. Second, and more 
importantly, the authors have Intra-Party Democracy as a final outcome when both the 
selectorate is expanded (X axis) and when the decisions of the leader can be ‘widely’ contested 
(Y axis), while I argue that even if the X and Y axes (in my framework, the selectorate and the 
candidacy dimensions) are extremely inclusive, we cannot talk about Intra-Party Democracy, but 
simply about Party Leader General Inclusiveness. 
60 Some very interesting considerations on the reasons why parties might decide to focus on 
specific areas to reform can be found in Gauja’s book (2016, pp. 106–111). 
	 61 
At this point some clarification is needed: Section 3.1 has been devoted to underline the 
general framework within which my hypotheses are formulated, and Chapters 4 and 5 specifically 
deal with such hypotheses. In other words, these two chapters answer the question: why do 
parties open their leader selection rules (their selectorates)? Here I have focused on different 
questions: why do party leadership rules become a suitable area where intra-party power holders 
may decide to intervene? What makes party leader selection rules so attractive? It is clear that the 
latter questions are different from the first one, and this is why I have dealt with these latter 
questions in this section. 
All in all, in this section, I have drawn a comparison between, on the one hand, Dahl's box 
and his conceptualisation of the different paths towards polyarchy, and, on the other hand, the 
various openings that might happen within political parties on leaders' selectorate or candidacy 
dimensions. I have also put forward an original way to understand the difference between 
openings either on the candidacy or the selectorate and openings ofvolving both dimensions. In 
this latter case, if some specific thresholds are reached, we might talk about a Party Leader 
General Inclusiveness. After this discussion, it is time to go back to explaining the openings of 
party leader selectorates. Which countries are included in the empirical analysis? Which parties 
are considered? Which are the features of the DVs? The next section answers these questions. 
 
3.4 Time and space: the case selection and the features of the party leader 
selectorates 
 
It is time to clarify the temporal and the spatial span of this dissertation. I analyse the 
determinants of the openings of party leader selection rules in Western Europe. The focus on 
Western Europe has been driven by the fact that studies on party leader selection rules have this 
area as a crucial focus. Moreover, Western Europe has been at the centre of political research for 
many decades, and this means it is possible to have at one's disposal an extremely rich amount of 
data, which are fundamental, as I show in the next two chapters, to proficiently analyse the 
openings of party leader selection rules. 
More specifically, I focus on 10 Western European countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom61. These 10 
                                                
61 The reason behind the selection of these countries also lies in the results of the Personalisation 
of Party Politics expert survey I have devised along with Nicola Martocchia Diodati and Luca 
Verzichelli (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017) and whose data are used in the 
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countries show a good institutional, social, and political variability, therefore allowing for a 
potentially useful explanation for the openings of the selectorate for many Western European 
parties. France has been instead excluded. Indeed, a central political and party-related moment in 
France is surely the election of the President of the Republic. Who would be the party leader for 
French political formations62? For some parties, it might be easy to posit the presidential 
candidate is the leader, but what about other parties? And, more crucially for this work, what 
happens if a party loses the presidential election? Would the defeated candidate be the leader, 
despite having lost the presidential race? Or, conversely, would the head of the extra-
parliamentary organisation the organ to focus on? It is evident answering these questions risks 
introducing a serious bias. Considering that also French scholars do not have a clear or 
encompassing answer to these questions63, I have decided to exclude France from this analysis. 
The time-span considered in this study is the 1985-2015 period. In this way, societal and 
party organisational changes occurred in Western Europe in the past few decades can be 
accounted for: in other words, a long-term and encompassing perspective can be adopted, and 
this can be very fruitful from the explanation and also from the comparative viewpoints64. 
Moreover, the mid-1980s is a good starting point also to allow some time to pass between the 
democratic transition and at least the inception of the democratic consolidation in three 
Southern European countries (Portugal, Spain, and Greece, which are indeed included in the 
analysis), thus allowing for comparing more homogeneous countries from the democracy 
viewpoint. 
Turning our attention to the selection of parties, the aim has been that of selecting relevant 
actors in each country. Which criteria can be used to reach this target? The literature has 
proposed several cutting points: for instance, having obtained at least 3% of the votes in a given 
election (Ware, 1996), or at least 5% of seats in at least two consecutive elections (Janda, 1980), 
or having reached 10% of the seats in at least one election (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Such 
                                                                                                                                                  
empirical analysis of this dissertation. For some Western European countries (Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden), it has been impossible to obtain answers to some specific questions of 
the survey. Therefore, these countries have been excluded from the empirical analysis and they 
are also not considered in this section. 
62 See also fn. 45 in Section 3.2. 
63 Personal communication of the author with Florence Faucher and with Christophe Roux. 
64 On a side note, data on the Personalisation of Party Politics survey are only available from the 
mid-1980s onwards, and this might be another reason to consider concerning the time-span of 
the empirical analysis.  
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criteria, albeit being either too restrictive or too loose, pave the way for devising a good middle-
of-the-road solution. I have adopted a two-fold criterion: having obtained at least 5% of the 
votes in one election between the mid-1980s and the mid-2010s, and having reached at least 1% 
of the votes in a single election for the party to be included for that specific election. This 
solution has been driven by a series of considerations: while a threshold is needed (and that is 
why the 5% of the votes is applied), it is also useful to consider the possibility that once-
important parties have completely or almost completely disappeared from the political scene due 
to a slow decay or to an abrupt drop in their share of votes (e.g. the Italian PSI in 1994). In these 
latter cases, such parties are not relevant actors of the system anymore, and this must be taken 
into account when selecting the parties for the empirical analysis. Moreover, the same threshold 
is useful in the decision concerning when to start considering a party that has (slowly or abruptly) 
increased its presence in the electorate and the political system (e.g. the Dutch SP in 1994). 
Following the same reasoning applied to ‘crumbling' parties, even in this case, these parties start 
being relevant actors of the political system, and this must be considered in the case selection. 
The following step has been that of obtaining data for the leader selectorates of the parties 
that reach the above-mentioned two-fold threshold. In some cases, data have been collected 
thanks to the 2015 version of the Comparative Study of Party Leaders (COSPAL) dataset 
created for the books edited by Pilet and Cross (2014b) and by Cross and Pilet (2015) while, in 
some other cases, personal communication with country experts has been used65. I have also 
performed additional research to fill gaps concerning parties and/or countries66. Data have been 
aggregated at the legislature level, given some crucial factors, that should allegedly favour the 
openings of party leader selection rules (of the selectorate), and that have been presented in 
Section 3.1, only vary at the legislature level, like electoral setbacks and those related to the 
                                                
65 E.g. data for Austrian parties from 2013 to 2015 have been provided by Laurenz Ennser-
Jedenastik, Belgian parties from 2013 to 2014 have been obtained thanks to personal 
communication with Emilie Van Haute, data on Greek parties have been provided by Costas 
Eleftheriou, data for Portuguese parties from 2013 up to 2015 have been given by Isabella 
Razzuoli. 
66 E.g. data for Irish parties have been retried from several different sources (Farrell, 1992; 
Marsh, 1993b; Cross and Blais, 2012; Poguntke, Scarrow and Webb, 2016b; Rafter, 2016; 
Bolleyer and Weeks, 2017), as well as data on Dutch parties, where both pieces of research (Van 
Holsteyn, Koole and Den Ridder, 2014; Voerman, 2014) and personal communication with 
scholars (specifically, with Martijin van Nijnanten) have been used. 
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personalisation of politics67, and also given some others substantially vary only in each legislature 
(like the opposition status of a party, which can vary if the majority supporting a government 
changes, but such changes are not very frequent in my dataset)68. In order to have logically 
organised data, aggregating data at the legislature level means that a change in a party leader' 
selectorate is only reported if such change lasts at least until the end of a legislature (or the end 
of a given period). Otherwise, given this party would have the same score on the selectorate 
continuum both at the beginning and at the end of a legislature, this very short-term movement 
cannot be categorised as a change. As shown in a moment, this only applies to a specific case for 
a German party in 1993: it follows that almost all cases considered in the analysis involve parties 
that have opened party leader' selectorates and have maintained such opening for a reasonable 
amount of time. All in all, I have obtained data for more than 50 parties from the mid-1980s 
until the mid-2010s69. Appendix A reports the parties, their acronyms, and the period for which 
they have been considered70. 
                                                
67 For further information, see Chapters 4 and 5. 
68 Further notice this choice has also been taken in other analyses on party leader selection rules, 
like the one by Meyer and Odom (2016). 
69 Legislatures starting in 2014 or 2015 have been excluded from the analysis. Also, parties 
contesting just one election in the period under examination have been excluded as well. 
Moreover, two parties have been omitted from the analysis for two different reasons. On the 
one hand, I have excluded the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) because of its peculiar 
membership structure. The founder and party leader, Geert Wilders, is the sole member of the 
party (and he also has the power to select the political leader of the party). This means that the 
membership-decline-related factor I discuss in Chapter 4 might be at odds with a party whose 
membership is only made by the party leader. On the other hand, I have excluded the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) since I have obtained information on its leader selectorate 
only for the 2005-2010 and 2010-2015 legislatures. Since I did not want to include only partial 
information for a party (given the first entry of the UKIP in my dataset should have been in 
1997, and I was, therefore, risking biasing the analysis by not inserting possible openings of the 
selectorate between 1997 and 2010), I have decided to exclude the UKIP from the analysis. 
Nonetheless, I have replicated all the empirical analyses performed in Chapter 6 – by attributing 
0 on the membership-decline-related variable for the PVV and only using 2005-2010 and 2010-
2015 entries for the UKIP – and the results are similar to those shown in Chapter 6. Finally, also 
the Portuguese Left Bloc (BE) has been excluded, given that it has been impossible to detect a 
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It is useful to turn our attention to a more precise description of data related to the 
selectorate for party leadership selection. A first striking piece of evidence, albeit confirmed by 
earlier studies focusing on single countries (Detterbeck and Rohlfing, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik 
and Müller, 2014), is that, for some countries, there is not a single opening of party leader 
selection rules (Austria and Germany). Detterbeck and Rohlfing (2014, pp. 80–81) report the 
quickly reversed opening of the selectorate by the SPD in 1993, which was followed by a closing 
the following year. Nonetheless, this means that the SPD' value on the selectorate continuum at 
the beginning and the end of the legislature (1990-1994) was the same, equal to a selection by the 
party congress.   
In some other countries, a certain number of openings can be detected. For instance, almost 
all Belgian parties have opened their leader selectorate in the period under examination: some 
parties passed from a congress-based selection of the party leader to a party primary selection: 
the Walloon Socialist party (PS) in 1997, the Flemish Socialist party (SP/SPA) in 1995, the 
Flemish Christian Democratic party (CVP/CDV) in 1993, as well as the Walloon Liberal party 
(PRL/MR) in 1989 and the Flemish Liberal party (PVV/VLD/OVLD) in 1993. Moreover, some 
Belgian parties opened their selectorate in an even stronger way, passing from a party-elite-based 
selection to a party primary: the Flemish Green party (AGALEV) in 1995 and the Flemish 
VU/NVA in 1999. Finally, the Flemish VB also opened its selectorate for the party leadership in 
2004, passing from a leadership-based selection to a party-elite one. Interestingly, some other 
Belgian parties – the Walloon Christian-Democratic one (PSC/CDH) and the Walloon Green 
party (ECOLO) have not open their leader selection in the period under study because, in the 
former case, an opening was performed in 1970, and, in the latter case, the party was born 
already ‘endowed' with a membership-based leadership selection.   
Turning our attention to Greece, there are parties that never opened their leaders' 
selectorate from mid-1980s until mid-2010s (the KKE and, for the most recent years, DIMAR), 
while there are political formations that opened just once (SYNASPISMOS in 1993, passing 
from party elite to party congress; PASOK in 2004, moving from party congress to a party 
primary), and even a party that opened for even three times its selectorate (ND, which made its 
selectorate more inclusive in 1985, from MPs to an electoral college, in 1997, from the electoral 
college to the party congress, and, finally, in 2009, from the congress to the party primary). 
                                                                                                                                                  
clear leadership organ within the party for the period under examination, also following the 
considerations by Lisi and Freire (2014). 
70 In the empirical analysis, whose results are shown in Chapter 6, some parties have been 
excluded, given that data for some independent variables were not available. 
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Irish parties have also been at the centre of an expansion of the leader’ selectorate. While 
the Labour party was the ‘early bird’ in this regard, having opened its selectorate in 1989 (from 
party MPs to party primary), the FG opened in 2004 (from MPs to an electoral college), as well 
as the PD in 2004 (again, from MPs to an electoral college), and, finally, the FF in 2015 (from 
MPs to an electoral college). 
Also, some Italian parties opened their leader’ selectorate in the 1985-2015 period. For 
instance, the FI opened its selectorate in 1997, passing from a party-elite-based selection of the 
leader to a congress-based one, while the post-communist DS opened twice in about two years: 
in 1998, passing, again, from a party-elite-based to a congress-based selection of the party leader, 
and in 2000, when a party primary was implemented. Finally, the LN opened its selectorate in 
2013, passing from a congress-based leader selection to a party-primary-based one. The other 
Italian parties considered in the analysis did not open their leaders’ selectorates (PRC, UDC, and 
the like)71. 
Turning our attention to the Netherlands, apart from the GL that opened its selectorate in 
1993, passing from the congress to the members72 (coded as party primary in my dataset), all the 
openings occurred between 2002 (the PVDA passed from congress to members, i.e. party 
primary) and in 2003 (both the CDA and the VVD moved from a congress-based to a 
membership-based, or primary-based, selection), while the SP and the D66 never opened their 
party leader selectorate in the period under study. 
Let us move to the Iberian Peninsula. Starting from Portugal, the main openings happened 
in 1986 (the PSD passed from a party-elite-based to a congress-based selection of the leader), 
1998 (the PS leader’ selectorate passed from party elite to a party primary) and between 2005 and 
2006 (respectively, the CDS opened the leader’ selectorate from the congress to the party 
                                                
71 Appendix B shows that the PD, born after the merging of the post-communist DS and the 
post-Christian democratic DL, has received a new party ID in my dataset. This means that the 
adoption of an open primary to select the leader of the party in 2007 cannot be deemed as an 
opening, given that the PD is considered as a newly-born party, and therefore, from my 
perspective, it adopted a certain party leader selectorate in 2007, while it did not open it – being the 
party non-existent before the decision to adopt the open primary as way of selecting the party 
leader. 
72 For this dissertation, the selection of the leader by a Dutch ‘membership congress' is 
considered as equivalent to a selection by party members in other Western European countries. 
Therefore, such selectorate falls into the ‘party primary' category of the 6-point ordinal scale 
presented in Section 3.2.  
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primary, and the PSD followed the same path the next year)73. As in all cases of communist 
parties hitherto analysed, no openings are detectable for the PCP. 
Moving to Spain, only did the PSOE change their leader selectorate in 2014 (from congress 
to a party primary)74. The AP/PP and the PCE/IU did not open their selectorate between the 
mid-1980s and mid-2010s. 
Finally, two British parties out of the three included in the case selection opened their 
leaders’ selectorate between 1985 and 2015: in 1998, the Conservative Party passed from a 
parliamentary-party-based to a party primary75, while the Labour Party abandoned the electoral 
college in 2014 for a selection of the leader by means of a party primary76. 
                                                
73 Notice that Portuguese parties are among the few political formations where a closing in the 
leader selectorate is detectable. In 1986, the PS leader’ selectorate passed from party congress to 
the party elite, while in 2011 the CDS closed the selectorate for its leader (passing from a party 
primary to the party congress). 
74 Following the reasoning according to which only a movement towards a higher value on the 
selectorate continuum presented in Section 3.2 constitutes an opening, I do not consider as such 
the modification in the way of counting votes for the PSOE’s congress in 1994 (from a territory-
based counting of delegates votes to a ‘one delegate one vote’ system). 
75 The Conservative Party’ selection of the party leader consists of a first selection by party MPs, 
who reduce the number of contenders to two people, followed by a membership selection 
between these two people. How to categorise such selection? The first phase of reducing the 
number of candidates does not necessarily lead to a parliamentary-party-based selection of the 
leader. Notice Theresa May’s direct selection in 2016 by the parliamentary party was triggered by 
the fact that the alleged opponent in the soon-to-be membership selection, Andrea Leadsom, 
retired from the competition, leaving May the sole candidate for party leadership. Therefore, 
party members’ role in the selection of the Conservative Party’s leader can be extremely 
important. From a slightly speculative viewpoint, the first elimination phase by party MPs can be 
thought of as a sort of ‘candidacy requirement’ for perspective party leaders: in order to be an 
‘effective’ candidate (i.e. a candidate that reaches the decisive stage of membership vote), a 
person needs to secure the support of a sufficiently high number of MPs so that he/she finishes 
either first or second in the parliamentary party’s elimination ballot. Then, if this person reaches 
such candidacy requirement, he/she will run against his/her opponent in the membership vote. 
This is the reasoning behind my choice of considering the Conservative Party’s leader selectorate 
as equivalent to a membership-based one. Therefore, even in this case, the party’ selectorate falls 





In this chapter, I have presented the general framework within which my analysis moves. 
Then, I turned the attention to the operationalization of the focus of my study - the openings of 
the party leader selectorates – comparing my operationalization with that of other scholars. I 
have underlined that the two different viewpoints from which leader selectorates can be seen 
shall be related to two different dependent variables: a dichotomous one and an ordinal one. 
Before moving to a more detailed analysis of the party leader selectorates under examination (the 
time-span of the analysis, the countries and the parties included in this work), I have drawn a 
comparison between, on the one hand, Dahl's account of the historical movement towards 
polyarchy and, on the other hand, the analysis of the openings of the selectorate of party leaders 
(which could eventually lead to a Party Leader General Opening if both the candidacy and the 
selectorate dimensions are sufficiently open). Such comparison has also had the aim of 
understanding whether we can talk about a democratisation of party leader selection rules when 
only one dimension of analysis (in this case, the selectorate) is made more inclusive, and my 
answer has been a negative one. 
At this point, the reader should have a sufficiently clear idea of the party leader selectorates 
and the cases under consideration in this dissertation. What remains to be fully explored is the 
precise way in which internal and external factors contribute favouring the opening of party 
leader selectorates. I begin with the internal factors, explored in Chapter 4, before moving to the 
external ones, tackled in the subsequent Chapter 5. 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
76 Following, again, the reasoning according to which an opening on the selectorate is 
represented by a movement towards a higher value on the selectorate continuum presented in 
Section 3.2, the 1993 modification of the share of votes attributed to party members, party MPs 
and members of collateral organisations within the Labour Party has not been considered as an 
opening. 
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Chapter 4 – The internal factors behind the openings of party 
leader selectorates 
 
‘[W]e think that it is important to explicitly state […] that some party change can be 
explained by internal factors alone’ (Harmel and Janda, 1994a, p. 265). This interesting quote 
might serve as a starting point for this chapter: without being so clear-cut, I would argue that 
internal factors might be of great help to start shedding some light on the openings of party 
leader selection rules (more specifically, in party leader selectorates). 
 This chapter focuses on internal determinants of party leader selectorates' openings. Five 
factors are considered: two more classical internal factors, leadership changes (Section 4.1), a 
decline in party membership (Section 4.2). Then, two factors related to the personalisation of 
politics are tackled: the party leader's ability to drive consensus towards the party in a general 
election (Section 4.3), and the control of the party organisation by the party leader (Section 4.4). 
Finally, I deal with the ideological family to which each party belongs (Section 4.5).   
If the first two factors can be deemed as closer to classical analyses of party change and of 
changes (openings) in party leader selection rules, the discussion about the third and fourth 
factor constitutes the first attempt, to the best of my knowledge, to in-depth connect the 
personalisation of politics at the intra-party level and party leader selection rules. For each of the 
first four factors, I discuss the main findings and limitations of existing research, then put 
forward a formal hypothesis, and carefully explain the operationalisation. In the final section, I 
then explain why I control for parties' ideological family in the empirical analysis. 
 As a final notice, starting from this chapter, I use expressions like ‘probability to open the 
selectorate', ‘likelihood to open the selectorate', ‘more chances to open the selectorate'. They 
have been chosen for a precise reason. The two DVs under examination (the dichotomous one 
and the ordinal one) are analysed by means of generalised linear models, and therefore the 
independent variables' effect on the DVs shall be interpreted as an increase (decrease) in the 
probability that the DVs have a certain value (be it 1 for the dichotomous DV or a specific value 
on the 6-point ordinal scale for the ordinal DV). Therefore, for readability and consistency 
reasons, from this chapter onwards, precise reference is made to probabilities related to the 




4.1 The leadership change 
 
The first internal factor potentially affecting the probability that a party leader’s selectorate 
becomes more inclusive is related to a change in the party leader himself/herself. We can 
intuitively connect a change in the party leadership to an intra-party crisis and, possibly, to a 
successive opening of party leader selectorates. For instance, when the leader of a party resigns 
(or dies, or is replaced), especially if the party is a relevant one, this becomes a piece of news to 
be discussed in newspapers, on TV, on the Internet. Which are the theoretical and, if any, 
empirical grounds behind the intuition connecting party leaders’ change and party leader’ 
selection rules (selectorates)?  
Starting from the pioneering contribution by Janda (1990), Harmel and Janda (1994a, p. 266) 
argue that a change in the party leadership, either brought about by the ‘natural’ exit of the leader 
(illness or death) or by his/he removal, is likely to bring about party change. The reasons behind 
this link are related, according to Harmel and Janda (1994a), to the necessity to deal with the 
wishes of the winning internal factions. To this reasoning, I would add that it might be necessary 
to mark a strong discontinuity with the old leadership, which has either ‘naturally’ come to an 
end or has been abruptly interrupted. To be fair, Harmel and Janda themselves argue that a 
leadership change might not have such a strong effect on the likelihood of party change 
(especially if compared with external shocks), but their fifth proposition states that ‘[a] change in 
the person who leads the party is likely to produce party change […] simply to consolidate the new leader’s 
power base within the party […or] to impose new methods for achieving party goals’ (Harmel 
and Janda, 1994a, p. 280).  
The proposition is slightly problematic in that it deals with a person leading the party 
(therefore possibly contrasting with the existence of a collective body that leads it), but a more 
substantial point to recall is that already one year later do Harmel et al. (1995) recognise that 
leadership change might be important in fostering party change, for a series of reasons, ranging 
from the possible relevant differences between outgoing and ingoing leaders to the willingness of 
new leaders to bring about innovations to consolidate their hold on the party, to the generally 
destabilising nature of leadership changes. Their analysis shows there is empirical confirmation 
for a certain effect of leadership changes on party changes.   
So, a theoretical, and partly empirically tested, connection between a leadership change and 
party change exists. Yet, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, many analyses on party change 
have had a qualitative focus, therefore tackling a few or even just one party. Hence, 
unsurprisingly, as already briefly seen in Chapter 2, the subsequent analyses by Müller (1997) and 
Bille (1997) come to partly different conclusions: in the former analysis, devoted to the Austrian 
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SPÖ between the mid-1940s and 1970, leadership change is a crucial source for party change. 
Conversely, in the latter study, focusing on the Danish Social Democratic party between 1960 
and 1995, it is argued that the party manifesto and the party rules related to the internal 
distribution of power are not affected by a change in the leadership, and only a limited change in 
the coalition-related party behaviour is detectable. All in all, the findings related to leadership 
changes are partial and contradictory.   
Yet, it would be wrong to dismiss the role of leadership change in fostering party change 
(and therefore, in supporting an opening of party leader selection selectorates). If we slightly 
widen the scope of analysis, it can be noticed that another area of research not so distant from 
party leader selection rules is thought to be affected by leader change: candidate selection rules. 
Indeed, in their seminal contribution on the determinants of candidate selection reforms, Barnea 
and Rahat (2007, p. 387), argue that a leadership contest, or a leadership succession, can trigger 
change of candidate selection rules, because ‘[l]eadership succession, and even a serious 
leadership contest, may intensify pressures for reform because this can serve the interest of a 
strong contender, or of a new leader, to reshuffle the former power balance’. Despite the fact 
that their reasoning (strongly) resembles the one put forward in the party change literature, this is 
the first contribution where explicit reference is made not simply to the wide topic of party 
change, but to a narrower area of research (which is definitely closer to leader selection rules), i.e. 
candidate selection.  
After this first step, Chiru et al. (2015) hypothesise that leadership change should influence 
changes in party leader selection rules77, and the empirical analysis does indeed find empirical 
confirmation for this hypothesis. Finally, it is Gauja (2016, pp. 148–154) who points out at some 
important elements to consider when weighting the role of party leaders in driving party change, 
and her considerations might be extremely interesting from a party leader selection rules 
viewpoint. According to Gauja, party leaders can ‘establish agency', meaning that they can 
publicly affirm their role as drivers of change, endowed with a certain amount of power to do so; 
second, they can present reforms to the wide public, having the possibility to speak to the people 
as ‘the most important figure in a party'; third, they can carefully craft changes as having positive 
and modernising aims and consequences for the party. Finally, Gauja (2016, pp. 105–114) also 
argues that many relevant reforms are implemented by the parties she includes in the empirical 
analysis within a short period (approximately a year) after the selection of a new leader, and this 
                                                
77 Let us recall their analysis includes several dimensions of analysis, including de-selection rules, 
party leaders’ term length and the maximum number of terms allowed for a person to be a party 
leader. 
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should allegedly bring about some evidence on the strong impact that a leadership change might 
have on party changes.  
Therefore, it might be reasonable to expect a change in a party’s leadership might have a 
certain effect on the likelihood the party changes something at the intra-party level. Going more 
into detail, there might also be an effect on the probability that parties open party leader 
selection rules, given the great importance these rules have at the intra-party level. Therefore, I 
test the theoretical and empirical arguments put forward in the party change literature, in the 
candidate selection one, and in the party leader selection and de-selection literature. All in all, my 
first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1. Leadership change increases the probability for a party to open the selectorate of its leader. 
 
 How to operationalize leadership change to create a variable for the empirical analysis? 
Despite its apparent simplicity, different researchers have come to different conclusions: for 
instance, Chiru et al. (2015) tackle the problem according to which a leadership change can 
happen in the same year as the changes in party leader selection rules. They solve the problem by 
arguing that it is likely what comes first is the selection of the leader, followed by the change in 
the rules. Yet, this might be a non-totally satisfactory solution. I have created a dichotomous 
variable, called Leadership Change, operationalizing whether in a certain legislature there is at least 
one leadership change before an opening of the selectorate.  
This choice has been driven by the logical consideration that a leadership change cannot 
affect the opening of the selectorate if the latter happens before the former. Moreover, if the 
leadership change occurs in the same year of an opening of the selectorate, I have checked which 
of the two events comes first. In other words, I have investigated which selectorate elected the 
leader: if the former has not changed concerning past leadership selections, it logically follows 
that what comes first is the leadership change, followed by an opening of the selectorate. 
Furthermore, if a new party comes to life (e.g. the Irish Progressive Democrats in 1987, or 
the Italian FI in 1994), the ‘selection’ of the first leader for this new party has not been 
considered as a leadership change, given that such person has not replaced another party leader. 
Let us take FI’s example: the fact that Silvio Berlusconi became the leader of the party when the 
party was founded cannot be considered as a leadership change: before him, there was nobody 
leading the party, for the logical reason the party did not exist before his leadership. Therefore, 
he was the first leader, and also the founder, of the party. 
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Data for this variable have mainly been obtained from the 2015 version of the COSPAL 
dataset used in the Pilet and Cross’ (2014b) and Cross and Pilet’s (2015) books. For Irish parties, 
data have been retrieved from Marsh (1993b), Rafter (2016) and O’Malley and Murphy (2017), 
while data on leadership change in Dutch parties have been taken from the Dutch 
Documentation Centre for Political Parties (DNPP)78. Appendix B reports further details related 
to party- or country-specific issues concerning the operationalization of Leadership Change.  
 












United Kingdom 50 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
Table 4.1 above reports, for each country, the percentage of party-cases (that is, of each 
party in each legislature) having had at least one leadership change in the considered period. For 
instance, almost 50% of Austrian party-cases from 1986 until 2015 changed their leader. As it 
can be seen, data for this variable show interesting differences: some countries where openings 
of party leader selection rules have been rarer (Spain, and Italy) show a lower percentage of 
changes in party leadership. Conversely, Belgium and Portugal, where more openings of party 
leader selection rules are detectable, also show high values of leadership changes. Yet, German 
party-cases, where no change at all is detectable from 1987 until 2015, show extremely high 
values of party leadership changes. German parties, in proportion, are the ones who changed 
more easily their leadership in the period under consideration. This is not surprising, given that 
German party leaders, from the 1980s onwards, have had a very short average tenure 
(Detterbeck and Rohlfing, 2014, p. 88). Another outlier is represented by Greek parties, which 
show the lowest percentage of party-cases where a change in party leadership is detectable from 
the mid-1980s until mid-2010s. Again, this should not come as a surprise, given the tenure of 
some Greek party leaders (especially of the two parties which were main actors of the system 
                                                
78 http://dnpp.ub.rug.nl/dnpp/. 
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until recent years, the ND and the PASOK) is surely longer than the one of their German 
colleagues. 
 All in all, Table 4.1 shows that there seems to be a specific pattern concerning the possible 
relationship between the changes in party leadership and the openings of party leader selection 
rules, albeit the existence of outlying countries shall be noticed. In this sense, the empirical 
analysis performed in Chapter 6 might help us understand this puzzle.  
 
4.2 The membership decline 
 
The second internal factor I deal with is the decline in party membership. This is one of the 
most important elements to consider when analysing party organisations, and its evolution over 
time is at the centre of many analyses: from the mere study of membership figures (Katz et al., 
1992; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012; Van Biezen and 
Poguntke, 2014; Van Haute, Paulis and Sierens, 2017); to research focusing on party members 
via surveys tackling the reasons behind the decision to join the party, their motivations, and so 
forth (Van Haute and Gauja, 2015), also in connection with the adoption of the direct election 
of the party leader by party members or voters (Sandri and Seddone, 2015b; Bernardi, Sandri and 
Seddone, 2017); to analyses related to the determinants of the changes in party membership 
figures (Kölln, 2016; Peters, 2016) or to the changes on party organisations themselves driven by 
party membership diverse trends (Kölln, 2015). 
 Yet, why is a change in a party's membership figures important to understand, and possibly 
contributing explaining, openings of the leader selectorate? Because members are crucial for 
giving a democratic legitimacy to political parties, and their decline is a phenomenon that cannot 
be underestimated. Indeed, between the late 1980s and early 1990s, more and more scholars 
underline the fact that a first decline in membership figures of Western European parties is 
detectable. With the alleged demise of the ‘golden age' (Janda and Colman, 1998) of mass parties, 
societal and organisational changes (Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995) are driving parties 
increasingly towards the electorate and away from party members. Already in 1990 is Richard S. 
Katz writing about the fact that party members, not necessarily contributing with a very 
substantial amount of money to party finances, and increasingly less crucial for communicating 
with voters, are less and less central for party organisations, so much so that parties risk partly 
losing their role of connectors between the state and society (Katz, 1990). This argument is 
enlarged in subsequent contributions (Mair, 1994; Katz and Mair, 1995), but what is of interest 
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here is the fact that party members seem to be considered, already in the early 1990s, as less and 
less important for political parties. Nonetheless, this is not the end of the story. 
Indeed, a crucial word has not entered the discussion yet: legitimacy. One of the most 
important functions performed by party members is giving political formations a strong 
democratic legitimacy (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 2000; Ignazi, 2014; Scarrow, 2014; Gauja, 
2015). To the previous two points (the increasing distancing between parties and the society, and 
the legitimacy that party members continue giving parties) we shall add the fact that party 
membership in Western Europe has been declining for the past few decades (Mair and Van 
Biezen, 2001; Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012; Van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014)79. As a 
consequence, a decline in party membership is not something parties might light-heartedly 
accept without doing nothing. In other words, membership decline is a relevant phenomenon 
that might have deep reverberations within political parties. 
Indeed, Tan (1997) argues that political parties might react to a decline in membership 
figures by implementing party change – and specifically, by reducing the centralisation of power 
and the complexity in political parties80. The author has actually a very nuanced position, 
underlining there is also the possibility that parties react to such decline by simply not changing 
the centralisation of power and the complexity. The results of Tan’s analysis (1997) show that 
party membership decline might affect party change, thus without pointing at a clear relationship 
between the two phenomena. Nonetheless, what is crucial to underline is that a first seed 
connecting the decline in party membership figures to modifications in parties' organisational 
structures is planted. As already seen with regards to leadership changes, even in this case, the 
incremental nature of political research makes it necessary to wait for some years before an 
explicit link is made between membership figures and party leader selection rules. The well-
known article by Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke (2012, pp. 39–40) argues that:  
 
‘The increasingly frequent adoption of broadly based primaries and membership ballots to select 
party leaders and candidates may also reflect recognition by the parties themselves that their 
active memberships are no longer representative […], if primaries are intended to broaden the 
base of leadership support, it makes much more sense to extend the opportunity for 
                                                
79 For a partly different yet very stimulating account of the changes in party membership figures 
in Western Europe, see Scarrow (2000). 
80 Let us recall that Tan starts from a party-change-like perspective, and in this framework party 
leader selection rules are included in the centralization of power cluster of data. For more 
information, see Section 2.1 
	 76 
participation in these primaries beyond the party itself, and certainly beyond the narrow reach of 
the active members’. 
 
 This argument might mean two different things: there is the necessity to open party leader 
selection rules either to account for the now-non-representativeness of party members or to give 
a certain democratic legitimacy to party leaders.  
The line of reasoning by Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke (2012), which unfortunately is not 
further developed in their contribution, is expanded by Scarrow (2014), and, more importantly 
for the purposes of this section, by Wauters (2014) in his analysis of the adoption of OMOV 
leader selection rules in Belgian parties. According to Wauters, Belgian parties might have 
opened their leader selection rules to either fight a membership decline by attracting new 
members and also to keep old members within the party. The results of his empirical analysis 
underline that membership figures might play a role, albeit not a very central one.   
Up to now, we have seen that the connection between party membership figures and 
openings of party leader selection rules does exist, but seems a bit blurred. It is useful to turn to 
Gauja’s book (2016, p. 31), where she interestingly argues that ‘shrinking party memberships 
provide a strong motivation for organisational reform, whether it is to secure more members for 
functional reasons, or simply to demonstrate the party's legitimacy'. 
I do believe the crucial word in the discussion is legitimacy. Political parties need to be 
legitimised, or at least to have a sufficient level of legitimisation to operate. Nonetheless, it is well 
known that political formations have been undergone terrible problems of illegitimacy, especially 
in the Western world and in Western Europe (see for instance the discussion in Ignazi, 2014). 
Therefore, a suitable solution to deal with these problems might be opening the party leader 
selectorate, to signal a certain predisposition towards democracy and other democratic values like 
inclusiveness or participation. In other words, a ‘democratic' legitimacy problem, brought about 
by a decline in party membership, might be fought with the means of an allegedly ‘democracy-
enhancing' reform, i.e., opening the selectorate of party leaders. All in all, my second hypothesis 
is as follows: 
 
H2. The stronger the decline in a party’s membership, the higher the probability for a party to open the selectorate 
of its leader. 
 
The operationalization of the membership decline of a party is obviously strictly connected 
to the general discussion on the operationalization of parties’ membership figures. As already 
partially argued by Duverger (1964, pp. 79–101) and, in a more complete way, by Bartolini (1983, 
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pp. 182–189), there are three different ways to calculate the membership figures of a party: the 
raw number of members (M), the membership/party voters ratio (M/V) and the 
membership/electorate ratio (M/E). The problems with the first two measures are discussed by 
Bartolini (1983, p. 186) and by Katz et al. (1992, pp. 330–331): to begin with, M is strongly 
related to a country's population (the bigger the country, the bigger the party membership 
figures, all other things being equal). Conversely, the problems related to the M/V ratio are 
twofold: on the one hand, a variation in its value might be related to a parallel increase (or 
decrease) in both the party's membership figures and the party's number of voters, or to a 
divergent change (an increase in the former and a decrease in the latter, or vice versa). In this 
second scenario, many problems of interpretation might arise: for instance, ‘does M/V rise 
because the party has managed to encapsulate a higher proportion of its voters, or because the 
party loses voters while not losing members?' (Katz et al., 1992, p. 331). Moreover, and from a 
more general viewpoint, even the broad meaning behind the M/V ratio is debated among 
scholars (Duverger, 1964, p. 92; Bartolini, 1983, p. 186; Scarrow, 2000; Bosco and Morlino, 
2006). On the other hand, the M/E ratio does not suffer from the above-mentioned issues, 
given that denominator of the fraction is a relatively stable number, the electorate of a country, 
and also that the M/E ratio easily allows for cross-party (cross-country) comparisons (Bartolini, 
1983, p. 189; Katz et al., 1992, p. 331).  
Therefore, also following scholars dealing with cross-country and cross-party membership 
comparisons (e.g. see Weldon, 2006; Kölln, 2015, 2016), in this work I focus on the M/E ratio at 
the party level. To calculate the (possible) decline in party membership figures (i.e., in the M/E 
ratio), I have calculated the inter-legislature change for each party in each legislature under 
consideration. In other words, I have calculated the difference between two five-year moving 
averages: one taken at T and one at T-1. The decision to focus on moving averages has been 
taken to efficiently tackle not simply short-lived fluctuations in the parties' membership trends, 
but to include a (possible) longer more profound decline in membership figures. Given that I 
work at the legislature level, the two periods (T and T-1) correspond to a legislature at T and to a 
legislature at T-1. Finally, to avoid endogeneity problems, I have calculated the M/E five-year 
moving average in the first year of each legislature. The resulting variable has been called 
Membership Decline. 
Data for Membership Decline have been obtained, concerning party members, mainly from the 
MAPP dataset (version 2.0) (Van Haute and Paulis, 2016) and, for the electorate, either from 
Nohlen and Stover (2010) or from each country’s electoral authority (for the more recent 
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elections)81. When possible, data have been completed via linear interpolation82. More details on 
the variable and its operationalization can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 4.1 Aggregate M/E ratio per country over time, Western Europe (1985-2015) 
 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
 Figure 4.2 above reports the aggregate M/E ratio for each country between the mid-1980s 
and mid-2010s. The general take from a quick look is that, as widely shown by other pieces of 
work, the M/E ratio – considered at the aggregate level, i.e. for each country – has been 
declining for the past few decades in the Western European countries under examination. The 
most significant decline is visible for Austria, which is also the country which started from the 
highest aggregate M/E ratio in the mid-1980s. Moreover, slightly less abrupt decreases in the 
                                                
81 The only exception is related to Greek parties’ membership data, which are not available in the 
MAPP dataset. In this case, I have recurred to additional sources of information (Charalambis, 
Maratou-Alipranti and Hadjiyanni, 2004, p. 375; Eleftheriou, 2009; Vernardakis, 2011, p. 222; 
Eleftheriou and Tassis, 2014, p. 202; Nea Dimokratia, 2015; Pasok, 2015), and also to personal 
communication with Costas Eleftheriou for data on SYNASPISMOS/SYRIZA most recent 
years’ membership figures. Concerning the more recent elections’ data sources, information can 
be found in Appendix B when discussing the operationalization of the Electoral setback variable 
(see Chapter 5 for more information).  
82 Moreover, when I had just data for a part of a legislature, I have attributed those data also to 
the first or the last years of the legislature.  
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M/E ratio can be detected in Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom. On the other 
hand, declining but more erratic trends are depicted in the quadrants of Greece and Italy. It is 
interesting to notice that countries experiencing the sharpest decline in the country-level M/E 
ratio are Austria and Belgium and, for more recent years, Italy and Greece. Except for Austria, in 
all the other countries, there have also been a significant number of openings of party leader 
selection rules. Chapter 6 might help us understanding whether this impressionistic hint finds 
empirical confirmation in a multivariate regression model.  
 
4.3 The personalisation of politics (1): leaders’ effects in general elections 
 
Up to now, I have dealt with two intra-party determinants that have already been connected 
– in various fashions and with a variable coherence - with party change, and especially with the 
openings of party leader selection rules: leadership change and membership decline. 
Yet, there are other intra-party factors, which have not been at the centre of empirical 
studies on party leader selection rules, which might have an impact on the DVs. I am referring to 
variables related to the personalisation of politics. This section is devoted to the study of the 
ability of party leaders to drive consensus towards their parties in general elections. I argue that 
when leaders are more able to foster electoral consensus towards their parties, there are more 
chances to make the rules to select them more open, for a series of reasons. Then, the next 
section is related to the exploration of a further personalisation-related variable, the control of 
party organisations by their leaders. Finally, in Chapter 5, I explore the possible influence of a 
third variable, namely, the general impact of the personalisation of politics in a given election. 
These three variables (the two presented in this chapter and the one put forward in Chapter 
5) are related to the two areas of the personalisation of politics discussed in Section 2.4, namely, 
the general-elections-related one and the intra-party-related one. In this dissertation, there is the 
first attempt to connect the personalisation of politics and the openings of party leader selection 
rules from a quantitative perspective. In other words, this is the first time that the personalisation 
of politics is extensively linked to the analysis of party leader selection rules from a comparative, 
cross-country and diachronic, viewpoint. So, including some variables related to the 
personalisation of politics might be useful to fully grasp the potential effect of this long-term and 
pervasive phenomenon on the openings of party leader selection rules. 
Let us now focus on the first variable related to the personalisation of politics: the ability of 
party leaders to drive consensus towards their parties in general elections. Such determinant is at 
the centre of many studies analysing the personalisation of politics. As already argued elsewhere 
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(Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017), a good example is the well-known analysis 
by King (2002), where the central research question is devoted to the understanding of whether 
leaders’ (and candidates’) role is important in shaping the outcomes of general elections. Then, in 
the same co-authored contribution, the authors underline that many pieces of research are 
focused on this quest: the book by Karvonen has at least one entire chapter devoted to the 
analysis of the influence of leaders in general elections’ outcomes (2010, pp. 65–84); the 
framework of analysis devised by Rahat and Sheafer (2007) and subsequently expanded in 
Balmas et al. (2014) allocates some space to the fact that ‘people vote more on the basis of their 
evaluations of leaders and less on the basis of evaluations of parties and identification with them’ 
(Balmas et al., 2014, p. 40); Blondel and Thiébault straightforwardly argue that it is necessary to 
focus on the analysis of the leaders’ personalisation on the electorates of the countries under 
examination and, even more specifically, to focus on the ‘ability of party leaders to boost 
support’ (towards their parties in general elections) (2010, p. 72); Aarts, Blais and Schmitt (2011) 
devote an entire book the analysis of leaders’ effects in general elections in a number of Western 
European countries between 1970 and 2000, a road subsequently followed by Costa Lobo and 
Curtice (2015); even those who focus on the more contested concept of ‘presidentialisation of 
politics’ are interested in the effect of party leaders in affecting the results of their parties in 
general elections (Poguntke and Webb, 2005a).  
Before delving deeper into the discussion on the role of party leaders in a general election, a 
slightly more general point must be addressed. Some authors (Balmas et al., 2014; Musella, 2015, 
2018; Passarelli, 2015) believe more open leader selection rules are an aspect of the 
personalisation of politics, not a possible consequence of it, given that the openings of the 
abovementioned rules should bring about, among other things, a higher legitimacy for party 
leaders and also a higher disintermediation between leaders themselves with wider strata of the 
party and/or of the electorate.  
I do not share this view, for a series of reasons. First, many authors have shown, as I report 
in this section and Section 4.4, that the two phenomena are different and indeed one (the 
personalisation of politics) might cause the other (more open leader selection rules). Second, the 
idea that more open party leader selection rules are a part of the wider phenomenon of the 
personalisation of politics contrasts with two important points. 
On the one hand, we know that more open party leader selection rules might bring about 
more legitimisation for party leaders (Poguntke and Webb, 2005b; Lisi, 2010; Sandri and 
Seddone, 2015a; Pasquino, 2016). Yet, this cannot be said with regards to the personalisation of 
politics. How can a phenomenon (more open party leader selection rules) which is thought to be 
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part of a wider process (the personalisation of politics) bring about such contrasting results in 
such a crucial area of democratic politics, that is, the legitimacy of political actors? 
On the other hand, the second relevant point on why it would be better to separately treat 
the two phenomena is related to Wauters' piece of work (2014), which has already been analysed 
in Section 2.4. Without entirely re-quoting the points already raised in that section, Wauters' 
piece of work is interesting because it seems to point out that the personalisation of politics 
might influence more open party leader selection rules, but also that the latter can have an effect 
on the former. In other words, not only is the relationship between the two phenomena quite 
blurred, because one brings about consequences (more legitimised politics) that the other does 
not, but also because the causal relationship between them might also be reversed. More 
specifically, more open party leader selection rules can also cause an increase in the 
personalisation of politics. In this dissertation, I lengthily show why I believe it is indeed the 
personalisation of politics to affect the probability parties open their rules to select the leader and 
not the other way around. Nonetheless, what is of interest here is the fact that overlapping the 
two concepts might be extremely problematic. From a more conservative viewpoint, it is better 
to treat them as two phenomena, and not as one. 
After this brief digression, let us go back to the effect of leaders’ role in general elections. Is 
it possible to connect this phenomenon with the openings of party leader selection rules (party 
leader selectorate)? Here a consistent effort is required, given that, as briefly mentioned in 
Section 2.4, just a handful of researchers have dealt with this topic and, in most of the cases, just 
in a very general way. The necessary starting point is made by those studies focusing on the 
opening of candidate selection rules. The reason is straightforward: not only do systematic 
analyses of the opening of candidate selection rules precede those related to leader selection, but 
the framework used in these candidate-related studies is also widely implemented in the 
subsequent works dealing with leader selection rules. To begin with, Barnea and Rahat (2007), in 
their analysis of the determinants of the ‘democratisation’ of candidate selection rules, hint at a 
possible role, at the party system level, of the personalisation of politics. This hint is not 
expanded, but it is adapted into the party leader selection rules studies by Lisi (2010), who argues 
about the role of the ‘presidentialisation of politics’ in the sense that more open party leader 
selection rules might increase party leaders’ autonomy.  
Despite some problematic points (already analysed in Section 2.3), this intuition about the 
connection between the personalisation of politics and more open party leader selection rules is 
more lengthily discussed by Wauters (2014). In this dissertation, it is the first time that the 
personalisation of politics is explicitly and lengthily linked to more open party leader selection 
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rules. This means that, despite being a phenomenon that has been studied for a certain number 
of years, just in very recent years have scholars connected the personalisation of politics and the 
openings of party leader selection rules. It also follows there is room for manoeuvre to build a 
comprehensive framework of analysis to link these two important phenomena. 
Some attention shall be finally devoted to the analysis by Gauja (2016) who, also building on 
Wauters’ analysis, inserts into her party change framework (that includes openings of party leader 
selection rules) the role of the personalisation of politics at the political system level. Yet, she 
somewhat surprisingly argues that the personalisation of politics, along with the 
‘Americanization’ (already briefly mentioned  in Barnea and Rahat, 2007), are ‘concepts [that] 
have been used both in scholarship and party rhetoric to describe both the causes and effects of 
organizational change, [but] they have limited analytical utility in assisting comparative party 
scholars to analyse the nature and trajectory of reform due to the ‘fuzziness’ of the concepts 
involved’ (Gauja, 2016, p. 79).  
This final critique does not seem to be further developed in Gauja’s book, but it is a good 
excuse to understand a more general point concerning the relationship between the 
personalisation of politics and the openings of party leader selectorate. Many contributions focus 
on the alleged effect of the former phenomenon on the latter at the political system level. In other 
words, most of the above-mentioned authors seem to be at odds with a concept – the 
personalisation of politics – which might indeed be quite fuzzy if understood solely at the 
political system level. This does not mean that a political-system-level effect of the 
personalisation of politics on party leader selection rules (selectorates) cannot be detected. In 
Section 5.4, I try to show that such general effect might indeed exist. Nonetheless, it is 
understandable that many authors have only considered the political-system-level effect of the 
personalisation of politics on party leader selection rules.  
One reason behind this ‘generalization-related' choice might be that a true synchronic and 
diachronic comparative study of the different faces of the personalisation of politics in Western 
Europe in the past few decades is not available (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 
2017). Indeed, this has been one of the reasons behind our decision to devise the Personalisation 
of Politics Expert Survey. More specifically, as I explain in the final part of this section, the 
survey allows researchers to precisely tackle the different ‘faces’ of the personalisation of politics, 
going downwards to the party level. So, one of the possible consequences of the above-
mentioned lack of encompassing comparative studies on the different party-level aspects of the 
personalisation of politics is that this concept might be seen as ‘too fuzzy’ in empirical analyses. 
This might also be one of the reasons behind Gauja’s critical account. 
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In order to be less unclear and bring about a more encompassing and precise account of the 
possible relationship between the personalisation of politics and the opening of party leader 
selectorate, I argue that if party leaders have an effect on general elections - more specifically if 
they can obtain consensus towards their party in a general election - this should increase the 
probability that the party opens its leader selectorate. Why should it be so? ‘Successful' party 
leaders – i.e. those who have been able to drive consensus towards their parties in a general 
election – might be seen as profitable assets by party elites or even by party cadres or members. 
Therefore, there might be pressure to open the selectorate that elects the leader to capitalise on 
this success and transmit the image of a successful ‘more democratic' party to the external 
environment, and possibly to party members or sympathisers as well. In other words, a 
‘successful' leader who might receive a wider legitimisation in future intra-party competitions 
might serve as a good advertisement for the party itself. 
Let us recall, one more time, that a more open selectorate does not necessarily imply that a 
party is more democratic (as I have lengthily discussed in Section 3.3). What counts is the image 
transmitted either within the party or towards the party environment. Moreover, the party leader 
himself/herself might be tempted to negotiate an opening of the leader selectorate in order to 
curb intra-party opposition, in line with the well-known reasoning put forward by Mair (1994), 
and subsequently developed by Scarrow, Webb and Farrell (2000), Barnea and Rahat (2007), and 
by Gauja (2016, pp. 42–46), who, very wittily, talks about the ‘battle for organisational control’. 
My adding to this line of reasoning is the role that the ability of a party leader to get consensus 
during general elections might have in triggering this process. More formally, the third 
hypothesis states: 
 
H3. The higher the ability of a party leader to obtain consensus during a general election, the higher the 
probability for a party to open the selectorate of its leader. 
 
At this point, let us turn our attention to the operationalization of the related independent 
variable. Thus, it might be useful to give some information about the Personalisation of Politics 
Expert Survey. It includes data on 117 parties, obtained thanks to the collaboration of more than 
150 country experts (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017). More specifically, the 
survey was made by three sections: a first general one, a second one related to Elections and 
Elites, and a third one connected to Intra-Party politics (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and 
Verzichelli, 2017). Furthermore, while the first section is extensively dealt with in Section 5.3, let 
us focus on the second section. In the Elections and Elites section, there was a question asking 
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experts to rate the ability of party leaders to obtain consensus during each general election under 
consideration. Respondents were asked to rate leaders on a 1-10 scale (where 1 means very low 
ability, and 10 very high ability). For the operationalization of this variable, I have decided to 
focus on this question83. Then, the resulting variable, called Leader in Election, operationalizes the 
ability of each party leader under consideration to shape a general election by obtaining 
consensus for his/her party. The extremely positive results of several reliability tests we have 
performed for the related question in the Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey further 
confirm the goodness of question and the fact that different experts have attributed highly 
reliable scores to the party leaders under examination (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and 
Verzichelli, 2017).  
Figure 4.3 below reports the mean value, over time, of Leader in Election in each Western 
European country included in this dissertation. Apart from Austria, Greece, and Netherlands, in 
all the countries included in the analysis, there is a first phase of growth in the average value of 
the ability of party leaders to drive consensus towards their parties, which lasts approximately 
until the mid-1990s. It shall be underlined that the three countries which instead show an initial 
decreasing trend also have initial average values which are extremely high, especially if compared 
with those of the other countries. This might help to explain the diverse trend of these three 
countries compared to the other seven ones.  
Then, after this initial phase, a decreasing trend is detectable, followed by a third phase of 
increase in the average value of the variable related to the ability of leaders to obtain consensus. 
It is also interesting to notice that, at least in some countries, there are periods where average 
values of Leader in Election are higher also correspond to periods of openings of party leader 
selectorates (e.g., mid-to-late 2000s and early 2010s for Ireland; early-to-mid-2010s for Spain, 
1990-2010 for Greece, and so forth). 
  
                                                
83 The precise formulation of the question is as follows: ‘How would you evaluate the ability of 
party leaders to obtain consensus during electoral campaigns? For each of the following parties 
and general elections, please rate such ability on a 1-10 scale, where 1 means “very low ability” 
and 10 means “very high ability”’. 
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Figure 4.2 Average values of Leader in Election per country over time, Western Europe (1985-2015) 
 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
As I have previously argued, the personalisation of politics is a multi-faceted concept. This 
also means that it might have a multi-faceted effect on the openings of party leader selection 
rules (selectorates). For instance, a connection might be imagined before the intra-party face of 
this concept and the leader’ selectorate. The subsequent section directly tackles this face and its 
possible effect on the DVs under study. 
 
4.4 The personalisation of politics (2): leaders’ control of party organisations 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that many authors have connected party leaders’ role 
in general elections to the encompassing concept of the personalisation of politics. Turning our 
attention to party leaders’ control of the party organisations – the fourth internal factor I deal 
with in this chapter – it can be noticed that the situation is surely more complex.  
Indeed, the existence of an ‘intra-party personalisation face’, even just loosely related to 
what leaders can do within party organisations, requires some discussion. As posited in Section 
2.4, it is Duverger himself (1964) who writes about the increasing authority of leaders within 
political parties. Then, this intuition is left underdeveloped for many years, until more recent 
contributions are published. For instance, Poguntke and Webb (2005a) put forward their analysis 
of the presidentialisation of politics framework by also focusing on the ‘party-related’ 
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presidentialisation, intended as ‘a shift in intra-party power to the benefit of the leader. Were this to be 
the case, we would expect to find evidence of growing leadership autonomy from the dominant 
coalitions of power within the party’ (Poguntke and Webb, 2005b, p. 9). Then, a further step 
towards a connection between the personalisation of politics and leaders’ roles in intra-party 
matters is surely the already-mentioned framework by Rahat and Sheafer (2007) and Balmas et al. 
(2014): in the latter contribution, some reference is made to the fact the position of party leaders 
within their parties has become stronger.  
Then, more specific points are raised in the book by Blondel and Thiébault (2010), where 
there is an explicit recognition of the fact that one of the aspects of the personalisation of 
politics is related to the power of party leaders within political parties and also that leaders’ 
personal power within the party constitutes a very important dimension of analysis. Finally, albeit 
no explicit reference is made to the concept of the personalisation of politics, let us recall the 
works by Schumacher, De Vries and Vis (2013) and Schumacher and Giger (2017), where an 
analysis based on the fact that parties are ‘leadership-dominated’ or ‘activist-dominated’ is put 
forward.  
These last works come back later in the section during the discussion of the 
operationalization of the variable related to the power of party leaders within party organisations, 
but, for now, a clear point is that, in contrast with the wide literature focusing on party leaders in 
general elections, the attention towards the intra-party leaders’ control has received substantially 
less attention. This also means that, as already seen in the previous section, this is the first 
attempt to connect the power of leaders within political parties with the openings of leaders’ 
selection rules. 
Indeed, we can focus on the possible connection between, on the one hand, the control of 
party organisations by their leaders and, on the other hand, the openings of party leader 
selectorates by starting from the intuition in Schumacher, De Vries and Vis (2013). They argue 
that parties can be leader- or activist-dominated. Without entering the discussion whether this is 
a feasible dichotomisation or not, the crucial point is that the domination of a political party can 
be in different hands. If we assume that the party leader has more domination – or control – over 
the party, we can also safely expect that other groups of people – be them the activists, the MPs, 
the rank-and-file, and so forth – have less domination or control over the party. In other words, a 
party leader with more domination (or control) over the party might also have less internal 
opposition to cope with - to be more precise, less effective or influencing opposition. Therefore, 
he/she might be freer to act, as if he/she has less internal constraints. In this sense, the necessity 
to ‘take away’ influence from the hands of middle-level activists raised by Mair (1994) and by all 
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the following contributions, already analysed in the previous section, might be less strong. Why 
curbing internal opposition by means of alleged ‘more democratic' party leader selection rules if 
such opposition has already been constrained? The fact that openings of leader selection rules 
can be put forward to win the ‘battle for the organisational control' (Gauja, 2016, pp. 42–46) has 
been already analysed in the previous section when discussing the first personalisation-related 
variable.   
Here, by making a step forward, I would argue that if the party leader has a certain control 
over the party, he/she does not need to fight the above-mentioned battle: he/she has already 
won it. Therefore, following this line of reasoning, the chances that it would be ‘necessary’ to 
opening the party leader’ selectorate are lower. This does not obviously mean that the leader’s 
‘victory’ will be total or necessarily a long-term one: things can obviously change, and the control 
might be reduced (or, obviously, increased as well), and this can have substantial consequences 
on the ‘organisational battlefield’. More specifically, and from a more formal viewpoint, my 
fourth hypothesis states:  
 
H4. The higher the leader’s control of the party organisation, the lower the probability for a party to open the 
selectorate of its leader. 
 
 Even in this case, I have operationalized the control of party organisations by their leaders 
thanks to the data collected by the Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey (Marino, Martocchia 
Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017). More specifically, the Intra-Party Politics section of the survey 
included a question on the level of control of the party organisations by the party leader, and 
asked respondents to rate such control on a 1-10 scale, 1 meaning very low control and 10 very 
high control84. I have therefore created a variable, called Leader in Party, which reports results of 
the expert survey for each party and each election. Even in this case, there have been very 
positive results concerning the reliability of the experts’ answers concerning this question 
(Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017). Therefore, even for this question – and for 
the related answers – we can be fairly confident about the fact that different experts have given 
highly reliable scores to each country’s party leader involved in the questions. 
                                                
84 The precise formulation of the question is as follows: ‘Finally, how would you rate the control 
that party leaders have on party organisation? For each of the following party leaders, please rate 
leaders’ control on a 1-10 scale, where 1 means “very low control” and 10 means “very high 
control”’. 
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 The reasons why I have relied on the Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey to 
operationalize the control of the parties by their leaders are that existing accounts of the ‘intra-
party' personalisation of politics – i.e. of the power of party leaders within their organisations – 
suffer from some problematic issues. To begin with, the single chapters – each focusing on a 
single country's party leaders – in the book edited by Poguntke and Webb (2005a) do not present 
clear and comparative data either from the synchronic or the diachronic viewpoints. The same 
issue is related to the chapters in the contribution by Blondel and Thiébault (2010). In other 
words, in these contributions, there is a very rich account of the evolution of the phenomenon, 
but a clear-cut and replicable operationalization of this concept is not put forward, and also 
comparisons are extremely challenging, if not impossible. This obviously does not mean that 
these studies are of a limited utility: on the contrary, they have served as a valid starting point 
from which our survey was devised (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017).  
Let us turn our attention to the two contributions by Schumacher and other colleagues.  
The two works can be overlapped when one deals with the operationalization of the ‘leadership-
dominated’ parties. The important thing to notice is that both contributions state the importance 
of expert surveys in dealing with specific issues related to the dominance of parties by leaders or, 
conversely, by activists: ‘a major advantage of using this expert survey for our measure of party 
organization is that it taps precisely into the theoretical element we are interested in’ 
(Schumacher, de Vries and Vis, 2013, p. 470). I would argue the same is true when one deals 
with the control of party organisations by party leaders: having a survey expert exactly related to 
the dominance of party organisations by their leaders allows us to precisely operationalize this 
concept.  
Moreover, the advantage of recurring to the data presented in Marino, Martocchia Diodati 
and Verzichelli (2017) is that, unlike the data put forward in other contributions85, the measure 
of the control of the party organisation by its leader varies across time. Therefore, using the data 
from the Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey allows for a more precise evaluation of the 
impact of leaders' control on parties on the probability to open party leader selectorates, also 
                                                
85 In the article by Schumacher, De Vries and Vis (2013), the authors use the expert survey 
presented in Laver and Hunt (1992), and use this time-invariant data for the 1977-2003 period; 
this issue is partly solved in a subsequent article by Schumacher and Giger (2017), which uses the 
data by Laver and Hunt, along with those by Janda (1980), Harmel and Janda (1994b), and 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012), for the 1955-2008 period. Nonetheless, partly different 
measures are put forward. Moreover, different countries and parties are included in these 
different contributions.  
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given the fact that the same question is asked for the entire period under study, thus greatly 
increasing the overall reliability of the measure implemented for the analysis. To give a more 
precise snapshot of the results of the expert survey for leaders' control of parties, Figure 4.4 
below reports the average value, over time and for each country included in this dissertation, of 
the variable Leader in Party. 
 
Figure 4.3 Average values of Leader in Party per country over time, Western Europe (1985-2015) 
 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
A first glance at Figure 4.4 above reveals some interesting trends. While some countries only 
experience limited changes in the average control of parties by their leaders (Ireland and, to a 
lesser extent, Portugal and the United Kingdom), in some other polities, more evident variations 
are detectable. For instance, in Belgium and, more importantly, in Greece, an initial phase of 
decline is followed by an increase in the average values of Leader in Party. In Spain and Italy, an 
initial upwards trend is detectable, while a subsequent decrease follows. 
Moreover, it might be useful to briefly compare the country trends related to this variable 
with the country trends for the variable Leader in Election, analysed in the previous section. 
Interestingly, some countries show comparable trends for the two variables related to the 
personalisation of politics: Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Interestingly, 
in this set, there are countries where no openings of party leader selection rules are detectable 
(Austria and Germany), and also countries where such openings can, in fact, be found (Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal). 
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Furthermore, there are some other polities where only a partial overlapping between Leader 
in Election and Leader in Party can be found (Ireland, and Spain), and, finally, a small group of 
countries having erratic trends for the two personalisation-related variables (Belgium, Greece, 
and the United Kingdom). In all the countries belonging to the last two groups (partial 
overlapping and no overlapping), there was at least one opening of party leader selection rules.  
Concluding, a final element to underline is that the country trends related to the 
personalisation of politics at the intra-party level (Leader in Party) seem smoother and more 
homogeneous than those of the variable connected to the personalisation in general elections 
(i.e. Leader in Election). This shows that the two variables might be indeed related to two sides of 
the personalisation of politics: one (the control of parties by their leaders) with a lower intra-
country variability, another (the ability of party leaders to drive consensus towards their parties in 
general elections) with more diverse trends in each polity under consideration. 
In this section, I have presented the last hypothesis related to intra-party factors and their 
impact on the probability to open the selectorate for party leadership. Before turning our 
attention to the possible impact of external factors on the DV, a task performed in Chapter 5, it 
is necessary to focus on a control I implement in the empirical analysis. More precisely, the next 
section tackles the possible role of a party’s family on the openings of party leader selection rules 
(party leader selectorates). 
 
4.5 An intra-party variable: party family 
 
Why should there be a connection between a party’s ideological family and the likelihood it 
changes its leader selection rules (selectorate)? The question is far from being trivial, given that 
just a handful of researchers have extensively dealt with this question. A first account of this 
alleged relationship can be found in Punnett (1992, pp. 22–23), according to whom ‘[a] 
traditionalist party, that embraces elitist and non-participatory values, is likely to favour the 
selection of the leader by a relatively small number of party notables through discreet 
consultations rather than a formal election’.  
This proposition has not received a wide scholarly attention, and there might be many 
reasons behind this pattern: to begin with, Punnett himself recognises that many contemporary 
parties understand that democratic procedures are something attractive (1992, p. 23). So, the 
‘democracy-enhancing' rhetoric I have briefly underlined in this chapter and Chapter 3 might 
undermine the positioning of party elites towards having the complete control of the party leader 
selectorate, as far as this choice is feasible. In other words, party elites like to publicly define their 
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political formation as ‘democratic' – or at least they do not like it to be defined as undemocratic. 
As a consequence, understanding whether party elites, cadres, MPs, and so forth really follow 
elitist and non-participatory values is a very complicated and possibly very frustrating task, 
especially if one needs data on the 10 Western European countries included in this dissertation 
between the mid-1980s and mid-2010s.  
 A more fruitful road to understand the possible effect of parties' ideology on the 
probability to open their leaders' selectorate might be that of asking ourselves whether belonging 
to a specific party family affects such probability. It is the road taken by Lisi, Freire and Barberà 
(2015) who, in their study (already analysed in Section 2.3), building on the existing research by 
other scholars (Astudillo Ruiz, 2012; Krouwel, 2012) put forward a series of hypotheses on the 
connection between party families (or party ideologies) and leadership selection methods (more 
specifically, the party leader selectorate). The results of their bivariate correlation analysis shows 
that parties belonging to the radical left or the libertarian family are more likely to adopt more 
inclusive selectorates for party leadership, ‘while communist, conservatives/ Christian 
democrats, and radical right parties have more centralized and restricted methods’ (Lisi, Freire 
and Barberà, 2015, p. 15); moreover, no clear patterns can be detected in regionalist parties, 
while across time, with the noticeable exception of communist and radical right parties, there 
should be a convergence towards more inclusive leadership selection methods; to add more, just 
partial confirmation is brought for two hypotheses: centre and left-wing parties should be more 
likely to have selectorates ranging from party congress to party voters (while right-wing political 
formations should have less inclusive selectorates); moreover, left-wing parties, compared to 
right-wing ones, should be more likely to change.  
Partly departing from the road taken by these three scholars, Chiru et al. (2015) test whether 
left parties are more likely to change their leader selection rules. Let us briefly recall, as already 
done in Section 2.3, that their work includes a lot of different dimensions of analysis, related to 
both the selection and the de-selection of party leaders, and that their study focuses on changes 
and not on openings of leader selection rules. Bearing in mind these caveats, their analysis shows 
that there is no empirical support for the above-mentioned hypothesis. 
These partial and also contrasting findings in the literature bring me to control for the party 
family of each party included in the empirical analysis. I do not have precise expectations 
concerning the effect of party families on the probability for political formations to open their 
leaders’ selectorate, but it might be useful to control for the possible effect of the former on the 
latter. I have decided to operationalize the related variable, called Party Family, by recurring to the 
‘Family ID’ categorical variable put forward in the ParlGov dataset (Döring and Manow, 2016). 
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‘Family ID’ is composed by eight categories (Communist/Socialist; Green/Ecologist; Social 
Democratic; Christian Democratic; Liberal; Conservative; Right-Wing; Agrarian) which have 
been transformed into a 7-value categorical variable: Party Family86. The reason why eight 
categories have been transformed into a 7-value variable lies in the fact that no Agrarian party 
exists in my dataset. Therefore, the Party Family variable can only assume 7 values. 
 
Figure 4.4 Descriptive statistics of parliamentary seats by party family per country, Western Europe 
(1985-2015) 
 
 Source: author's elaboration. Note: ‘Comm’ denotes the Communist/Socialist party family; 
‘Eco’ the Green/Ecologist one; ‘SD’ the Social Democratic one; ‘CD’ the Christian 
Democratic one; ‘Lib’ the Liberal one; ‘Con’ the Conservative one; finally, ‘RW’ denotes the 
Right-Wing party family. 
 
Figure 4.4 above reports some descriptive statistics, via box-and-whisker plots, for the 
different party families in each country under consideration. First of all, one can easily notice 
that, in some countries, the inter-party variability in terms of percentage of seats is very low 
(Belgium, Austria), while all the other countries show a very different pattern (let us for example 
                                                
86 The decision to recur to the variable created by ParlGov has been driven by a series of 
considerations; for instance, the variable ‘Party Family’ devised by the scholars working on the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2016) suffers from some issues, such as the 
strange and counterintuitive categorisation of some parties (e.g. the Portuguese SPD has been 
categorised as a Social Democratic party). 
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look at the Greek and the Irish cases). Interestingly, in the former set of countries, one finds 
both polities where no openings of party leader selection rules can be detected between the mid-
1980s and the mid-2010s (Austria) and also polities where such openings did happen (Belgium). 
Nonetheless, Figure 4.4 also seems to underline there is not a perfect relationship between the 
intra-country party family variability (in terms of average percentage of seats obtained in general 
elections) and the number of openings of leader selectorate. Indeed, some countries with such a 
lower variability did have some openings of their party leaders’ selectorate in the period under 
consideration (e.g., the Netherlands), but also some countries with a higher variability have 
parties which opened, with certain frequency, their leader selectorate (e.g., Ireland). 
A second fascinating element is that more extreme party families (the Communist/Socialist 
one and the Right-Wing one) show a lower average percentage of seats compared to more 
centre-leaning party families. This could be connected to another point: between the mid-1980s 
and the mid-2010s, only have a handful of parties belonging to these extreme party families 
opened their leader selectorate, while parties belonging to other party families have done so with 
a higher frequency. All in all, Chapter 6 might be of great help also concerning the possible 
effect of belonging to a specific party family on the likelihood that a political formation opens its 




In this chapter, I have tackled the intra-party factors that should influence the openings of 
party leader selectorates. More specifically, I have dealt with the leadership change, the party 
membership decline, and with two factors related to the personalisation of politics, that is, the 
ability of party leaders to drive consensus toward their party in a general election, and the control 
of party organisations by their leaders. These four factors have been translated into four 
variables used in the empirical analyses performed in Chapter 6. Moreover, I have also 
introduced a fifth variable, party family, whose effect on party leader selectorates' openings is 
also controlled for in the empirical analysis. 
Nonetheless, there is still an important part of the explanatory factors that needs to be in-
depth explored. I am referring to the external factors that have been considered by the party 
change literature and also by those scholars focusing on party leader selection rules as crucial 
explanatory elements to fully understand both party change and, more crucially for this analysis, 
the openings of party leader selection rules. Chapter 5 is indeed devoted to the exploration of 
these external factors. 
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Chapter 5 - The external factors behind the openings of party 
leader selectorates 
 
Let us imagine two different situations. A political party suffers from an electoral setback; 
another one, instead, obtains a very successful result in a general election. Is it possible to argue 
that the former has undergone an external ‘shock’ which shall be accounted for when analysing 
party changes (and also openings of party leader selectorates)?  
The relationship between intra-party matters and what happens outside political formations 
is an important issue to consider when one analyses party changes and, more generally speaking 
what happens within political formations. Indeed, parties do not live ‘by themselves': they act in 
an environment from which positive or negative influences might arrive at them. Therefore, 
analysing the possible impact of external factors on parties' decisions to open their leader' 
selectorates is of paramount importance. 
This chapter is devoted to precisely analysing four external factors that might be related to 
the DVs under examination: having suffered from an electoral setback; being in opposition; 
being influenced by an increased impact of the personalisation of politics at the party system 
level; being at the centre of an organisational ‘contagion’ brought about by other political 
formations. These four factors are dealt with in the four sections of this chapter. 
 
5.1 The electoral setback 
 
Let us turn our attention to a possible determinant of the opening of party leader 
selectorates that has received a lot of attention by scholars: the electoral setback. Such 
phenomenon has been widely studied, especially within the party change framework. Already in 
1990, Janda writes that ‘defeat is the mother of party change’ (Janda, 1990, p. 6) and that ‘[t]he 
poorer the party's performance, the greater the pressure for party change.’ (Janda, 1990, p. 9; italics in 
original). Janda explicitly quotes an extremely interesting consideration by Mair (1983, p. 408), 
according to whom ‘the party interprets its [electoral] losses as the rejection of its politics or its 
representativeness. There are many cases in the literature of parties seeking to renew their 
organizational effectiveness in the wake of electoral setback’.  
Therefore, an electoral setback is considered as a dire event that can trigger deep 
modifications within political parties, and this is partly in line, as Janda himself recognises, with 
Panebianco’s account of a crisis within party organisations that can be substantially influenced by 
a ‘strong environmental pressure’, like an electoral defeat (Panebianco, 1988, p. 243). The 
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argument is further developed in the subsequent seminal article by Harmel and Janda (1994a), 
where an ‘electoral failure’ is thought to be a powerful external driver of party change87. Such 
proposition is empirically tested by Harmel et al. (1995, p. 3), where one hypothesis states that 
‘[p]arty change is proximally preceded by poor electoral performance’88.  
After some years, the relationship between electoral setbacks and party change is then 
moved into the party leadership selection area: LeDuc (2001, p. 323) explicitly posits ‘parties 
which have suffered a serious electoral setback may embark on a process of party 'renewal' in 
order to lay the foundations for an eventual return to power. [A]n important component of the 
argument can be the need for greater 'democratization' [arguably, of leader selection rules]’. This 
view of the importance of electoral setbacks for changing (opening) party leader selection rules 
can also be found in Faucher and Treille (2003). Also Lisi (2010), building on a similar logic put 
forward by Barnea and Rahat (2007) on candidate selection rules, argues that ‘democratising’ 
party leadership selection rules might be a move in order to cope with a poor electoral 
performance and have more chances to have a more successful electoral result in the (near) 
future. This point is briefly touched by Gauja (2016) in her account of party reforms (also from 
the leadership selection rules viewpoint): Gauja argues that electoral setbacks can be one of the 
‘party-system level’ or competitive pushes for reforming political parties, also in light of future 
electoral competitions89.  
Now, the crucial point of Lisi’s and Gauja’s frameworks is that they do not limit themselves 
to deal with a reaction to an event (in this case, an external event, like an electoral setback), but 
they also put forward the (more or less explicit) argument according to which political parties act 
                                                
87 As already seen in Section 2.1, I am well aware of the differentiation that the party change 
framework and especially Harmel and Janda (1994a) make concerning the different effect that an 
electoral setback can have on different parties according to parties’ main goal. This is explicitly 
taken into account later in this chapter, where I present a specific hypothesis related to these 
issues. Yet, given a noticeable number of scholars have focused on the ‘simple’ or unconditional 
effect of electoral setbacks on the openings of party leader selection rules, I have preferred to 
start treating electoral setbacks from a very general viewpoint, and then passing to a more 
specific account of the differentiating effect that this phenomenon can have in different parties. 
88 For an account of the issue of the proximity of the events triggering party change, see Section 
3.4. 
89 Interestingly, she also argues that the payoffs of these changes might be more limited than one 
might think (Gauja, 2016, pp. 51–57). 
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prospectively, trying to cope with foreseeable future events to increase their future chances of 
success. This might seem a straightforward procedure to analyse political matters, given that a 
reaction to an unfavourable event is driven by the willingness to reduce the likelihood such 
phenomenon happens in the future, all other things being equal90. Nonetheless, by putting 
forward such prospective viewpoint, a certain discontinuity with the party change framework is 
marked, insofar Janda (1990, p. 14) argues that ‘[t]he logic of the performance theory of change 
limits it to explaining reactive rather than anticipatory change’. In other words, and going back to 
electoral setbacks, adapting a reactive perspective means that only electoral setbacks shall be 
considered, while, conversely, following a prospective viewpoint, one should also at least carefully 
consider whether to include successful electoral performance into the analysis91. 
The relationship between electoral setbacks and the openings of party leader selection rules 
is also explicitly discussed in the book by Cross and Blais (2012), where some descriptive 
statistics of the openings of Ireland, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada 
seem to confirm the relationship between the two phenomena, and in the concluding chapter of 
the edited book by Pilet and Cross (2014a), in this case by means of cross-tabulations. While 
more nuanced conclusions are reached on this point by Wauters (2014), Chiru et al. (2015) find 
that an electoral setback increases the chances to change a number of dimensions, maybe 
including, but not limiting to, leaders’ selectorates92. Finally, an intriguing result is the one 
brought about in the analysis by Meyer and Odom (2016), who show that the opening of the 
selectorate in Ireland, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada seems to be 
affected, among other things, by electoral setbacks, especially by the most catastrophic ones (in 
their framework, when a party is shrunk into its regional strongholds). 
                                                
90 ‘All other things being equal’ is related many possible intervening factors that limit the ability 
to proficiently change political parties: from party ideological family, to party’s internal struggle 
for power, to organisational characteristics, to party-system features, and so forth. 
91 On the relationship between successful electoral performance and the opening of party leader 
selection rules, see Wauters (2014). 
92 To be more precise, the analysis by Chiru et al. (2015) does not have a separate section for 
party leader selection rules (or for party leader selectorates) vs other rules they include in the 
analysis (e.g. term limits or de-selection mechanisms). Therefore, it is not possible to precisely 
disentangle the effect of electoral setbacks on the probability to change party leader selection 
rules or party leaders' selectorate.  
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Wrapping up this discussion, and following most of the authors analysing party change and 
party leader selection rules, I would argue that an electoral setback does not simply increase the 
likelihood for a party to open its leader selectorate, but that stronger electoral setbacks should 
have a stronger effect on party leader selectorates' openings. In other words, and going back to 
the concept of defeat as a trigger for party change, and subsequently, for party leader selection 
rules, not all defeats are equal. Some of them might have a stronger impact than others. This 
relationship can give birth to different hypotheses, but let us start from the most straightforward 
one. If an electoral setback is brought about, an external crisis might reach the party, and this 
might trigger an opening of party leader selection rules. This effect should be more powerful for 
bigger electoral setbacks. Therefore, my fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H5. The stronger the electoral setback, the higher the probability for a party to open the selectorate of its leader. 
 
At this point, a fair question would be related to the operationalization of the concept of 
‘electoral setback’. Several solutions have been proposed in the literature. Harmel et al. (1995, pp. 
26–33) present an operationalization based on parties' perceptions of their performance in the 
last general election and, alternatively, an operationalization based on journalists' accounts and 
scholars' analyses: election results are categorised as poor, neutral, good. It is evident such 
classification can lead to dire problems related to researchers' biases or to different evaluations 
by different scholars of the same election.   
A more suitable solution would be that of recurring to electoral results regarding changes in 
seats or votes. Cross and Blais (2012, pp. 40–42) use an absolute measure of the variation in the 
seats won by a party in the last general election compared to the previous one (in other words, 
they only analyse whether a party has lost or gained seats, without considering the scope of this 
variation). On the other hand, Wauters (2014) relies on the variation regarding votes, as well as 
Chiru et al. (2015). Finally, Meyer and Odom (2016) do have a measure on the percentage of 
seats gained or lost by each party in their analysis, and also several other seat-related measures to 
test different hypotheses.   
All in all, it seems there is a bit of discrepancy in the literature concerning the 
operationalization of an electoral setback. I operationalize the concept via the percentage of seats 
lost (or gained) by each party in the last general election compared to the previous one. This 
decision has been driven by two main considerations: on the one hand, it is necessary to control 
for the disproportionality between votes and seats brought about by some electoral systems 
(most noticeably, the British one, and the Spanish one). I would argue it is not a chance that 
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many studies where the United Kingdom is included operationalize the electoral setback by 
recurring to the percentage of seats lost (gained) instead of the percentage of votes lost (gained). 
Moreover, there is another reason why recurring to the percentage of seats might be a feasible 
solution: the percentage of seats a party has obtained in a general election (compared to the one 
it had received in the previous one) gives us a clear snapshot of the power relationships in the 
Lower House among parties. A party can increase its share of votes, but can also maintain or 
even decrease its share of seats. Vice versa, a party can have a successful result regarding gained 
seats compared to T-1 but also lose a percentage of the votes compared to the previous election. 
Therefore, a more precise measure is the one related to the percentage of seats obtained in a 
general election. 
Therefore, I have created a variable, called Seat Share Loss, operationalizing the change in the 
percentage of the Lower House’ seats obtained by a party in a given election compared to the 
previous one. More specifically, from the percentage of Lower House’ seats held by a party at T, 
I have subtracted the percentage of Lower House’ seats obtained by that party at T-1. Data on 
this variable have been collected by a series of sources. Up to 2009, data have been obtained 
from Nohlen and Stover (2010), while from 2010 onwards, I have referred to each country’s 
national official source93. 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for party-cases having lost seats in a general election, Western Europe 
(1985-2015) 
Country  Mean SD Min Max 
Austria  -5.206 4.606 -18.579 -0.546 
Belgium  -2.306 1.661 -6 -0.472 
Germany  -4.489 4.080 -15 -3 
Greece  -4.270 5.219 -20.333 -0.333 
Ireland  -7.785 9.213 -35.5 -0.7 
Italy  -5.220 7.255 -27.778 -0.794 
Netherlands  -4.960 4.097 -14.667 -0.667 
Portugal  -5.864 5.829 -20.435 -0.422 
Spain  -3.810 4.516 -16.857 -0.286 
United Kingdom  -6.914 8.827 -26.6 -0.31 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
                                                
93 The sole exception has been Italy, given the well-known discrepancy between Nohlen and 
Stover's data and the one released by the Italian Ministry of Interior. More details on the 
operationalization of this variable and specific party- or country-related issues can be found in 
Appendix B. 
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Table 5.1 above reports some descriptive statistics for the parties having lost seats in a 
general election compared to the previous one. The table, where party-cases (that is, each party 
in each legislature) are considered, shows, first of all, that there is a certain variability in the 10 
Western European countries according to the mean seat loss experienced by political parties 
between the mid-1980s and the mid-2010s. The lowest average seat loss is that of Belgian parties, 
while the highest one belongs to the Irish ones.  
Let us notice that some countries where no openings of leader selection rules can be 
detected (Austria and Germany) have not very low mean values of parties’ seat loss. Yet, what is 
of interest here is that the SD values of these two countries are among the lowest ones. It means 
that Austrian and German parties experiencing an electoral setback in the time period under 
examination did not lose, on average, an extremely high percentage of seats. Conversely, very 
high SD values (and also very high minimum values) can be detected in some countries having 
had a series of openings of party leader selection rules: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the 
United Kingdom. All in all, it seems there might be certain connection between electoral 
setbacks – measured in seat losses – and the openings of party leader selection rules. 
 At this point, those who have a certain knowledge of the party change framework and the 
specific hypotheses on electoral setbacks and party change would argue that something is 
missing. More specifically, Harmel and Janda (1994a) contend that parties might have different 
aims: maximising their votes, their offices, being policy or ideology advocates, being intra-party 
democracy advocates94. Having different aims means that different external ‘shocks' should have 
dissimilar effects for different parties. Let us focus on the vote-maximising parties: Harmel and 
Janda argue that, for these parties, the electoral setback is the most powerful shock they can 
experience. Then, Harmel et al. (1995, p. 3) explicitly posit that the ‘relationship between poor 
electoral performance and party change is stronger for large, competitive parties than for small 
parties'. This should be related to the fact that larger parties are thought to be more vote-
maximising ones than smaller parties95. 
Yet, despite the logical coherence of these propositions, no author, to the best of my 
knowledge, has ever tried to connect these hypotheses to party leader selection rules, and, more 
specifically, to the opening of party leader selectorates. In other words, no author has considered 
whether electoral setbacks have a more powerful effect on larger parties concerning the 
likelihood they open their leader selection rules.  
                                                
94 See also the related discussion in Section 2.1. 
95 Another implementation of Harmel and Janda’s framework concerning the different aims that 
different parties might have can be found in Müller (1997). 
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This means there is room for putting forward a hypothesis connecting these insights from 
the party change framework and the opening of party leader selectorates. Indeed, it might be 
argued that the mechanism put forward within the party change framework can be applied to the 
openings of party leader selectorates as well. In other words, when an electoral setback severely 
affects the primary aim of a party, this can have a stronger effect on the likelihood this party 
opens its leader selectorate compared to parties which do not have such goal, or have it to a 
lesser extent. So, the sixth hypothesis to be tested in the empirical analysis is: 
 
H6. The larger the party, the stronger the effect of an electoral setback on the probability to open the selectorate of 
its leader. 
 
Even in this case, what matters is the increase/decrease in the percentage of seats obtained 
by a party compared to T-1. To test this hypothesis, apart from the variable Seat Share Loss, it is 
necessary to operationalise the size of a party. I would again recur to the parliamentary 
representation of political formations, but consider such representation at T-1. Indeed, whether 
to categorise a party as bigger or smaller is a matter that cannot be left to a calculus based on its 
parliamentary representation at T. In this case, an endogeneity problem would arise, because the 
calculation of whether a party is more or less large would depend on the electoral performance in 
the last general election. Yet, this performance would also be included in the calculus of Seat 
Share Loss, the variable related to the electoral setback. So, using a party’s result at T to 
operationalize its size is a misleading solution. 
For this reason, I have decided to use the percentage of seats held by each party at T-1 to 
calculate the variable Party Size. The specific country- and party-related matters related to Seat 
Share Loss and discussed in Appendix B obviously apply here as well, with the only addendum 
that if a party contests the first election at T, it receives a 0 as a value for Party Size. This decision 
has been driven by the consideration that if a party contests the first general election of its life, it 
could be very difficult to imagine that such party has already internally defined its primary aim. 
Indeed, such political formation should have a foreseeable very low institutionalisation, and 
therefore the intra-party environment might be extremely fluid.  
This section has been devoted to presenting two hypotheses related to a ‘classical’ 
determinant of party change (and of party leader selection rules): electoral setbacks, albeit the 
second hypothesis has never been in a quantitative empirical analysis of openings of party leader 
selection rules before. The analysis of determinants already encountered in the literature does not 
stop here. Indeed, the next section is related to another factor that the party leader selection 
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literature has widely considered in several contributions: whether a party governs or, conversely, 
is in opposition. 
 
5.2 The opposition status 
 
A factor which is related to the electoral setback is surely the opposition status of a party. 
The two things evidently do not perfectly coincide, also at the party-change-framework level 
(Harmel and Janda, 1994a, p. 270), and it might be useful to separately consider the effect of an 
electoral setback and, more crucially for this section, of the opposition status on a party’s 
likelihood to open its leader selectorate.  
The connection between being in opposition and party change is not new: to begin with, 
Janda (1990, p. 9), when discussing the usefulness of analysing the impact of the last electoral 
cycle on parties’ changes, underlines that a distinction shall be drawn between an unsatisfactory 
electoral performance and the ability to control/influence the government. Then, it is the 
seminal article by Harmel and Janda (1994a, p. 270) that draws a more systematic distinction 
between the two concepts: going back to the already-mentioned differentiation among different 
parties with diverse aims, apart from the vote-maximizer parties (which we have encountered in 
the previous section), the two authors also deal with office-maximizer parties, for whom not 
being in government is substantially the strongest shock they can experience. The literature on 
party change has not further developed these interesting insights, while the same is not true for 
the literature on party leader selection rules96. 
Indeed, Punnett (1992, pp. 21–22) argues that a party which is in government and expresses 
the Prime Minister should have closer party leader selection procedures, given that if choosing a 
leader also means choosing a Prime Minister, a quicker and less ‘problematic’ selection should be 
more likely to be implemented. Let us recall that Punnett’s analysis has a specific focus on the 
United Kingdom, where, from the end of the Second World War onwards, almost only one-
party governments have been in place. A slightly more systematic study of the effect of the 
opposition status of a party is performed by Cross and Blais (2012, pp. 39–41), who argue that 
parties in opposition should be less cohesive are more prone to change, also given an alleged 
shift of power from the parliamentary branch to the extra-parliamentary one. Cross and Blais 
show, via some descriptive statistics, that many parties – in the five Anglo-Saxon countries 
                                                
96 Concerning candidate selection rules, Barnea and Rahat (2007) argue there might be a 
connection between ‘government turnover’ and the reforms in candidate selection rules. 
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included in their analysis –have opened their party leader’ selectorate when in opposition. This 
alleged influence of the opposition status of a party is also tested by Pilet and Cross (2014a) who 
argue, in this case, thanks to cross-tabulations, that many parties, among those who have opened 
their leader selection rules, have done so while in opposition.   
Then, moving the analysis a step forward, and loosely following the same path taken in 
Section 5.1, I now turn to the chapter by Chiru et al. (2015): their hypothesis concerning a 
positive effect on the likelihood to change party leader selection rules finds empirical 
confirmation, albeit one must remember, also already done in Section 5.1, that their decision to 
put together many different aspects concerning leader’ selection and de-selection does not allow 
to precisely grasp the effect of the opposition status of a party on the probability it opens its 
leader’ selectorate. This issue is dealt with by Meyer and Odom (2016), at least concerning the 
five Anglo-Saxon countries included in their empirical analysis: they show that the opposition 
status of a country does not seem to exert any effect on the likelihood to open party leader 
selectorates. 
Briefly wrapping up this discussion, it seems that the effect of the opposition status is a bit 
blurred. Yet, I do believe that this factor shall be taken into consideration, not simply for the 
compelling reasons put forward by Cross and Blais (2012), but also following another viewpoint. 
More specifically, and slightly broadening the horizon of the discussion, Mair (1994), and Katz 
and Mair (1995, 2002) show that, in the last decades, the Party in Public Office (i.e. MPs and 
government’s members) (Katz and Mair, 1993) has been acquiring an increased relevance in 
Western European party organisations.  
If this is true, it might be argued that a powerful ‘face' of the party, who is out of the 
government – therefore being ‘shrunk' to the parliamentary representation of a party – might be 
tempted to push for intra-party reforms (including an opening of party leader selection rules), to 
(re-)gain prominence within the government. And given the increased leverage the Party in 
Public Office should have within Western European political parties, such temptation might find 
fertile ground within the party organisation. 
This brief discussion expands Cross and Blais’ general argument about the reasons why 
parties in opposition should open their leaders’ selectorate: they argue that, when in opposition, 
the internal balance of power within parties shifts towards the extra-parliamentary branch (Cross 
and Blais, 2012, p. 39). This could be true. Yet, I would argue that we might consider another 
viewpoint. More specifically, another reason why parties in opposition could open their leaders’ 
selectorate is precisely related to the fact that, despite the opposition status, the party in parliament 
still retains a certain amount of leverage, and it might be used to push for openings of the party 
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leadership selectorate, also given that this could be a way to show to the external public a 
positive, ‘receptive’ and ‘more democratic’ image of the party (as generally argued in Sections 3.1 
and 3.3). All in all, my seventh hypothesis states that: 
 
H7. When in opposition, the probability for a party to open its leader’ selectorate is higher. 
 
To empirically test H7, I have created Opposition Status, a dichotomous variable having value 
1 if a specific party in a legislature has never been in government, a 0 otherwise. For instance, if a 
party has spent a certain period of a legislature in opposition and then in government, it receives 
a 0; if it has only been in opposition, it gets a 1; if, finally, if it has always been in government, it 
gets a 097. Finally, given the specific nature of caretaker governments, I have decided not to 
include them into the calculus of this variable98. Data for this variable have been obtained from 
ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2016). 
Table 5.2 below reports the percentage of party-cases (that is, of each party in each 
legislature under consideration) that has been in opposition (i.e. has had value 1 on the variable 
Opposition Status) for each of the 10 Western European countries taken into account in this 
dissertation. A brief look at the table reveals that some countries with a very high percentage of 
party-cases having spent a legislature in opposition, like Spain, Greece, Portugal, are also 
                                                
97 As a side note, if a government is appointed the year after the general election, the variable is 
calculated as if the government is appointed in the same year of the general election, thus the 
short passage period between the general election and the appointment of a government does 
not enter the calculus of the variable. This decision has been driven by the idea that a short 
vacancy period – like the one happening between a general election and the appointment of a 
new government – should not affect the value that a party receives for the variable Opposition 
Status. 
98 According to ParlGov’s codebook for cabinets, caretaker governments are those ‘with a 
limited legislative mandate’. I have decided not to distinguish among different types of caretaker 
governments, or of governments with a limited mandate from the parliament. Distinguishing 
among different types of ‘non-full’ cabinets would inevitably introduce a strong personal bias, 
given the different definitions put forward in the literature to categorise caretaker governments 
(Mcdonnell and Valbruzzi, 2014, pp. 661–662). Therefore, a more objective way of dealing with 
caretaker governments is just considering them as a different type of government, not included 
in the calculus of the variable Opposition Status. For further information, see 
http://www.parlgov.org/documentation/codebook/#cabinet . 
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countries where some openings of party leader selection rules have happened. Yet, Table 5.2 also 
shows that some other countries where no such openings have occurred (Austria, and Germany) 
also have a medium-to-high percentage of opposition party-cases. 
 











United Kingdom 61 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
Obviously, being an aggregate measure, its values depend on a series of factors, like the 
number of parties included in each government, and that is why, to precisely grasp the effect of 
Opposition Status on the probability parties open their leader selectorate, we have to recur to a 
more complete multivariate analysis, performed in Chapter 6. Nonetheless, we have not arrived 
there yet. Indeed, there are two other external factors that shall be taken into account before 
moving to the empirical analysis. I am referring to the contagion effect and to a possible general 
influence of the personalisation of politics at the country level. These two factors are respectively 
tackled in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below. 
 
5.3 The contagion effect 
 
When someone analysing party organisations finds the word ‘contagion’, two scholars 
immediately come to mind: Maurice Duverger and Leon Epstein. They differently deal with this 
important concept, which is of crucial importance not only for party organisational changes, but 
also, from a more specific viewpoint, for party leader selection rules.  
Duverger (1964, pp. 24–27) discusses the adoption of the Socialist mass party structure by 
other parties, with the former acting as a ‘contagious’ organisations towards the latter. Even if 
the effective scope and width of this contagion are discussed by Duverger himself, what is of 
interest here is the fact that parties might follow a sort of imitative pattern, following the 
example set forth by a sort of ‘pioneering’ party organisation within a system. In the case of 
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Duverger, it is the Socialist party who acts as the vanguard, and therefore a commonly used 
expression, coined by Duverger himself, to denote this phenomenon is ‘contagion from the left’ 
(1964, p. xxvii). Then, the concept of contagion is used again, with a similar fortune, by Epstein 
(1967, pp. 257–260), whose ‘contagion from the right’ is the phenomenon by which the new 
means of mass communication and new financing systems for more right-leaning parties could 
foster an imitative pattern by left-wing political formations. All in all, the crucial element of both 
accounts of contagion is that a party’s actions, conformation, or strategies might be imitated by 
other political formations in the same system. This is the crucial concept around which this 
Section revolves. 
The concept of contagion in the party change framework has not received a lot of attention. 
Yet, Janda (1990, pp. 9–10), explicitly quoting Panebianco’s analysis of the SPD and the CDU 
(1988, pp. 253–255), argues that ‘political parties tend to operate in environmental “niches” and 
[…] they are particularly sensitive to sharing the marketplace with other parties, [therefore] the 
electoral experience of “comparable organizations” often determines how the party judges its 
own performance”. Notice that, in this account, the argument is not that a party will imitate what 
other parties do, under certain conditions, but simply that performance’s evaluation is done in a 
comparative perspective. A step forward is done by Harmel and Janda (1994a, pp. 263–264), who 
posit that parties might follow imitative patterns in order to more efficiently compete with other 
political formations. Unfortunately, this intuition is not further developed, but these are the first 
seeds of a long-lasting discussion, especially in the field of party leader selection rules.  
Indeed, Lisi (2010) writes that the contagion effect has played a role in the ‘democratisation’ 
of Portuguese parties’ leadership selection rules under study. Interestingly, this determinant is 
not included in Lisi’s framework of analysis, but it is briefly discussed in the conclusions of his 
contribution. Subsequent works devote more attention to the contagion effect in patterns of 
openings of party leader selection rules. For instance, Cross and Blais (2012, pp. 40–42) argue 
that a contagion concerning the opening of party leadership selectorates might be successful for 
two reasons: first, because ‘intra-party democracy' is positively judged by electors (thus, they 
assume that a more open party leadership selectorate can be considered as more democratic by 
party members or even by voters99); second, because if a party ‘does something' in line with the 
expectations of voters, other parties will feel pressured to do the same. Thanks to an analysis of 
descriptive statistics, Cross and Blais (2012) argue there is a certain effect of a ‘contagion effect’ 
                                                
99 On the relationship among party leader selection rules, openings of party leader' selectorate, 
and intra-party democracy, see the discussion in Section 3.3 and Marino and Martocchia Diodati 
(2017) 
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concerning the opening of party leader selectorates in the five countries they take into 
consideration. This conclusion is similar to that reached by Wauters (2014) in his analysis of the 
adoption of OMOV leadership selection mechanisms in some Belgian parties. Moreover, also 
the concluding chapter by Pilet and Cross (2014a) of their edited book argues that the contagion 
effect for the adoption of OMOV leader selection mechanisms might be at work in some 
specific contexts. This is partly similar from the findings by Gauja (2016), who argues that a 
contagion effect does play a role in fostering party change, but does not constitute the most 
important ‘competitive' driver for reform. 
Despite these useful insights, no quantitative empirical analysis has ever tested the effect of 
a contagion related to the openings of party leader selection rules. This is extremely surprising, 
given the number of contributions considering this factor. Indeed, the fact that parties do not 
operate in an empty environment, already pointed out in the introductory paragraphs, also mean 
that political formations could pay attention to what happens in other parties around them. This 
can be even truer when it comes to party leader selection rules. All in all, it might be worthy to 
precisely analyse the effect of the contagion effect in party leadership selectorates' openings. To 
account for this factor, the eighth hypothesis to be tested in the empirical analysis is as follows: 
 
H8. If party opens its leader’ selectorate, the probability that a party in the same system opens its leader’ 
selectorate increases. 
 
Turning to the operationalization of the contagion effect, it is useful to briefly account for 
Gauja’s discussion of contagion in party change. Indeed, Gauja (2016, pp. 64-66-113) argues 
that, despite the contagion effect might be a party-system-related driver for party reforms, it is 
extremely difficult to operationalise such concept. More specifically, there is ‘no systematic way 
within the field of party scholarship to accurately identify instances of contagion’ (Gauja, 2016, 
p. 64), because, in her view, some proposed solutions are flawed: inferring contagion from the 
simple timing of reforms (i.e., a party changes at T, and then another party changes at T+1) is 
wrong, given that it does not allow researchers to distinguish contagion from two events that 
casually happened in a temporal order (Gauja, 2016, p. 64). Moreover, we do not have a clear 
understanding of the period during which a contagion effect might be at work: how long should 
such period be (Gauja, 2016, p. 64)? Two possible alternatives suggested by Gauja are either 
related to the analysis of party documents, interviews, communiqués, statements, and the like, or 
to the analysis of the movement of people from one party to another (Gauja, 2016, p. 64). Yet, 
the author herself recognises these two strategies are more suitable for small-N studies and that 
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inferential analyses might shed some light on the effect of contagion on party reforms (Gauja, 
2016, pp. 107–108).  
How to take into account these reasonable arguments by Gauja? First of all, it is necessary 
to devise a variable taking into consideration casual patterns of openings of party leader 
selectorates: in other words, it is necessary to create a certain temporal separation between the 
party having opened at T-1, which should have acted as a ‘contagious organisation’, and the 
subsequent changes by other parties at T. Given the structure of my dataset – organised at the 
legislature level – a feasible solution is that of considering only changes happening in the 
previous legislature as contagious events, happened at T-1, which might potentially trigger 
imitative patterns by other parties at T. Notice this is a quite conservative solution, because it 
does not consider as events happening because of a contagion the openings of the same 
legislature. In other words, if – say - two openings by two different parties happen in the same 
legislature in the same party system, both parties receive a 0 on the contagion-related variable. 
The idea is avoiding idiosyncratic events which, given they ‘casually’ happen in the same 
legislature, might potentially inflate the effect of the contagion-related variable on the DV. 
Yet, this is just the first step to build the contagion-related variable. The second reason why 
I have considered only openings of the selectorate happening at T-1 (i.e., given the structure of 
my dataset, in the previous legislature), is related to another above-mentioned problem to be 
solved: the temporal stretch of the variable. How long should a contagion effect last? There is 
not an obvious answer to such question, apart from the logical consideration that the longer the 
time between two openings of the same system, the less likely the probability that the second 
event has been triggered by the first one. So, only considering openings of the previous 
legislature is a reasonable solution to account both for the necessity to avoid casual openings 
happening together in a very short period of time, and also for the idea not to let too much time 
pass between a contagious event and its potential contagious effects. 
To sum up, I have created a variable, called Contagion, which considers as contagious events 
the openings happening in a certain party system at T-1 – i.e., in the previous legislature. More 
specifically, all the parties present in my dataset in a certain legislature have received a 1 for this 
variable if, in the same party system, a party has opened its party leader selectorate in the 
previous legislature (this latter party has obviously been given a 0). Given data for this variable 
are those used to build the dependent variable, more information on the specific data used in the 
construction of Contagion is available in Section 3.4. Furthermore, country- or party-specific 
information concerning this variable can be found in the related section of Appendix B. 
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Table 5.3 Percentage of party-cases where at least another party has opened its leader selectorate in the 











United Kingdom 16.7 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
Table 5.3 above reports the percentage of party-cases, for each country, having value 1 on 
the variable Contagion. Starting from Austria and Germany, since no opening happened in those 
countries between the 1980s and mid-2010s, it follows no party in these two polities might have 
been influenced by the contagion of another political formation. Conversely, the very high 
percentage for Greece is related to a series of factors, like the number of leader selectorates' 
openings happened in this polity and the temporal diffusion of such openings. In other words, if 
in a country there is a noticeable number of openings, and such events are also distributed in the 
time-period under consideration, it follows the number of party-cases potentially affected by 
Contagion is high. On the contrary, the very low value for Dutch and Irish parties is related to two 
factors: the lower number of openings and the temporal concentration of these reforms. All in 
all, it seems there are potentially interesting patterns to explore concerning the effect of Contagion 
on the probability parties open their leader selectorate. Before turning our attention to Chapter 6 
and the empirical analysis, a final factor shall be carefully analysed: the personalisation of politics 
at the country level. Section 5.4 below is devoted to this task. 
 
5.4 The personalisation of politics (3): a general effect 
 
 Another relevant factor that can influence the opening of party leader selectorates is the 
personalisation of politics understood as a wider phenomenon happening at the party-system 
level. Section 4.3 and 4.4 have been already devoted to the possible effect of, respectively, 
leaders' effects in general elections and leaders' control of their parties on the DVs. Here, I 
would widen the scope of the analysis and consider the possible effect of a more general increase 
in the impact of personalisation of politics in a certain party system.  
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The first thing one notices when dealing with a broad view on the personalisation of politics 
is that different authors, despite diverse definitions, focus on the same underlying idea: for Rahat 
and Sheafer (2007, p. 65, italics in original), ‘[p]olitical personalization should be seen as a process 
(Brettschneider & Gabriel, 2002; Kaase, 1994) in which the political weight of the individual 
actor in the political process increases over time, while the centrality of the political group (i.e., 
political party) declines’ ; the quote by Karvonen (2010, p. 4), already mentioned in Section 2.4, 
underlines that ‘[t]he core of the personalisation hypothesis is the notion that individual political 
actors have become more prominent at the expense of parties and collective identities’; Balmas et 
al. (2014, p. 37) bring about the idea that personalisation could be seen as a ‘mutual process of 
growing centrality of the individual together with a decrease in the power of political groupings 
such as political parties, parliaments and cabinets’. Without further exploring all the definitions 
given by all authors on the topic, the above-mentioned quotes underline the growing importance 
of individuals and the declining role of parties, collective identities, and so forth. I argue that 
such phenomenon, and the underlying general concept, are of great importance to tackle the 
openings of party leader selection rules. 
One of the reasons behind my standpoint is that the personalisation of politics is not a 
phenomenon that should be seen as disconnected from political and social life. On the contrary, 
its inception and development are linked to several crucial transformations in Western European 
polities, as we have also seen in Chapter 1. As argued, for instance, by Karvonen (2010, p. 4), 
many possible different phenomena can explain the alleged rise in the personalisation of politics: 
from the modernization of societies, to the decline of traditional social cleavages, from the 
increasing role of (new) media in political communication, to the declining power of party 
identifications. In other words, these are fundamental changes happened in our societies in the 
last decades. Shedding some light on the consequences of the personalisation of politics on an 
important intra-party area, like leader selection, might be framed in the account of wider social 
and political transformations happening in Western Europe.  
 At this point, a logical question might arise: why should there be an influence of the 
personalisation of politics at the party system level on the likelihood that a party opens its leader' 
selectorate? The answer to this question is simple: Sections 4.3 and 4.4 have been devoted to the 
task of tackling the possible influence of two specific aspects of the personalisation of politics on 
the dependent variables. These two faces of the personalisation of politics were related to 
political parties. From a broader viewpoint, it might also be interesting to analyse the influence 
of the personalisation of politics at the systemic level, to control for the possible presence of 
specific patterns that shall be accounted for in the empirical analysis.   
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All in all, following the reasoning put forward both in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 and in Marino, 
Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli (2017), if we assume that the personalisation of politics is at 
least partly (if not widely) related to the political changes happened at the electoral and the inter-
party levels, it might be interesting to understand the effects on the DVs not only of specific 
aspects of the personalisation of politics (as done in Sections 4.3 and 4.4), but also of its more 
general, encompassing, and underlying transformations. 
In this sense, an increase in the impact of the personalisation of politics – broadly intended 
– might act as a push for opening party leadership selectorates: assuming that the personalisation 
of politics means an increasing role of ‘people’ at the expenses of other ‘groups’ allegiances, or 
determinants, of party support, it follows that if intra-party power-holders realise that ‘people’ 
are more important than ‘structures’ – in this case, leaders are more central than their parties – 
there might be the incentive to open the leader’ selectorate in order to transmit a more 
‘democratic’ image of the party to its members, supporters, and to the external environment.  
More specifically, we know that the adoption of more open party leader selection rules 
might increase the legitimacy of party leaders (Lisi, 2010, 2015, pp. 110–111; Sandri and 
Seddone, 2015a; Pasquino, 2016). I do not want to dispute whether this alleged relationship 
holds; on the contrary, I might, more modestly, argue that, at the intra-party level, there is some 
knowledge of the foreseeable effects that an opening of party leader selection rules might have 
on the legitimacy of a party leader selected by a wider selectorate. Moreover, there might also be 
a certain knowledge of the general transformations concerning the personalisation of politics 
happening in a certain party system. 
One possible logical consequence of these two phenomena is that, at the intra-party level, 
there might be certain incentives to open the selectorate for the leadership selection if this 
decision is thought to be good for the future perspective of the party leader’s legitimacy. And 
given that an increasing impact of the personalisation of politics is, above all, an increased 
importance of the person, if such person – the party leader – is selected by a wider selectorate, 
he/she might have the chance to see his/her legitimacy increased, exactly because the 
personalisation of politics has made him/her, and also his/her mode of selection, more 
interesting to consider by the public – and ultimately, by voters. Therefore, this reasoning has 
brought me to devise a ninth, and final, hypothesis: 
 
H9. If the impact of the personalisation of politics in a given general election increases, the probability that a party 
opens its leader’ selectorate increases. 
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 To operationalize the variable necessary to test H9, I have relied on the data collected for 
the Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017). 
More specifically, the survey included a question aimed at tackling the personalisation in a given 
country in each election. We asked respondents to rate the overall impact of the personalisation 
of politics on a 1-10 scale, where 1 means ‘very low impact’ and 10 ‘very high impact’. Starting 
from the data derived from answers to this question, I have created a variable called Overall 
Personalisation. 
At this point, a counterargument would point out that asking such general question could 
have meant obtaining unreliable results, given the more general nature of the question compared 
to the other questions of the Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey. Yet, a reply to this 
argument would be twofold. First, we wanted to obtain a sort of ‘snapshot' of the 
personalisation of politics in each election in each country, without introducing any bias 
potentially influencing respondents, and assuming that experts had a general idea of the level of 
personalisation in each party system under consideration and its impact (Marino, Martocchia 
Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017). Second, even if the first reply was not convincing yet, we have 
run a series of reliability tests that, in line with the results obtained for the other questions of the 
expert survey100, show that the inter-expert reliability for this question – and therefore for the 
data obtained from the responses to the question – is extremely encouraging (Marino, 
Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017). 
  
                                                
100 See Sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
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Figure 5.1 Average values of Overall Personalisation over time per country, Western Europe (1985-
2015) 
 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
Figure 5.1 reports the mean values, over time, attributed by experts to the overall impact of 
the personalisation of politics in the 10 Western European countries under examination. Some 
cases stand out: for instance, the abrupt rise in the values of Overall Personalisation in Italy in the 
mid-1990s is attributable to the rise to power of Berlusconi’s party, FI, whose alleged importance 
for the personalisation of politics in Italy has been widely analysed (see for instance Calise, 2015). 
Also, the increase in the mean values in the United Kingdom in mid-to-late-1990s might also be 
related to the rise to the political scene of Tony Blair (Heffernan and Webb, 2005), albeit there 
was a declining trend up to 2010, showing that, at least according to the experts we have 
surveyed, the impact of the personalisation of politics in the British case would require a careful 
investigation.  
Figure 5.1 also shows some – more or less constant – declining trends, like those of Ireland 
and Greece, whereas some other countries, namely, Belgium and Germany, experienced an 
increase in the overall impact of the personalisation of politics between the mid-1980s and the 
mid-2010s. Concerning the possible impact of Overall Personalisation on the probability that parties 
open their leaders' selectorate, it seems there is not a clear pattern at work: in some countries, 
there is a declining trend but there are selectorate openings (Ireland, and Greece), while in others 
there is an increasing trend but there are no openings (Germany), and there are also openings of 
countries experiencing more erratic trends of increase or decrease in the impact of the 
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personalisation of politics (the United Kingdom, and Portugal). Even in this case, the empirical 




At the end of this chapter, a brief recap might be of help: after having presented the internal 
factors allegedly influencing the openings of party leader selectorates in Chapter 4, this chapter 
has been devoted to putting forward the reasoning behind the presentation of four external 
factors that should impact on parties’ openings of their leaders’ selectorate. These external 
factors are electoral setbacks, the opposition status, the contagion by other parties, and the 
overall impact of the personalisation of politics.  
The two-fold presentation of internal and external factors in Chapters 4 and 5 has followed 
the logic put forward in Section 3.1 on the general framework of analysis at the basis of this 
dissertation. Now, what remains to be explored is whether all these factors, or only some of 
them, have an impact on parties' probability to open their leaders' selectorates. Chapter 6 is 
devoted to this task and therefore focuses on the empirical analyses for the two dependent 
variables of this study, the dichotomous one and the ordinal one. 
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Chapter 6 – The empirical analysis 
 
 As shown in Chapter 3, there are two questions that need to be addressed: first, why do 
parties open their leader selectorate? Second, why do partied adopt a specific selectorate? This is 
related to the fact that the openings of party leader selectorates can be seen – and therefore 
analysed – from two different viewpoints: by considering all openings as equal (and thus using in 
the empirical analysis a dichotomous dependent variable) or, conversely, by separately 
considering the different selectorates (meaning, adopting an ordinal dependent variable). The 
two DVs are necessary to deal with the two abovementioned standpoints and must be analysed 
using two different regression models. More specifically, Section 6.1 deals with the analysis of 
the dichotomous DV, while Section 6.2 tackles the ordinal DV. Finally, Section 6.3 compares the 
determinants of the two dependent variables and also puts forward a tentative research agenda 
for future comparative pieces of research on party leader selection.  
 
6.1 The analysis of the dichotomous dependent variable  
 
In this section, I answer the question why parties open their leader selectorate (from a 
general viewpoint). Chapters 4 and 5 have put forward nine hypotheses to try answering this 
question. Before delving deeper into the empirical analysis, Table 6.1 below reports some 
descriptive statistics for the DV and the independent variables. Moreover, the sign of Membership 
Decline and Seat Share Loss has been inverted to facilitate readability and the interpretation of the 
empirical analysis: positive values of these two variables respectively mean a decline in a party’s 
average M/E ratio (compared to T-1) and a decline in a party’s percentage of seats obtained 
(compared to T-1). 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics for the dichotomous Dependent Variable 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max N 
Selectorate Dichotomous  0.076 0.265 0 1 355 
Leadership Change  0.437 0.497 0 1 355 
Membership Decline  0.707 0.379 -2.654 1.901 355 
Leader in Election  6.001 1.462 2.3 9.182 355 
Leader in Party  6.739 1.688 2.5 10 355 
Seat Share Loss  0.102 7.120 -24 35.5 355 
Party Size  20.829 16.878 0 63.6 355 
Opposition Status  0.589 0.493 0 1 355 
Overall Personalisation  6.631 1.042 4.083 8.461 355 
Contagion  0.239 0.427 0 1 355 
Party Family  - - - - 355 
 Communist/Socialist     49 
 Ecologist/Green     31 
 Social Democratic     81 
 Christian Democratic     66 
 Liberal     54 
 Conservative     43 
 Right-Wing     31 
Source: author's elaboration 
 
Since the DV under examination (Selectorate Dichotomous) is a dichotomous one (where 1 
means an opening and 0 otherwise), it follows a logistic regression shall be performed. 
Moreover, it would be useful to control for the fact that, given my observation (the party-case) is 
the party in the legislature, party-legislature observations are clustered in party-level observations.  
This specific structure of the dataset must be taken into account; otherwise the standard errors 
calculated by the logistic regression might be not correct (and this is also related to the 
probability that type-I errors might be more likely generated) (Steenbergen et al., 2002). 
Moreover, the dataset includes repeated observations over time (party-legislature) of the same 
individual (party), and this must also be considered when devising the regression, to control for 
errors' autocorrelation. 
All in all, I have decided to test the impact of the independent variables presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5 on the dichotomous DV by using a time-series-cross-section (TSCS) analysis, 
and specifically, a random-intercept logistic regression101. Before using this model, I have 
declared the dataset to be time-series, and have specified a panel variable and a time variable: the 
former is the variable Party ID, while the latter is the variable Legislature. The N of the two 
variables is, respectively, 52 and 10. Notice that the panel variable’s numerosity follows the 
argument put forward by Stegmueller (2013) about the fact that at least 15 or 20 cases are 
                                                
101 All the analyses in this chapter have been performed by using Stata13. 
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necessary for the second-level variable in order not to have biased results102. More details on the 
operationalisation of the two variables are available in Appendix B. 
 
Table 6.2 Random-intercept logistic regression on Selectorate (Dichotomous), Western Europe (1985-
2015) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    Leadership Change 
 
-2.091*** (0.457) -2.128*** (0.452) 
    Membership Decline 
 
-0.676** (0.241) -0.719** (0.232) 
Leader in Election 
 
-0.102 (0.203) -0.107 (0.199) 
    Leader in Party 
 
-0.223 (0.172) -0.294 (0.163) 
    Seat Share Loss 
 
0.095** (0.033) -0.041 (0.067) 
    Party Size 
 
0.009 (0.016) -0.003 (0.017) 
    Seat Share Loss | Party Size . 0.004* (0.002) 
Opposition Status 
 
0.600 (0.583) 0.495 (0.578) 
    Contagion 
 
0.413 (0.484) 0.435 (0.484) 
Overall Personalisation 
 
0.129 (0.173) 0.171 (0.172) 
Party Family (Communist/Socialist) 
 
-1.845* (0.921) -1.959* (0.894) 
    Party Family (Ecologist/Green) 
 
-0.441 (0.690) -0.794 (0.703) 
    Party Family (Social-Democratic) 
 
0.307 (0.481) 0.305 (0.484) 
    Party Family (Christian-Democratic) [Ref. Category] 
 
. . 
    Party Family (Liberal) 
 
-0.050 (0.721) -0.259 (0.713) 
    Party Family (Conservative) 
 
-0.302 (0.742) -0.554 (0.790) 
    Party Family (Right-Wing) 
 
-0.376 (0.795) -0.357 (0.802) 
    Constant -2.497*** (0.200) -1.360 (1.342) -0.857 (1.433) 
    Observations 355 355 355 
Observations (Panel-level) 52 52 52 
AIC 195 186.8 184.8 
BIC 202.8 248.7 250.6 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -95.5 -77.4 -75.4 
Wald Chi-Square  27.1* 28.4* 
Log-Odds reported. Cluster-Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
It is now time to move to the empirical analysis. Table 6.2 above reports the results of the 
logistic regression analysis performed on the dichotomous dependent variable103. Model 1 is an 
                                                
102 For further considerations, see also Bryan and Jenkins (2016). I have also decided to cluster 
errors according to Party ID, to control for heteroskedasticity-related and autocorrelation-related 
problems, following Cameron and Trivedi (2009). 
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empty model, while Model 2 includes all the variables presented in Chapters 4 and 5, minus the 
interaction between Seat Share Loss and Party Size (which is necessary to test H6). Finally, Model 3 
includes all the variables presented in this dissertation, including the interaction104. Both the 
constitutive terms of the interaction (that is, Seat Share Loss and Party Size) and the interaction 
itself are reported (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). 
Looking at Table 6.2 above, there are some interesting preliminary considerations to make. 
First of all, the fact that just a handful of variables have a statistically significant impact on the 
DV is reflected in the goodness of fit measures. Concerning the comparison between Model 1 
and Model 2, only does the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) (Akaike, 1974) show that there 
is an increase in the goodness of fit, albeit it is not a very strong one. On the other hand, the BIC 
(Bayesian Information Criterion) (see, for instance, Raftery, 1995), being more sensible to the 
number of variables used in a model (and therefore more penalising), shows that there is not an 
increase in the goodness of fit. Yet, these considerations might be tempered by looking at the 
significance level of the Chi2. 
Let us start analysing the results of Table 6.2. The first four variables appearing in the table 
are those related to the hypotheses on the intra-party factors presented in Chapter 4: H1 
(Leadership Change), H2 (Membership Decline), H3 (Leader in Election), and H4 (Leader in Party). Then, 
we find the variables related to the external factors having a possible influence on the DV, 
analysed in Chapter 5: Seat Share Loss is related to H5, while Party Size and also the interaction 
between the Seats Share Decline and Party Size are related to H6; then, Opposition Status is related to 
H7, Contagion is necessary to test H8, and, finally, Overall Personalisation is connected to H9. The 
table also includes the different categories of the variable Party Family, which controls for parties’ 
ideological families. 
Turning our attention to the empirical test of the hypotheses, we first notice that some 
alleged relevant intra-party factors to explain the opening of party leader selectorates do exert a 
certain influence on the DV, but the sign of the coefficient is the opposite of the one I was 
expecting. 
More specifically, the significant (p<0.001) coefficient for Leadership Change has a negative 
sign, both in Models 2 and 3: it means that if parties change a leader in a legislature, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
103 I have run a multicollinearity test that reports no problems of multicollinearity: the VIF/TOL 
test reports no VIF values above 2, and a mean VIF value below 1.4. 
104 I have decided, for this Table and also for the Table related to the regression analysis 
concerning the ordinal dependent variable, to rely on log-odds instead of odds-ratios for 
readability reasons.   
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probability that they will open the leader’ selectorate is lower compared to those parties that have 
not changed the leader, all other things being equal. This means not only that H1 does not find 
empirical confirmation concerning the dichotomous DV, but also that, when dealing with 
general openings of party leader selectorates, a change in party leadership is not a push, but a 
brake for such openings. I discuss this result – and also the other results of Table 6.2 – later in 
this section. For the moment, let us turn our attention to the other variables presented in the 
table.  
The same logic of Leadership Change can be applied to the analysis of the sign of Membership 
Decline: being negative (and significant, p<0.01), both in Models 2 and 3, it means that when 
parties lose members – with respect to the previous legislature – their chances of opening their 
leader’ selectorate are lower, and when they instead gain members, they have more chances to 
open such selectorate. So, H2 does not find empirical confirmation, but this means that when a 
party’s M/E ratio increases compared to the past legislature, this acts as a positive drive for party 
leader selectorates’ openings.  
The other hypotheses do not find empirical confirmation, given the non-significance of the 
coefficients: so, the fact that a party is in opposition (H6), or that it acts in a more personalised 
party system (H7), or having a leader either able to drive consensus towards the party during a 
general election (H3) or with a greater control of the party organisation (H4), or even the fact 
that other parties in the same system opened their leader’ selectorate in the previous legislature 
(H9) do not have a statistically significant impact on the probability that parties open the 
selectorate that chooses their leader.  
A different discourse shall be made concerning H5, and therefore to Seat Share Loss: this 
variable has indeed a significant (p<0.01) and positive coefficient in Model 2, meaning that there 
is a statistically significant relationship between such variable and the DV. Moreover, according 
to the results of Model 2, as hypothesised in H5, a decrease in the percentage of seats held by a 
party increases the probability for this political formation to open the selectorate for its leader. 
Nonetheless, when passing from Model 2 to Model 3 (that is, when the interaction between Seat 
Share Loss and Party Size is also included), the coefficient for Seat Share Loss becomes non-
significant. It seems that what matters, in analysing the influence of electoral setbacks on the 
probability parties open their leaders' selectorate, is controlling for party size. Therefore, it might 
be more worthy investigating H6 (the hypothesis related to the influence of party size on the 
effect of electoral setbacks) than H5 (which is the hypothesis directly connecting such setbacks 
to the DV). 
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Let us, therefore, turn our attention to H6 and the interaction between Seat Share Loss and 
Party Size. By briefly recalling H6, the hypothesis stated that, for larger parties, the effects of an 
electoral setback on their probability to open leaders’ selectorate would have been stronger. 
Table 6.2 shows that the conditioned effect of Party Size on the influence of Seat Share Loss on 
the DV is significant and positive. Thus, it seems that, when controlling for the size of parties (in 
terms of seats held in Parliament at T-1), an electoral setback does have a positive effect on the 
likelihood to open leader selectorates. More specifically, it seems that the effects of an electoral 
setback for bigger parties are that they should have a higher probability to open their leaders’ 
selectorates. 
 




To fully grasp the effects of the interaction, following again Brambor, Clark and Golder 
(2006), Figure 6.1 above reports the Average Marginal Effect of the interaction between Seat 
Share Loss and Party Size. There are two substantial reasons to recur to this post-estimation tool: 
on the one hand, Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) greatly facilitate the interpretation of the 
influence of the independent variables on the dependent one (also when an interaction is taken 
into consideration), given they measure the change in the expected value of the dependent 
variable when an independent variable changes by an extremely small value (Mood, 2010).  
Figure 6.1 does reveal an interesting pattern. From Table 6.2, we know the coefficient of the 
interaction between Seat Share Loss and Party Size is significant (p<0.05). Yet, Figure 6.1 tells us 
that only when the party size at T-1 (X axis) is sufficiently big – around 33% of the seats in the 
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Lower House – does the average marginal effect on the probability to open the leader’ 
selectorate increase. In other words, for bigger parties, the stronger the electoral setback, the 
higher the probability they will change their leader’ selectorate. Moreover, the lower confidence 
interval of the marginal effects’ line reaches the zero on the Y axis starting from party size at T-1 
equal to circa 30% of the seats of the Lower House105. In other words, for smaller parties, it is 
not possible to consider H6 as empirically supported, while there is indeed empirical 
confirmation for bigger parties.  
Let us wrap up the results of Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1. A first take is that both internal and 
external factors seem to exert a statistically significant influence on the probability a party opens 
its leader' selectorate. On the one hand, both the lack of changes in the leadership and an 
increase in the M/E ratio increase the likelihood a party makes the selectorate for its leader more 
inclusive. Moreover, along with these two internal factors, also an electoral setback has an impact 
on the DV, albeit its effect is more blurred. More specifically, if, on the one hand, we do not 
include in the analysis the interaction between Seat Share Loss and Party Size, Model 2 shows that 
an electoral setback is indeed a push for fostering an opening of party leaders’ selectorate, but 
when the interaction is taken into consideration (Model 3), this unconditioned effect disappears, 
and only the conditioning effect of parties’ size on the impact of electoral setbacks is statistically 
significant. These results show that, at least concerning the dichotomous DV, the discussion 
raised in Section 3.1 on the importance of external or of internal factors, where I have adopted 
an ‘agnostic’ view, might have been a good solution: including both sets of factors has allowed us 
to discover interesting paths of analysis. 
A second consideration is that the Western European political parties included in the 
analysis seem to be quite conservative organisations: if a party changes its leader during a 
legislature, or if its M/E ratio declines compared to the previous legislature, such party is less 
likely to open its leader selectorate. In other words, when faced with two dire internal 
phenomena – the fact that the leader of the party changes or the lower ability of the party either 
to attract new members or to keep existing ones in – parties react by not opening their leader 
selection rules. One possible reason is that the two above-mentioned phenomena can reduce the 
ability of political parties to control and have a grasp of the environment around them106.  
                                                
105 For more information on the interpretation of the marginal effects’ plots and on issues related 
to the problems when the confidence intervals touch the zero line, see Brambor, Golder and 
Clark (2006) 
106 For a detailed account of the importance of the external environment for political parties, see, 
for instance, Panebianco (1988). 
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Indeed, a change in a party's leadership means that the person (the organ) who (which) is 
theoretically the one who (which) should lead the party is a new one. The old leadership, with its 
knowledge of the external environment (be it limited or extended), is gone. Moreover, a decline 
in party membership substantially means a party is less and less able to be attractive to citizens. It 
follows the function of connecting the state with the society, already thought to be in decline by 
Katz (1990), Mair (1994), and Katz and Mair (1995), might be extremely precarious. Indeed, all 
other things being equal, a declining M/E ratio also means – with all the possible caveats one 
should remember107 - that less ‘fresh blood’ is entering the party organisation. Therefore, again, 
all other things being equal, there is also a lower knowledge of the external environment, 
especially of the one closer to political parties, that is, of those citizens who might be interested 
in joining them. All in all, both phenomena seem to me as pointing towards the same direction: 
more uncertainty and less knowledge of what is happening outside the party. And the 
consequence of this situation seems to be clear: a lower probability to open party leader selection 
rules. 
 Obviously, this consideration might be tempered by two further points. The first one is that 
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 show that, for bigger political parties, a dire event, like an electoral 
setback, increases the probability of an opening of party leader selection rules. Despite nothing 
substantial can be said for smaller parties, the interaction suggests us that the party change 
framework might have hinted at a possible important element only for larger parties: they are 
mostly interested in being electorally successful. And therefore, an electoral setback might bring 
about the necessity to change something at the intra-party level. More specifically, the party 
leader selectorate. As extensively argued in Section 5.1, this might be because electorally 
unsuccessful parties might want to renew themselves (or their image transmitted to the 
electorate) by fostering reforms that might appear as ‘popular'.  
The second, and final, point is related to the ‘other side of the coin’ of Membership Decline. 
Indeed, the negative sign of the coefficient reported in Table 6.2 means not only that a decline in 
the M/E with respect to T-1 reduces the probability for a party to open its leader selection rules, 
but also that an increase in the M/E ratio (compared to T-1) increases the probability to open the 
selectorate for party leaders. In this sense, a useful insight might come from Gauja and Van 
Haute (2015) who, discussing the results of the analyses performed by country experts on party 
membership in a number of Western countries and presented in their edited volume (Van Haute 
and Gauja, 2015), bring about two interesting points of discussion: first, there is a certain desire 
                                                
107 For instance, concerning the percentage of old members renewing their membership, a kind 
of data which is extremely difficult to obtain, especially for large-N comparative analyses. 
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for (more) Intra-Party Democracy by party members, and, second, policy- and political-values-
related reasons are the most important motivations why people join political parties.  
So, when the M/E ratio of a party increases, it means that a political party has a higher 
number of people than before who have decided either to renew their membership or to join 
that political formation108. Moreover, it also means that older party members, who might be 
extremely interested in Intra-Party Democracy, are joined by newly-enrolled members, who 
might have become party members predominantly for the desire to have an impact on policy-
making and to follow the party's political values. Therefore, party members might have a certain 
willingness to push for ‘democracy-enhancing' reforms, like the opening of the party leadership 
selectorate, and sometimes be also successful in such requests. Obviously, this is a speculation, 
albeit it is based on many empirical pieces of evidence, and might seem more or less 
convincing109. A good way to verify its adherence to reality is testing it in future empirical 
research.  
What, instead, can be immediately done is understanding whether the determinants for 
some specific openings of party leader selectorates – i. e. for the passages from one specific value 
of the ordinal dependent variable to the next one – are similar or different from the ones for the 
dichotomous DV. In the next section, I deal with the analysis of the ordinal DV before moving, 
in Section 6.3, to a general recap of the findings of this chapter. 
 
6.2 The analysis of the ordinal dependent variable 
 
 This section tackles the following question: why do parties adopt specific leader 
selectorates? To answer this question, an analysis of the ordinal dependent variable presented in 
Section 3.2 is put forward. Given the DV is ordinal, I show the results of an analysis based on an 
                                                
108 Obviously, another possibility is that the electorate of a country – that is, the denominator of 
the M/E ratio – has declined while the number of members of a party has either remained stable 
or has declined at a lower rate than the electorate. Yet, with the sole exception of Italy for the 
last three elections (after a reform giving Italians abroad the power to directly elect some MPs), 
in all the countries included in the empirical analysis, the electorate has expanded through time.  
109 On a small side note, Tormey (2015, pp. 19–20) argues that a decline in parties’ membership 
should mean that such parties’ leaders are less and less influenced by members, and more and 
more pressured by party funders, interest groups, or even the media. By inverting this argument, 
an increase in parties’ membership might signal a higher influence by members on party leaders.  
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ordered logistic regression. Indeed, an ordered logistic regression computes the probability for 
an individual to pass to a higher value of the DV's distribution compared to the probability that 
the individual remains at lower levels. (e.g. passing to value 4 vs the probability to remain at a 
value lower than 4). This seems a feasible way to tackle the second question and understanding, 
in a fine-grained and detailed way, the precise movements of parties on the selectorate's 
exclusiveness/inclusiveness continuum presented in Section 3.2. More specifically, the regression 
considers the – possibly – different probabilities that might be at play for parties to have a 
specific more open selectorate for party leaders (i.e., a higher value of the DV) vs the probability 
they have a less open selectorate (i.e., lower values of the DV). Even for the ordinal DV, I deal 
with a TSCS analysis thanks to a random-intercept ordered logistic regression. Moreover, before 
running the regression, I have followed the procedure seen in the previous section and declared 
the data to be time-series (panel variable: Party ID, time variable: Legislature)110. 
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics for the ordinal dependent variable 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max N 
Selectorate (Ordinal)  - - - - 355 
 One Person     5 
 Party Elite     41 
 Party MPs     16 
 Electoral College     15 
 Party Congress     180 
 Party Primary     98 
Leadership Change  0.437 0.497 0 1 355 
Membership Decline  0.707 0.379 -2.654 1.901 355 
Leader in Election  6.001 1.462 2.3 9.182 355 
Leader in Party  6.739 1.688 2.5 10 355 
Seat Share Loss  0.102 7.120 -24 35.5 355 
Party Size  20.829 16.878 0 63.6 355 
Opposition Status  0.589 0.493 0 1 355 
Contagion  0.239 0.427 0 1 355 
Overall Personalisation  6.631 1.042 4.083 8.461 355 
Party Family  - - - - 350 
 Communist/Socialist     49 
 Ecologist/Green     31 
 Social Democratic     81 
 Christian Democratic     66 
 Liberal     54 
 Conservative     43 
 Right-Wing     31 
 
                                                
110 Even in this case, in order to control for heteroskedasticity-related and autocorrelation-related 
problems, I have clustered errors according to the variable Party ID. 
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Table 6.3 above presents the descriptive statistics for the empirical analysis. Then, Table 6.4 
below reports the results of the empirical analysis on the ordinal DV.  
 
Table 6.4 Random-intercept ordered logistic regression on Selectorate (Ordinal), Western Europe (1985-
2015) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    Leadership Change 
 
-0.152 (0.261) -0.156 (0.261) 
Membership Decline 
 
-0.398 (0.570) -0.361 (0.553) 
Leader in Election 
 
0.406** (0.158) 0.394* (0.158) 
Leader in Party 
 
-0.455* (0.185) -0.483** (0.184) 
Seat Share Loss 
 
0.044* (0.019) -0.004 (0.051) 
Party Size 
 
-0.046 (0.031) -0.046 (0.032) 
Seat Share Loss | Party Size 
 
 0.001 (0.001) 
Opposition Status 
 
-0.016 (0.264) -0.063 (0.278) 
Contagion 
 
0.985** (0.322) 1.005** (0.325) 
Overall Personalisation 
 
0.197 (0.271) 0.216 (0.268) 
Party Family (Communist/Socialist) 
 
-5.609** (2.055) -5.587** (2.053) 
Party Family (Ecologist/Green) 
 
-0.030 (1.834) -0.004 (1.852) 
Party Family (Social Democratic) 
 
1.941 (1.067) 1.929 (1.071) 
Party Family (Christian-Democratic) [Ref. Category] 
 
. . 
Party Family (Liberal) 
 
1.495 (1.486) 1.495 (1.494) 
Party Family (Conservative) 
 
-0.537 (1.289) -0.491 (1.303) 
Party Family (Right-Wing)  -2.532 (1.635) -2.444 (1.645) 
Constant 13.52*** (3.916) 7.884* (3.556) 7.870* (3.571) 
Cut-Off 1 -11.001*** (1.642) -12.000** (3.709) -12.150** (3.762) 
Cut-Off 2 -4.322*** (0.641) -5.902 (2.940) -5.206 (2.980) 
Cut-Off 3 -3.365*** (0.604) -4.046 (2.594) -4.155 (2.640) 
Cut-Off 4 -2.611*** (0.579) -3.253 (2.379) -3.359 (2.416) 
Cut-Off 5 1.909*** (0.557) 1.599 (2.122) 1.500 (2.168) 
Observations 355 355 355 
Observations (Panel-level) 52 52 52 
AIC 665.6 637.9 638.7 
BIC 688.9 719.62 723.9 
Log-Likelihood -326.8 -297.9 -297.4 
Wald Chi-Square  82.47*** 74.64*** 
Log-Odds Coefficients reported; Cluster-Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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As done for Table 6.2 presented in the previous section, even Table 6.4 above reports the null 
model (Model 1), the model with all the variables minus the interaction (Model 2) and, finally, 
the complete model where also the interaction between Seat Share Loss and Party Size is present 
(Model 3)111. Following the scheme for the analysis of the dichotomous DV, the upper part of 
Table 6.4 reports the variables related to the four ‘internal’ hypotheses: Leadership Change (H1), 
Membership Decline (H2), Leader in Election (H3), and Leader in Party (H4). Then, the table also 
includes the variables for the five ‘external’ hypotheses: Seat Share Loss (H5), Party Size (which, 
along with Seat Share Loss, is needed to test H6), Opposition Status (H7), Contagion (H8), and, 
finally, Overall Personalisation (H9). An evident difference with the table related to the analysis of 
the dichotomous DV is that Table 6.4 above also reports the values of some cut-off points. They 
are the estimated points of an unobserved latent variable separating different levels of the DV 
when the independent variables are zero (see, for instance, Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 682). 
The first piece of evidence one notices by looking at Table 6.4 is that the variables explaining 
the adoption of a specific selectorate are different than the ones generally influencing the 
opening of a party leader selectorate. Indeed, Table 6.4 shows that, contrarily to Table 6.2, 
Membership Decline and Leadership Change are non-significant. It follows that, for the ordinal DV, 
H1 and H2 do not find empirical confirmation. In other words, changing a leader or losing 
members do not drive parties to adopt specific leader selectorates. Moreover, Seat Share Loss is 
significant in the second model of the regression for the dichotomous DV, and this is also true 
for the second model of the ordinal DV’s regression. Let us recall that both Model 2 in Table 6.2 
(the one related to the dichotomous DV) and also Model 2 in Table 6.4 above (the one analysing 
the ordinal DV) do not include the interaction between Seat Share Loss and Party Size. Therefore, 
the effect of electoral setbacks of parties’ probability to open their leaders’ selectorate seem to be 
at least partly compatible when controlling for the specific selectorates’ openings and when one 
considers all selectorates’ openings as equal. Later in this section, we see whether this first hint is 
also confirmed when it comes to the interaction between an electoral setback and the size of 
parties possibly affected by such event.  
All in all, these first pieces of evidence show that the picture emerging from the analysis of 
the ordinal DV seems different than the one rising from the regression related to the 
dichotomous DV. Let us precisely analyse what emerges from Table 6.4 above. 
To begin with, Leader in Election has a statistically significant (p<0.01) and positive impact on 
the probability that parties adopt a more open party leader selectorate, both in Models 2 and 3. 
                                                
111 The results of the multicollinearity test also apply to this analysis and therefore report no 
problems of multicollinearity.  
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Therefore, H3 finds empirical confirmation: when party leaders have a higher ability to drive 
consensus towards their parties, the chances to open such parties’ leader selectorate increase. 
Moreover, this is a first piece of evidence confirming the goodness of verifying whether the 
personalisation of politics has an impact on party leader selection rules (i.e., the selectorate). This 
last consideration seems to find further support when analysing Leader in Party: also in this case, 
the variable has a statistically significant (p<0.05) and negative impact (in both Models 2 and 3) 
on the probability for a political party to adopt a more open selectorate to choose its leader. 
Therefore, H4 finds empirical confirmation as well: more powerful party leaders decrease the 
probability for their parties to adopt more open leader selectorates. Interestingly, the variable 
analysing the encompassing effect of the personalisation of politics – Overall Personalisation – is 
not significant: in other words, it seems that the personalisation of politics is more relevant in 
explaining the openings of party leader selectorates when one considers the specific ‘faces’ of 
personalised politics, while a more general and encompassing effect of this phenomenon does 
not appear to be a relevant factor. This might also be a further confirmation of the fact that it is 
the party leader who has a strong impact on parties – for instance, concerning the decision to 
open the leader selectorate – while a more general phenomenon, like the increase in the impact 
of the personalisation of politics, does not exert any significant influence. 
Moreover, the fact that Leader in Election and Leader in Party are both statistically significant 
seems to point out at an alleged total importance of the internal party factors in fostering 
openings on the ordinal DV. Nonetheless, this would be a hasty conclusion. On the one hand, a 
closer look at Table 6.4 reveals that Contagion has a significant (p<0.01) and positive effect on the 
likelihood that parties open their leader selectorate. It follows that H8 finds empirical 
confirmation: if at least one party opens its leader selectorate, other parties in the same system 
are more likely to follow its path and do the same thing compared to a situation where no party 
opens its selectorate. This last point underlines that, as also seen with regards to the 
dichotomous DV, even for the ordinal dependent variable, both internal and external factors are 
at play in fostering openings of party leader selectorates.  
Nonetheless, we still need to verify the effect, on the ordinal DV, of the interaction between 
Seat Share Loss and Party Size (H6). Are bigger political formations more affected by an electoral 
setback when deciding whether to adopt specific more open leader selectorates? By following the 
same procedure put forward in the previous section, even in this case, a graph representing the 
Average Marginal Effect (AME) of Seat Share Loss at different levels of Party Size is needed.  
Figure 6.2 below reports an interesting effect of the interaction between the electoral 
setback and the party size on the probability that a party adopts a specific more open leader 
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selectorate. Indeed, similarly to what we have seen in Figure 6.1 (the one related to the 
dichotomous DV), H6 does not find empirical confirmation for smaller parties (those who have 
had, at T-1, a percentage of seats in the Lower House equal to or lower than approximately 
31%). On the contrary, there is an average increasing positive impact of an electoral setback 
when Party Size is equal to or bigger than around 31%. Therefore, the hypothesis finds only 
partial empirical confirmation. Moreover, a small difference with Figure 6.1 is that, in Figure 6.2 
below, the lower confidence intervals for very large parties (approximately, those that have had 
more than 43% of the seats at T-1) start to be flatter and show slightly less positive values for 
extremely large parties (those that have had more than 50% of the seats at T-1), up to reaching 
the zero for a party size equal to 63%. The marginal effect of Seat Share Loss remains positive and 
continues increasing, but this might tell us we need to interpret the results of the interaction for 
the ordinal DV with a grain of salt compared to the interaction for the dichotomous DV. 
 




Up to now, we have seen the effects of the independent variables on the ordinal DV. So, at 
this point, a logical question might arise: is the adoption of specific selectorates influenced by the 
same factors? In other words, is there any difference between the probability that parties adopt – 
say – a congress-based leadership selection and the probability that they adopt a primary election 
for selecting their leaders? Are different levels of the ordinal DV influenced by the same 
independent variables? These questions might be extremely interesting to address, given they 
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could give us an even more precise insight into the phenomenon of openings of party leader 
selection rules. 
So, I now turn to the analysis of the Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) at two different 
values of the ordinal DV: congress vs less inclusive selectorates and primary election vs less 
inclusive selectorates. There are two reasons to explore these specific values: on the one hand, 
the party congress and the party primary are, by far, the two most common means of leadership 
selection in the Western European parties under consideration (see Table 6.3 and, for a 
comparison, Pilet and Cross, 2014a). On the other hand, the passage from – say – party MPs or 
the electoral college to the party congress, and also the passage from – say – the party congress 
to the party primary represent two crucial moments in parties’ lives. Indeed, in the first case, 
party elites cede a non-marginal power of leader selection by allowing the party congress to 
choose the party leader. Reiterating a point already made in Section 3.3, when the leader 
selectorate is opened, party elites do experience a decrease in their selection power, all other 
things being equal. This does not mean that such power disappears completely, but that other 
organs – say, the party congress – or other groups of people within the party – say, activists or 
congress delegates – see an increase in their leader selection power. Moreover, when a party 
primary is implemented as the way of selecting the leader, it represents another fundamental 
turning point for a political formation, given that either just party members, or even party voters 
are allowed to select the head of the party. Moreover, the adoption of party primaries has 
consequences going far beyond the mere empowerment of a wider selectorate (e.g., see Wauters, 
2015; Bernardi, Sandri and Seddone, 2017). 
So, Table 6.5 below reports the AMEs at the congress-level and at the party-primary-level of 
the ordinal dependent variable112. In this case, AMEs’ implementation is necessary because when 
one deals with generalised linear models (like a logistic regression, or an ordered logistic 
regression), the analyses using these models suffer from some issues, and especially unobserved 
heterogeneity (Allison, 1999; Mood, 2010), that make it extremely problematic (if not impossible) 
to compare the coefficients (be them log-odds or odds-ratios) across groups or samples or even 
models, under certain circumstances. Therefore, AMEs analysis gives an easily interpretable and 
                                                
112 As the reader might notice, Table 6.5 does not report the AMEs for the interaction between 
Seat Share Loss and Party Size, given that marginal effects for interactions have not been 
computed. For a compelling explanation, see Williams (2012). Moreover, the marginal effects of 
Table 6.5 are related to the probability of being at a certain specific level (e.g. congress) vs the 
probability to be in lower levels (e.g., the electoral college, or party MPs). For a longer discussion 
on this specific point, see Greene (2007, pp. 736–740). 
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comparable snapshot of the effects of the independent variables on the probability that parties 
adopt two specific leader selectorates: the party congress and the party primary. 
 
Table 6.5 Average Marginal Effects for two levels of Selectorate (Ordinal): Party Congress and Party 
Primary 
 
Model Alpha  
DV=Party Congress vs. 
DV<Party Congress  
Model Beta 
DV= Party Primary 
vs. DV<Party Primary 
Leadership Change 0.010 (0.018) -0.020 (0.035) 
Membership Decline 0.024 (0.038) -0.047 (0.073) 
Leader in Election -0.026* (0.013) 0.051** (0.021) 
Leader in Party 0.031* (0.015) -0.063** (0.024) 
Seat Share Loss -0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) 
Party Size 0.003 (0.002) -0.006 (0.004) 
Opposition Status 0.004 (0.018) -0.008 (0.036) 
Overall Personalisation -0.014 (0.017) 0.028 (0.036) 
Contagion -0.066* (0.033) 0.132** (0.045) 
Party Family (Communist/Socialist) -0.632*** (0.179) -0.190 (0.113) 
Party Family (Greens) 0.001 (0.137) -0.001 (0.244) 
Party Family (Social-Democratic) -0.288 (0.160) 0.344 (0.177) 
Party Family (Christian-Democratic) – [Ref. Category] . . 
Party Family (Liberal) -0.207 (0.248) 0.257 (0.278) 
Party Family (Conservative) 0.023 (0.058) -0.057 (0.143) 
Party Family (Right-Wing) -0.137 (0.243) -0.166 (0.112) 
Observations 355 355 
Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) reported; Cluster-Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
A striking piece of evidence emerging from Table 6.5 is that passing to a congress-based 
party leader selectorate (Model Alpha) is statistically significantly influenced by having had a more 
autonomous leader in the intra-party matters (AME of Leader in Party positive and equal to 0.031) 
and, to a lesser extent, by having a less influential leader in general elections (AME of Leader in 
Election negative and equal to 0.026). Moreover, adopting the congress selectorate is also 
negatively and significantly influenced by the fact that other parties in the system opened their 
leader’ selectorate at T-1 (Contagion’s AME negative and equal to 0.066), and the contagion effect 
is the most powerful one, even more powerful than the two personalisation-related variables. 
Also, Model Beta, which considers the probability of having a party primary as a leader 
selectorate, shows that the same variables mentioned above, the one for the contagion effect and 
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the two related to the leader-related personalisation, have a statistically significant effect. Even in 
this case, it is the contagion effect to be the most powerful drive for the opening of parties’ 
leader selectorate (AME equal to 0.132), while Leader in Election and Leader in Party have a less 
vigorous effect (their AME is, respectively, 0.051 and 0.063). Yet, in Model Beta, these three 
variables have an inverted sign compared to Model Alpha. In other words, the variables in 
Model Beta have the same sign of those related to the general analysis of the ordinal dependent 
variable, presented in Table 6.4. 
What can we draw from this comparison? Model Alpha and Model Beta tell us two different 
stories. Both are related to the ‘battle for organisational control’ (Gauja, 2016, pp. 42–46) already 
presented in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Nonetheless, different phases of the battle might be detected 
by looking at the possible reasons behind the different signs of the coefficients in the two 
models of Table 6.5.  
Indeed, starting from Model Alpha, leaders who are more autonomous in intra-party 
matters (positive sign of Leader in Party), but are less influential and with less leverage in general 
elections (negative sign of Leader in Election), might want to reduce the power of the Party in 
Public Office (PPO). We indeed know that this ‘face’ of party organisations (Katz and Mair, 
1993) has been acquiring increasing relevance in Western countries, and in Western Europe as 
well, from several viewpoints (Mair, 1994; Katz and Mair, 2002).  
Let us remember that Model Alpha focuses on parties who have an ordinal DV's value 
lower than 5 (e.g., party elite or party MPs) vs those who have a value equal to 5 (party congress). 
Therefore, those parties who have a selectorate which is less inclusive than the party congress 
have indeed a selectorate who might be (more or less) strongly influenced by the PPO, like the 
electoral college, the party MPs, or even the party elite113. So, party leaders – or even intra-party 
power-holders with the willingness to shrink PPO's influence and autonomy – might push 
forward alleged ‘democracy-enhancing' openings of the selectorate to take the power to select 
the leader away from the PPO. 
Indeed, even if endowed with an increased intra-party autonomy (let us recall the positive 
sign of Leader in Party), party leaders might nonetheless have a formidable internal opponent – 
the PPO – which has not only allegedly increased its relevance from a general and comparative 
                                                
113 When the selectorate for party leaders is equal to party elites, the alleged power of MPs shall 
not be underestimated, given that party MPs are usually de iure members of parties’ national 
executive organs, which generally are, in turn, exactly the organs endowed with the power to 
select the leader when parties’ leader selectorate corresponds to the party elite value on the 
inclusiveness/exclusiveness continuum shown in Section 3.2. 
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viewpoint in Western Europe, but which has also a particular influence in selecting the party 
leader himself/herself. Moreover, the electoral influence of the party leader, which might act as a 
powerful counter-balancing force, is allegedly not the best card in leaders' sleeves (negative sign 
of Leader in Election), and therefore, there might be the right conditions to take the power of 
selecting the leader away from the PPO’s hands.  
Another hint of the fact that we might be tempted of looking inside parties to understand 
this specific opening of party leaders’ selectorate is related to the negative sign of Contagion: when 
other parties in a system open their leader selection rules at T-1, this reduces the probability that 
other parties in the system do the same. In this sense, a ‘reverse contagion' effect is at work, and 
shows that what matters in fostering this specific opening of the selectorate is intra-party politics. 
It might be the case that, since we are dealing with openings of the leader selectorate that 
empower the party congress, the ‘democracy-enhancing' rhetoric already encountered in this 
work might be not so much strong as in the case of openings towards primary elections. In other 
words, Model Alpha deals with openings towards the party congress. From a propaganda or a 
rhetoric-based viewpoint, empowering the party congress is not as much ‘democratic' as 
empowering party members or party voters, because the rank-and-file or ‘the people' of a party 
do not have the power to directly select the party leader. This argument is expanded in Section 
7.2, where I argue that what could matter, for parties, is mimicking a general election thanks to a 
primary election – especially when people do not vote via a postal ballot but get out of their 
places and vote in some physical place. All in all, it might be not convenient for parties to imitate 
other parties in the system concerning openings of the leader selectorate when such selectorate is 
made more inclusive only up to the point of the party congress. 
On the other hand, something different is at work when analysing Model Beta, which shows 
the AMEs for parties adopting a party primary for their leader selection. Indeed, compared to 
less inclusive selectorates, having a party-primary-based selectorate of the leader is significantly 
influenced by having more influential leaders in general elections (positive sign of Leader in Election), 
less autonomous leaders in the internal party organisations (negative sign of Leader in Party), and, 
turning to external environment’s factors, by having had, at T-1, political organisations in the 
same system which opened their selectorate (positive sign of Contagion). Moreover, as briefly 
underlined above, Model Beta's determinants have the same sign and almost the same 
significance level of the final model for the ordinal DV presented in Table 6.4 (Model 3). So, it 
seems that the cases of the passage from values lower than 6 to 6 on the ordinal DV (that is, 
from less inclusive selectorates to party primaries) exert a significant leverage on the overall 
statistical analysis for the ordinal DV. 
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What can we say by looking at Model Beta? As I have previously argued, the metaphor of 
the organisational battle (Gauja, 2016, pp. 42–46) might be again of help. Indeed, in this specific 
case, a different phase of this battle could be ongoing. Party leaders with a certain ‘electoral’ 
legitimation, given by their influence in driving consensus towards their party, face a possibly 
problematic intra-party situation. More into detail, they have, on average, a lower autonomy 
concerning party organisational matters (negative sign of Leader in Party). It might be in their best 
interest to reduce the power of other party organs (again, of the PPO, but even of the party 
congress) by taking away from them a very important function – the selection of the party leader.  
Interestingly, the other side of the coin of Leader in Party is that when party leaders are more 
autonomous in party organisational matters, they have fewer incentives to open the selectorate. 
Why so? I would argue that, when party leaders have more power within their organisation, the 
‘organisational battle' might be in its final phases and that internal opposition has already started 
retreating and abandoning its fighting positions. Obviously, there might also be something else at 
work, not necessarily related to the organisational battle. As already argued in Section 4.3, it 
might surely be the case that intra-party power-holders themselves might deem the ‘final' 
opening of the selectorate (towards party primaries) as feasible, given that they might want to 
capitalise on the recent electoral ‘fortunes' of the party leader (positive sign of Leader in Election), 
so as to transmit a positive and ‘more democratic’ image of the party, also towards its lower 
strata (which will be endowed with the power to select the head of the party).  
Finally, in Model Beta, Contagion has a positive and significant AME coefficient, meaning 
that the selectorate opening of at least another political formation acts as a contagious decision 
for other political parties in the system. So, when one deals with the adoption of party primaries, 
the imitation of external organisations (namely, other parties) is also crucial in positively shaping 
parties' decisions. This marks a clear difference with Model Alpha – where the openings of other 
parties' leader selectorate acted as a brake for a party's decision – and further confirms the 
usefulness of separately considering the adoption of a party-congress-based leader selection vs a 
party-primary-based one.  
All in all, the interpretation of the different ‘stories' behind Models Alpha and Beta 
presented in Table 6.5 is necessarily a speculative one, albeit it is grounded in solid findings. A 
series of data which might be useful to empirically test such interpretation is missing. For 
instance, it would have been extremely helpful to have (or find) diachronic data on the power of 
the PPO within party organisations. The usual phrase ‘more research is needed' is therefore 
surely appropriate to deal with the arguments put forward in this section: in the (hopefully near) 
future, if suitable comparative data are released, or comparative research efforts are put forward, 
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it will be possible to expand the discussion I have sketched in this section. A preliminary step is 
made in the next section, where the most important points emerged in this section and the 
previous one are systematised and further developed.  
 
6.3 Discussion: insights from the analysis 
  
After having presented the results of the empirical analysis for the dichotomous and the 
ordinal dependent variables, let us briefly recap the main findings emerged in this chapter. First, 
there are some alleged important determinants of party change (and of the opening of party 
leader selectorates) that do not exert any influence in the Western European parties included in 
the analysis. For instance, being in opposition is a variable considered as a powerful drive both 
by scholars dealing with intra-party changes (Harmel and Janda, 1994a), or by those focusing on 
many different changes in party leader selection and de-selection rules (Chiru et al., 2015), or, 
finally, by researchers dealing specifically with openings of party leader selectorates (Cross and 
Blais, 2012; Pilet and Cross, 2014a). Nonetheless, the results of the analyses presented in Tables 
6.2 and 6.4 have shown that being in opposition does not have a statistically significant influence 
on party leader selectorates' openings. 
 Second, some other determinants only find partial empirical confirmation from the analysis: 
I am referring to electoral setbacks, that affect the DVs only when the size of the party is taken 
into consideration, and only for larger parties. In this sense, in this dissertation, it was the first 
time that the intuition by Harmel and Janda (1994a) - according to whom the effects of an 
electoral setback in fostering party change are stronger for bigger parties – has been applied to 
the analysis of party leader selection rules. The results of the analyses (and especially those 
presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.2) bring about the conclusion that electoral setbacks do have a 
greater impact on larger parties' probability to open their leader selectorates, but the (inverse) 
relationship does not hold for smaller political formations. 
Third, there are also some factors that have an impact on the DVs, but their influence is 
different whether we consider a dichotomous DV or an ordinal one (in other words, whether 
our research question is related to general openings of party leader selectorates or, conversely, is 
linked to the adoption of specific selectorates). More specifically, changes in a party’s leadership 
and an increase in a party’s M/E ratio have a positive impact on the likelihood of opening the 
selectorates for party leaders from a general viewpoint. The results of the analysis related to the 
leadership changes are at odds with the literature on party change and party reform (Harmel and 
Janda, 1994a; Gauja, 2016) and with the research on general leader selection and de-selection 
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rules (Chiru et al., 2015). Indeed, while the classical effect of a leadership change was considered 
to be a positive drive for changing something within parties, Table 6.2 (presenting the results of 
the empirical analysis for the dichotomous DV) has shown that leadership changes have a braking 
effect on the probability to open party leader selectorates, possibly due to increasing conservative 
character of political parties, due to the destabilising effect of a leadership change.  
Turning our attention to parties’ M/E ratio, even in this case, while the literature on party 
reform and party change (Gauja, 2016) and on membership decline (Van Biezen, Mair and 
Poguntke, 2012) has underlined a possible pushing effect of declining M/E figures on parties' 
probability to change (open) their leader selection rules, the empirical analysis for the 
dichotomous DV has shown that a decline in a party’s M/E ratio actually decreases the probability 
for the party to open its rules. Even in this case, in Section 6.1, I have put forward an 
explanation for this result. The crucial point to discuss here is the fact that something different 
with regards to other pieces of research might be at play.  
Then, an important external factor, i.e. the so-called contagion effect, brought about by 
other parties having opened their leader’ selectorate in the same party system, has an effect on 
the DV, but only when specific openings are taken into consideration (i.e., when the ordinal 
dependent variable is analysed). Even in this case, while the literature on the topic underlines a 
possible general effect of this event on parties’ openings (or changes) in their leader selection rules 
(Cross and Blais, 2012; Pilet and Cross, 2014a; Wauters, 2014), the differentiated analysis 
performed in this chapter has shown that to grasp an effect of Contagion it is necessary to take 
into consideration specific openings. In other words, the contagion effect is at work only when 
openings towards specific selectorates are considered. 
Fourth, one of the tentative innovations this work has brought about is related to the 
influence of factors related to the personalisation of politics on openings of party leaders’ 
selectorates. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 have shown that two personalisation variables - the ability of 
party leaders to drive consensus towards their parties in general elections and the control of 
party organisations by their leaders - do foster openings towards specific selectorates for party 
leaders. On the contrary, a factor related to the overall impact of the personalisation in general 
elections does not seem to be a factor at play for an opening of party leader selectorates. This 
differentiated effect is extremely fascinating and underlines that, concerning the personalisation 
of politics, intra-party and leader-related factors seem to be more important than external, more 
general, ones. It seems that, when weighting the effects of the personalisation of politics, political 
parties give more importance to what happens within them compared to what happens in the 
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party system around them. So, a careful consideration of the several aspects related to this multi-
faceted concept is needed, also in future empirical pieces of research. 
Furthermore, a more general consideration might be related to the partially different factors 
at play when different dependent variables are considered. On the one hand, there are some 
variables which exert an influence (with the same sign) in both analyses (i.e., for the 
dichotomous and for the ordinal DV): the interaction between an electoral setback and party 
size, belonging to the extreme left/communist family, and, accepting as satisfactory a p-value 
lower than 0.10, the control of parties by leaders114. On the other hand, there are variables which 
have a differentiated effect for the two DVs: the two ‘intra-party’ personalisation-related 
variables and the factor connected to the contagion effect. This shows that the two dependent 
variables seem to be related to two different faces of the main research question, as argued both in 
Chapter 1 and in Section 3.1.  
At this point, a logical – and final – question might be related to what it can be envisaged 
for future comparative pieces of research aiming at tackling party leader selection rules (and 
party leader selectorates). A first road would be that of expanding the different hints of the 
analysis, especially concerning the alleged importance of the Party in Public Office, by putting 
forward an extensive research programme aiming at collecting data on such important ‘face' of 
party organisations. For instance, a diachronic and synchronic dataset on the finances and other 
resources (staff, and so forth) available for the party in Public Office in Western Europe in the 
last decades might be something quite interesting to expand the results of this empirical analysis. 
Indeed, the theory according to which we have been witnessing a rise in the importance of the 
Party in Public Office in Western Europe (Katz and Mair, 2002; Bardi, Calossi and Pizzimenti, 
2017) could be paired with the intuition, already raised in several fashions in this chapter, that 
this face of party organisations might have had a non-negligible say in the evolution of party 
leader selection rules. So, should specific and in-depth comparative data on the Party in Public 
                                                
114 The variable Leader in Party is significant only at the lowest possible level of confidence 
(p<0.10) for the analysis related to the dichotomous DV. We have also just seen that the same 
variable has a significant (p<0.01) effect in the analysis of the ordinal DV. Therefore, from a 
general and comparative viewpoint, the fact that the variable is significant (albeit only with p-
values lower than 0.10) in both the ordinal-variable-related and the dichotomous-variable-related 
analyses is something to consider.  
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Office in Western Europe between the early 1990s and the early 2010s be available in the 
future115, a fascinating research agenda could be put forward. 
A second path could be related to more in-depth and qualitative analyses of specific cases of 
openings of party leader selection rules (selectorates). This road has been already followed by 
many scholars (as shown in Chapter 2). Yet, adopting a partially different perspective instead of 
the classical ones, possibly following the explanations put forward in this chapter, might be of 
help to understand something that in the past was overlooked or ignored. 
A third, and final, possibility would be that of exploring what these results can tell us for our 
more general understanding of party politics and party leaders. The concluding chapter of this 




The empirical analysis performed in this chapter on the two dependent variables (the 
dichotomous one and the ordinal one) has brought about the idea that not only are different 
faces of the research question related to different DVs, but also that such different dependent 
variables are shaped by (partly or totally) different independent variables. 
Despite these differences, the analyses of this chapter might also be considered from a more 
general viewpoint. Indeed, at the end of this long but fascinating journey into party leader 
selectorates and their determinants, it is possible to widen the scope of the discussion and 
consider what this study can tell us about intra-party politics, leadership’s autonomy and scope, 
and party decline. The final chapter directly tackles these points, whose importance goes well 
beyond intra-party politics. 
 
  
                                                
115 Indeed, the data collected for the early-1990s’ book edited by Katz and Mair (1992) and those 
made available by the Political Party Database Project in a recently published book (Scarrow, 
Webb and Poguntke, 2017) do not cover the 1991-2010 period. 
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Chapter 7 – Wrap-up discussion and concluding remarks 
 
 In the past few decades, leaders have become more and more central to democratic politics 
and also, from a narrower viewpoint, for political parties. Moreover, political parties have been 
increasingly recurring to more inclusive methods of selecting their leaders. In a number of cases, 
party members or even party voters have been given this selection power.  
Despite the increasing academic interest towards party leaders, a conundrum was still 
existing: why do parties make the rules to select their leader more inclusive? In other words, and 
quoting the tile of this dissertation, why do parties open their leader selection rules? Most 
contributions left much room for an encompassing analysis aiming at answering these questions. 
This is why this dissertation has been devoted to find the determinants behind the openings of 
the selection rules of the main political parties in 10 Western European countries between the 
mid-1980s and the mid-2010s. At the end of this dissertation, it might be useful to summarise its 
main themes and findings, and also illuminate three very general topics of research which could 
benefit from the insights derived from the work put forward in the previous chapters. 
Therefore, the following section focuses on a brief recap of what I have done in the 
preceding chapters, while Section 7.2 is devoted to a wider and encompassing discussion 
focusing on three research topics: the responsiveness and responsibility of party leaders; their 
representation styles; the (re) legitimisation of political parties. 
 
7.1 Openings of party leader selection rules between personalisation of politics 
and party change 
 
In this dissertation, I have in-depth investigated the determinants of openings of party 
leader selection rules. After the introductory Chapter 1, where I have discussed the relevance of 
party leaders and party leader selection rules for comparative politics, Chapter 2 has been 
devoted to understanding the state of the art of the literature on the matter. More specifically, I 
have identified some main points of discussion: the lack of a cross-country and diachronic 
analysis on the factors influencing the openings of party leader selection rules; then, the possible 
– yet hitherto neglected – role of the personalisation of politics in this process; and the 
recognition of explicitly incorporating the party change framework within the analysis. 
In Chapter 3, I have discussed the research question at the base of this work: why do parties 
open their leader selection rules? More precisely, following the operationalization of the DVs, 
why do parties open their leader selectorate? This research question could be seen from two 
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different standpoints: a first one is related to understanding why parties open their selectorate 
(without distinguishing among the types of selectorate), while the second one deals with the 
adoption by political parties of specific selectorates for their leaders’ selection. While the literature 
analysing from a comparative perspective openings of party leader selection rules has 
substantially just focused on the first viewpoint, in this dissertation, there is the first explicit 
attempt to also deal with the second perspective.  
Then, in Chapter 3, I have also lengthily discussed the existing operationalizations of party 
leader selection rules, and have shown why it is better to deal with the selectorate. Afterwards, I 
have explicitly put forward the operationalization of the selectorate, which has been used as the 
blueprint to build two dependent variables: a dichotomous one, necessary to deal with the 
general adoption of more open leader selectorates (where all openings are treated as equal), and 
an ordinal one, which has served to verify whether the opening towards different selectorates can 
be explained by the same or, conversely, by different factors. Finally, in Chapter 3 I have also 
presented my case selection: 10 Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom) and more than 50 
parties have been included in the empirical analysis. As a side note, it is the first time that 
systematic data on the selectorate of party leaders in Greece, Ireland, and the Netherlands have 
been collected. When possible, I have also expanded existing comparative datasets on party 
leader selectorates in the other Western European countries under examination. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 have presented of the independent variables and their related hypotheses. In 
the former, internal factors potentially explaining the openings of party leader selectorates have 
been put forward, while the latter has been devoted to the external factors. Some of these factors 
directly come from the party change literature or from that related to party leader selection, while 
some other have been originally devised for this dissertation.   
More specifically, in Chapter 4, I have discussed the role of leadership changes, the decline 
membership figures, parties’ belonging to different ideological families, and, last but not least, of 
two variables related to the personalisation of politics. More into detail, I have discussed the 
impact of the ability of party leaders to drive consensus towards their parties and, secondly, the 
control of party organisations by their leaders. Thanks to the data coming from the first 
Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017), 
which has allowed to collect systematic data on several faces of the personalisation of politics in 
Western Europe in the past few decades, it has been possible to deal, for the first time, with the 
two abovementioned factors related to personalised politics.  
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 Turning to external factors, in Chapter 5, I have analysed their possible influence on the 
openings of party leader selectorates. First of all, I have tackled electoral setbacks, parties' 
opposition status, the contagion effect, and, finally, a third personalisation-related variable: the 
general impact of the personalisation of politics in a given party system. Even in this case, data 
coming from the Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey have allowed me to discuss and test 
the influence of this third variable related to personalised politics.   
 Finally, Chapter 6 has been devoted to the empirical analysis. Two different analyses for the 
two DVs (the dichotomous one and the ordinal one) have been devised. The results of such 
analyses have been extremely fascinating: not only have they confirmed that both internal and 
external factors have been at play in pushing for openings of the leader selectorates of the 
Western European parties under consideration. More specifically, and starting from the 
dichotomous DV (which deals with openings of party leader selectorates from a general 
viewpoint), not having changed the party leader, having increased its M/E ratio, and, for bigger 
parties, having undergone an electoral setback positively influence parties' probabilities to open 
their leaders' selectorate. Conversely, turning our attention to the ordinal DV, its analysis has 
been split into two parts.   
In the first one, following what I have done for the dichotomous DV, I have analysed the 
determinants of the ordinal DV itself. I have found that different determinants are at work when 
one deals with specific party leader selectorates. Indeed, in this case, only do electoral setbacks for 
bigger parties affect openings of leader selectorates, as in the case of the dichotomous DV. 
Conversely, other variables do only impact on the DV when an inclusiveness/exclusiveness 
selectorate continuum is considered (i.e., when the ordinal DV is tackled). I am referring to the 
contagion effect and two variables related to the personalisation of politics. These latter variables 
are leaders' ability to drive consensus towards their parties during general elections and leaders' 
control of their party organisations.   
The second part of the analysis for the ordinal DV has dealt with the analysis of the 
determinants behind the adoption of two specific party leader selectorates: the party congress and 
the party primary. Surprisingly, the independent variables at play are the same ones, but with 
inverted signs. I have argued that this might be caused by the fact that opening a party leader 
selectorate by empowering either the party congress or the party primary could signal the 
existence of two phases of intra-party power battles, building on the concept of ‘battle for 
organisational control’ by Gauja (2016). 
After having summarised the contents of the main chapters, their innovations and their 
peculiarities, before concluding this research, it is possible to widen the scope and ask ourselves 
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whether what has been found in this dissertation might be useful not simply for party leader 
selection, but for other themes which might be of interest for comparative politics. I would 
argue this is possible, and three areas of research might benefit from an integration with that of 
party leader selection, also and (hopefully) especially, in light of what has been put forward in 
this research until now. The upcoming section is devoted to drawing such connection. 
 
7.2 The responsiveness and responsibility of party leaders, their representation 
style, and the (re)legitimisation of political parties 
 
 In this final section, I argue that the insights coming from the party leader selection 
literature and this dissertation might be fruitfully connected to other strands of research in the 
comparative political scholarship. Three themes seem to me particularly relevant: the evolution 
in the responsiveness and responsibility of party leaders, the possible modification of their 
representation styles, and, finally, the (re)legitimisation of political parties. Let us start with the 
first two matters.  
In Chapter 1, but also throughout this work, I have been discussing the fact that there have 
been noticeable changes in voters and political elites, in the sense of a progressive ‘distancing’ of 
one another (Mair, 2013). From the progressive individualisation of societies, to the declining 
importance of party identification for voters, from the growing indifference or hate towards 
democratic politics to the retreatment of politicians in their institutional strongholds, this 
increasing detachment is a well-known issue for the comparative political scholarship116.   
One of the consequences of these long-term processes has been the declining capacity of 
parties to represent and govern (Mair, 2009). On the other hand, data coming from the 
Personalisation of Politics Expert Survey (Marino, Martocchia Diodati and Verzichelli, 2017) tell 
us that, notwithstanding country- and time-related differences, party leaders are non-secondary 
actors of party democracy. So, using a theatre-related metaphor, party leaders are left as the main 
actors of the play, while parties, once central actors as well, have undergone a demise, so much 
so that they just survive as supporting characters. They have not disappeared from the stage, 
they simply appear less often – or with less important roles. At this point, two crucial processes 
deserve to be analysed: the changing responsiveness and responsibility of party leaders and the 
modification in leaders' representation style. Let us start with the former.      
                                                
116 Apart from Chapter 1, on these points, several other pieces of research might serve as useful 
guidelines (Manin, 1997; Mair, 2009, 2013; Tormey, 2015). 
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Following Bardi, Bartolini and Trechsel (2014, p. 237), responsiveness means that ‘parties 
and leaders […] sympathetically respond to the short-term demands of voters, public opinion, 
interest groups, and the media’, while responsibility is ‘the necessity for those same parties and 
leaders to take into account (a) the long-term needs of their people and countries […and] (b) the 
claims of audiences other than the national electoral audience’. The long-term transformations 
we were discussing above have contributed widening the gap between responsibility and 
responsiveness (Mair, 2009), in the sense that having both becomes increasingly difficult, and 
also widening the fracture between citizens’ (or, more generally speaking, the external 
environment’s) expectations and parties’ ability to proficiently deal with such expectations 
(Flinders, 2012). Is there a way to deal with this situation, or at least to reduce this gap? 
I would argue the answer to the latter question is positive once we account for the 
personalisation of politics and the openings of party leader selection rules. Indeed, leaders who 
are, for instance, more able to drive consensus towards their parties, or who are in control of the 
organisation they lead, or who are selected by a wider selectorate, have some powerful weapons 
at their disposal. Starting from the responsiveness standpoint, leaders elected by a wider 
selectorate, possibly endowed with some sort of personalised power, might appear as more able 
to take into account the party rank-and-file’s or even the party voters’ demands and wishes, 
exactly because they have been chosen by a wider set of people and/or because they possess 
some personalisation-of-politics-related characteristics that make them suitable to connect to 
wider and wider parts of the citizenry. 
Turning to the responsibility issue, even in this case, leaders with the abovementioned 
features might be deemed as pretty responsible. Indeed, we know that leadership is more and 
more important in several strands of democratic politics, and this is also true for personal 
(leaders') characteristics, like honesty, competence, and the like (Bittner, 2011; Garzia, 2014). 
This means that leaders might be perceived as men/women of their words, able not simply to 
drive consensus towards their parties or control their party organisation, but also as people able 
to think about the medium-to-long-term best interest of citizens. This might be magnified by 
means of more open party leader selection rules, given they might add a sort of ‘electoral boost’ 
(especially if leaders have been selected in a primary election), which increases leaders’ 
legitimacy117. Summing up, a first possible research agenda might be that of investigating 
whether more open party leader selection rules – possibly in connection with some of the factors 
                                                
117 The connection between more open party leader selection rules and increased leaders’ 
legitimacy has already been made in this dissertation (e.g., see Section 5.4). 
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behind them discussed in this dissertation, like the personalisation of politics – might be 
connected to leaders’ responsiveness and responsibility. 
Let us move to the problem of leaders’ representation styles. As I have argued at the 
beginning of the section, even in this case, we should start by considering the long-term societal 
and political transformations that have characterised the past few decades of democratic politics. 
Which connection can be drawn with the themes of this dissertation? Let us go back to a point 
already raised in this work: parties' ability to represent has been sharply declining. This has been 
allegedly caused not simply by the now-well-known processes discussed in Chapter 1 and in this 
chapter, but also by various other processes, as also argued by Manin (1997, p. 193), like the 
increase in electoral volatility, especially in Western Europe (Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2017). 
This is an important process to consider. Not only are parties less and less able to represent a 
social class or their members (Katz, 2014), but are also increasingly worse and worse in 
representing their voters, exactly because each party’s voters increasingly differ from one election 
to another. If we also add the process, already seen in different fashions in this dissertation, of 
the retreat of parties within the state (Mair, 1994, 2013, Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009), we can 
safely conclude that, regardless of the precise role of parties or citizens in this evolution, it is 
more and more difficult for parties to represent citizens (see, for instance, Tormey, 2015, pp. 59–
82). 
At this point, the logical question is why more open party leader selection rules, possibly 
influenced by some of the factors seen in this dissertation, should change something in this 
representation crisis. While, in the past, parties where central terminals of the link between 
‘makers’ and ‘audience’ of representation, quoting the terminology by Saward (2010), this has 
been increasingly put into question118. We also know that party leaders have been acquiring 
centrality in democratic politics. One of the possible consequences of this twofold process is, 
using Weberian terms, the rise of the ‘charismatic’ aspect of leadership at the expenses of the 
‘legal-rational’ one (Musella, 2018, pp. 31–32)119.  
The general contrast between a ‘Weberian’ and a ‘Schmittian’ concept of representation has 
also been extensively discussed in the literature (e.g., see Vieira and Runciman, 2008, pp. 53–58), 
but this clash can also be proficiently linked to another possible transformation in leaders’ 
                                                
118 See, for instance, the discussion by Manin (1997, pp. 206–219) and, for a partly different 
standpoint, the view by Tormey (2015, pp. 83–104). 
119 Musella argues this is also caused by more open party leader selection rules, which should 
constitute an aspect of party leaders’ personalised power. I have extensively discussed my 
standpoint on this issue in Section 4.3. 
	 143 
representative style. Party leaders, more legitimised having been selected by a wider selectorate, 
and possibly endowed with personalised-politics-related features (again, the control of their 
organisation or the ability to drive consensus towards their parties), might have a style of 
representation closer to the trustee style than the delegation or the identification ones. The 
underlying logic is simple: more and more powerful party leaders, less and less constrained by 
dying mass political organisations, elected by a wider selectorate, and surrounded by a world that 
requires faster and also more responsive and responsible decisions, could be seen as agents of 
representation who need extreme freedom of action to operate. And therefore, they could try to 
be less constrained by the requests and demands provided by those represented (e.g., party 
members, party voters, and so forth). From the other viewpoint, those represented (again, 
members, voters, and the like) might also see this higher freedom of action by the party leader as 
something necessary in a faster and less certain environment. Whether this new possible 
representation bond is something detectable in Western European polities is something that 
could be investigated in future empirical analyses120. 
Last, but not least, a third area of research which might benefit from what has emerged in 
this dissertation is surely that related to the analysis of parties’ legitimacy. The first two points of 
this section have been devoted to party leaders seen in connection with the demise of (mass) 
political parties. Conversely, in this final part of the section, I would like to invert the viewpoint 
and start from political parties’ perspective. Indeed, while they are surely in decline, political 
parties still constitute an important element of democratic politics, for instance concerning the 
recruitment of candidates for general elections121.  
In Section 1.1, we have seen that Western political parties’ legitimacy has been declining for 
many years now. Moreover, party elites have been retreating from society, not simply because 
their membership figures have been shrinking for the past few decades (as shown in Section 4.2), 
but also because of a more general ‘retreat’ into their state fortresses. As a consequence, 
(re)gaining legitimacy from their societal roots has become more and more difficult. So, as also 
argued by many authors (e.g., Saward, 2010, p. 143; Tormey, 2015, pp. 125–149), parties are less 
                                                
120 Unnecessary thought it sounds, the matter of representative roles has been much explored 
concerning Members of Parliaments. A good summary of the debate within the related literature 
can be found in Andeweg (2014). 
121 This is discussed by Mair (2013), who nonetheless also recognises the difficulties of parties to 
perform a ‘full’ party government. Notice that the recruitment and the presentation of candidates 
for general elections is the fundamental criterion for the definition of a party, according to the 
well-known definition by Sartori (1976) 
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and less loci of political representation other than the electoral one, which is surely important, but 
evidently not sufficient for giving them a reasonable legitimacy.  
The importance of legitimacy for political parties has been a well-known (and widely-
debated) issue, and I would argue that, within parties, this problem is acknowledged. One of the 
ways in which parties might get back some of their past legitimacy might be related to the 
opening of party leader selection rules. Indeed, a wider selectorate for the party leader (more so 
if it corresponds to a party primary) can be seen as a way to reduce the existing gap between 
party elites (party leadership) and citizens. More specifically, by mimicking what happens in a 
general election122, political parties can use the most powerful democratic rhetorical weapon, the 
election, to show a ‘more democratic’ (and therefore more legitimised) face at the eyes of 
citizens. So, the increasing legitimacy for party leaders, discussed in Section 5.4, might also mean 
an increasing legitimacy for their parties themselves. From a partially different angle, notice that 
this ‘equivalence’ is more and more reasonable once party leaders acquire relevance thanks to the 
now-well-known processes of personalisation of politics. Indeed, the passage of legitimacy from 
party leaders selected by a wider selectorate to their parties can happen once party leaders are 
recognised as pivotal actors for parties themselves, for instance, thanks to their power within the 
party organisation or their ability to drive consensus toward the party during general elections. 
Even in this case, the connection between party leader selection rules and the personalisation of 
politics might be stronger than one could expect. 
Obviously, this does not mean that democratic appearance corresponds to democratic 
reality. Despite all the accounts overlapping (either partially or totally) intra-party democracy with 
more open party leader selectorates, the situation is more complex. As I have already argued in 
Section 3.3, when parties open their selection rules it does not mean they are ‘democratising’ 
themselves, but simply that there is the possibility for parties to put forward a ‘cleaner’ and more 
‘democratic’ face to citizens and electors. Whether this is a successful move for parties and, more 
generally speaking, for democratic politics is a matter that I would leave to future pieces of 
research. 
  
                                                
122 This is especially true for non-postal ballots, i.e., for those primary elections where party 
members or sympathisers physically queue and cast a ballot for a candidate. A good example of 
this type of event is the party leader selection in the Italian PD, which has been performed 
exactly in this way since 2007. 
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Appendix A - List of countries and parties 
 
Country Original party name 




Bündnis Zukunft Österreich 
Alliance for the Future of Austria 
(BZÖ) 
2006-2015 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 1986-2015 
Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative 
The Greens – The Green 
Alternative 
1994-2015 
Liberales Forum Liberal Forum (LIF) * 1994-2015 
Österreichische Volkspartei Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) 1986-2015 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs 




Parti Socialiste Socialist Party (Wallonia) (PS) * 1985-2014 
Socialistische Partij / Socialistische Partij Anders Socialist Party (Flanders) (SP/SPA) 1985-2014 
Christelijke Volkspartij / Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams 
Christian People’s Party / 
Christian Democratic and Flemish 
(CVP/CD&V) 
1985-2014 
Parti Social Chrétien / Centre démocrate humaniste 
Social Christian Party / Humanist 
and Democratic Centre 
(PSC/CDH) * 
1985-2014 
Parti Réformateur Libéral / Mouvement Réformateur 
Liberal Reformist Party / 
Reformist Movement (PRL/MR) * 
1985-2014 
Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang / Vlaamse Liberalen en 
Democraten /Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten 
Party for Freedom and Progress / 
Flemish Liberals and Democrats / 
Open Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats (PVV/VLD/OVLD) 
1985-2014 
Anders Gaan Leven / Groen! / Groen Agalev/Greens 1985-2014 
Ècologiste Ecologists (ECOLO) * 1985-2014 
Vlaams Blok / Vlaams Belang 
Flemish Bloc / Flemish Interest 
(VB) 
1985-2014 
Volksunie / Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 




Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands 
Christian Democratic Union of 
Germany (CDU) 
1987-2015 
Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democratic Party (FDP) 1987-2015 
Die Grünen / Bündnis 90/Die Grünen The Greens 1987-2015 
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus / Die Linke 
Party of Democratic Socialism / 
The Left (PDS/DL) 
1990-2015 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 




Dimokratiki Aristera Democratic Left (DIMAR) * 2012-2015 
Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas 
Communist Party of Greece 
(KKE) 
1985-2015 
Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) 2004-2015 
Laïkós Sýndesmos – Chrysí Avgí Golden Dawn (XA) * 2012-2015 
Nea Dimokratia New Democracy (ND) 1985-2015 
Panellínio Sosialistikó Kínima 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) 
1985-2015 
Synaspismós / Syriza SYNASPISMOS/SYRIZA 1992-2015 
Ireland 
Fianna Fáil Soldiers of Destiny (FF) 1987-2015 
Fine Gael Family of the Irish (FG) 1987-2015 
Labour Party Irish Labour Party (LP) 1987-2015 
Progressive Democrats Progressive Democrats (PD) 1987-2009 
Italy 
 
Democrazia Cristiana / Partito Popolare Italiano / La 
Margherita – Democrazia é Libertà 
Christian Democracy / Italian 
Popular Party / Democracy is 
Freedom (DC/PPI/DL) 
1987-2015 
Forza Italia / Popolo delle Libertà / Forza Italia 
Forza Italia / People of Freedom/ 
Forza Italia (FI/PDL/FI) 
1994-2015 
Lega Nord Northern League (LN) 1992-2015 
Movimento Sociale Italiano / Alleanza Nazionale Italian Social Movement / 1987-2009 
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National Alliance (MSI/AN) 
Partito Comunista Italiano / Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra / Democratici di Sinistra 
Italian Communist Party / 
Democratic Party of the Left / 
Left Democrats / Democratic 
Party (PCI/PDS/DS) 
1987-2007 
Partito Democratico Democratic Party (PD) 2007-2015 
Partito Socialista Italiano Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 1987-1993 
Partito della Rifondazione Comunista 
Party of the Communist 
Refoundation (PRC) 
1992-2015 
Unione di Centro Union of the Centre (UDC) 2002-2015 
Netherlands 
Christen-Democratisch Appèl 
Christian Democratic Appeal 
(CDA) 
1986-2015 
Democraten 66 Democrats 66 (D66) 1986-2015 
GroenLinks GreenLeft (GL) 1989-2015 
Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party (PVDA) 1986-2015 
Socialistische Partij Socialist Party (PS) 1994-2015 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 




Centro Democrático e Social /  Centro Democrático e 
Social –Partido Popular 
Democratic and Social Centre / 
Democratic and Social Centre-
Popular Party (CDS/CDS-PP) 
1985-2015 
Partido Comunista Português 
Portuguese Communist Party 
(PCP) 
1985-2015 
Partido Socialista Socialist Party (PS) 1985-2015 
Partido Social Democrata Social-Democratic Party (PSD) 1985-2015 
Spain 
Alianza Popular / Partido Popular 
Popular Alliance / People’s Party 
(AP/PP) 
1986-2015 
Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya 
Democratic Convergence of 
Catalonia (CDC) 
1986-2015 
Partido Comunista de España / Izquierda Unida 
 
Spanish Communist Party / 
United Left (PCE/IU) 
1986-2015 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español 





Conservative Party Conservative Party 1987-2015 
Labour Party Labour Party 1987-2015 
Liberal Democrats Liberal Democrats 1988-2015 
Note: * denotes parties excluded from the empirical analysis because of lack of data on some independent variables. 
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4.1 Leadership Change 
 
Data up to 2012 have been generally obtained thanks to the 2015 version of the 
Comparative Study of Party Leaders (COSPAL) dataset used in the Pilet and Cross’ (2014b) and 
Cross and Pilet’s (2015) books or from additional sources concerning Irish and Dutch parties 
(see Section 4.1 in this work). For subsequent data, a first source of information has been a series 
of Internet searches, which, quoting Aylott and Bolin (2017, n. 10), ‘often led to Wikipedia 
entries’. Then, a subsequent search was performed either via a second Internet search focusing 
on each new leaders’ name. If a newspaper or a party-related source confirmed the Wikipedia 
entry, the year of the leadership change was inputted into my dataset. Alternatively, I have used 
WayBack Machine, a tool of analysis that allows retrieving past versions of webpages, to have a 
precise confirmation in political parties’ websites about the leadership change. More information 
about each leadership change is available upon request.  
As explained in Section 4.1, if a new party comes to life, its first leadership selection has not 
been considered as a leadership change, and therefore has received, on the Leadership Change 
variable, a 0. More specifically, this decision has affected the following parties in the following 
countries: for Austria, the BZO in 2006, the LIF in 1994, and the STRONACH in 2013; for 
Germany, the PDS in 1990; for Greece, the SYNASPIMSOS in 1992, the LAOS in 2004, and 
the DIMAR in 2012; for Ireland, the PD in 1987; for Italy, the FI in 1994 and the PRC in 1992. 
Turning to more country-specific issues, for Austrian Greens, I have inputted a 1 by default 
during the period in which the party had a collective leadership (up to 1992), also following the 
reasoning put forward by Dolezal (2016, p. 28), according to which the party congress meets at 
least once a year to select the new party executive. 
Passing to Belgium, for the CVP/CD&V, in 1993 there was both a leadership change and a 
change in party leadership. According to Wauters, Rahat and Kenig (2015), the ‘party primaries’ 
of 1993 were organised to select the new leader, and given that the party changed just one leader 
in 1993, it follows the new leader was selected after having opened the leader selectorate, and 
therefore the party for the 1991-1995 legislature has a 0 for this variable. 
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Turning our attention to Greece, for the ND cases of 1997 and 2009 and of the PASOK in 
2004, when there was both a leadership change and an opening of party leader selectorate. Rori 
(2012) shows that in all the three cases, the opening of the selectorate preceded the leadership 
change, and therefore, for these cases, Leadership Change has been given a 0. Moreover, even for 
the SYNASPISMOS case of 1993, when there was a leadership change and an opening of the 
selectorate, Eleftheriou (2009) states that the new leader was selected by the party congress, and 
given that the party congress was the resulting more open selectorate (being the previous one the 
central political committee of the party), even in this case the party has received, for that case, 0 
on Leadership Change. 
Concerning Italy, for the LN, in 2013, there was a change in the leadership and an opening 
of the selectorate for his/her selection. The opening of the selectorate preceded such change in 
the leadership, given that the just-empowered party members selected the new party leader in the 
party primary election organised in late 2013. So, in this specific occurrence, the LN received a 0 
for Leadership Change. 
Passing to the Netherlands, for the PVDA, in 2002, there was both a change in leadership 
and an opening of his/her selectorate. The Dutch Documentation Centre on Political Parties 
(DNPP) 2002 report on the PVDA shows that the opening of the selectorate preceded the 
change in the leadership (Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, 2017b), and this 
is why the PVDA has received a 0 for Leadership Change for the 2002 legislature. Furthermore, the 
DNPP also helped solve the 1993 GL problem (even in this case, a change in leadership 
happened in the same year as the opening of the selectorate): the yearly report on that party 
shows that what came first was the decision to open the selectorate, followed by the party leader 
selection (Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen, 2017a). 
Finally, on Portugal, a small note on the CDS-PP is needed: in 2005, there was both the 
opening of the selectorate and a leadership change. Barberà, Lisi and Rodríguez-Teruel (2015) 
show that new mode of party leader selection, the primary election, were organized in 2005, and 
given that just a leader was elected in that legislature, in 2005, I assume that the change in the 
rules happened before the change in the leadership. Therefore, the party has received a 0 for 
Leadership Change in that legislature. 
 
4.2 Membership Decline 
 
Regarding the operationalization of this variable, some clarification is needed concerning 
new parties or parties appearing as a merge of two or more existing parties. In the first case, I 
have decided not to compute the difference between the two five-year moving averages at T and 
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at T-1 for the logical reason that if a party appears on the political scene in a specific year, no 
earlier data on its membership are available, and therefore the above-mentioned subtraction 
cannot be performed. Therefore, for these parties, I have decided to assign the values of the 
M/E ratio of the first year of the first legislature to operationalize Membership Decline. This has 
involved a small number of parties (the ones reported in this Appendix when discussing the 
operationalization of Leadership Change). 
A second a somewhat easier problem concerns the parties appearing as the fusion of two or 
more parties. If earlies data for these merger parties are available, I have considered such data for 
the calculus of the variable. For instance, the Dutch GL contested the first general election in 
1989, and it is a merge of a number of existing parties (the Pacifist Socialist Party, the 
Communist party of the Netherlands, and so forth). In order to compute the value of Membership 
Decline for GL in the 1989-1994 legislature, I have subtracted from the five-year moving average 
of the merger parties and of GL in 1989 the five-year moving average of the merger parties in 
1986 (which is the first year of the 1986-1989 legislature). This choice has been applied to the 
following parties in the following countries: for Italy, the PDL in 2009, the PD in 2007, the 
UDC in 2002; for the Netherlands, the already-mentioned GL in 1989; for the United Kingdom, 




5.1 Seat Share Loss 
 
As explained in Section 5.1, data for this variable for elections held until 2009 (included) are 
taken from Nohlen and Stover (2010), while for subsequent elections I have used the following 
national official sources: for the 2010 Belgian general election, 
http://polling2010.belgium.be/en/cha/results/results_start.html ; for the 2013 German general 
election, https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2013/ergebnisse.html ; for 
the first 2012 Greek general election, http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012a/public/index.html?lang=en#%7B%22cls%22:%22main%22,%22p
arams%22:%7B%7D%7D ; for the second 2012 Greek general election, http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/v2012b/public/index.html?lang=en#%7B%22cls%22:%22main%22,%22
params%22:%7B%7D%7D ; for the first 2015 Greek general election, http://ekloges-
prev.singularlogic.eu/v2015a/v/public/index.html?lang=en#%7B%22cls%22:%22main%22,%2
2params%22:%7B%7D%7D ; for the second 2015 Greek general election, 
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http://ekloges.ypes.gr/current/v/public/index.html?lang=en#%7B%22cls%22:%22main%22,
%22params%22:%7B%7D%7D ; for the 2011 Irish general election, 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/publications/2011_Electoral_Handbookrev.pdf ; for the 
2013 Italian general election, 
http://elezionistorico.interno.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=24/02/2013&tpa=I&tpe=A&lev0=0
&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S ; for the 2010 and 2012 Dutch general election, 
http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/Na1918/Verkiezingsuitslagen.aspx?VerkiezingsTypeId=1 ; 
for the 2011 Portuguese general election, 
http://eleicoes.cne.pt/cne2005/raster/index.cfm?dia=05&mes=06&ano=2011&eleicao=ar ; for 
the 2011 Spanish general election, 
http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/busquedaAvanzadaAction.html;jsessionid=639B422ED79
2D711158F5F85AAA7EB88?codTipoEleccion=2&vuelta=1&isHome=1&codPeriodo=201111 
; for the 2010 UK general election, 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP10-36 .  
Moreover, in case two (or more) parties compete in different parts of the country but 
nonetheless form a unitary bloc in Parliament, I only consider the bigger one in the empirical 
analysis. Then, to calculate the number of seats of attributed to the bigger party, I have summed 
the percentages of seats attributed to all parties of the parliamentary coalition. This solution has 
been implemented for the following parties: the German CDU and CSU; the Western and 
Eastern German Greens in the 1990 German general election; the Spanish PSOE and PSC; the 
Spanish IU and PSUC, IC and other smaller political formations (e.g., IC/UIA, EUIA, and so 
forth); the Spanish PP and other smaller political formations (PDP, UPN, CG, and so forth).  
Passing to another issue, if a party forms an electoral coalition at T (excluding the above-
mentioned cases), when possible I have reported the percentage of seats obtained by each 
member of the coalition and separately calculated the increase/decrease in the percentage of 
seats obtained at T with respect to T-1. Moreover, if a party contests for the first time an 
election at T, I have decided to give this party the value corresponding to the percentage of seats 
obtained by that party in the first general election it has contested. E.g., the Italian FI has, for the 
1994-1996 legislature, a value corresponding to the percentage of seats it has obtained in the 
1994 Italian general election. The reason behind this choice is that if a new party appears in the 
electoral and, more crucially for this reasoning, the parliamentary environments, it follows 
whichever percentage of votes/seats it has obtained in the first general election it has contested 
is surely a positive electoral result. Indeed, at T-1 the party was non-existing, thus not having a 
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single vote or a single seat in Parliament. Therefore, it would have been wrong to give a value of 
0 to this party for the legislature following the first contested election. 
Turning to more specific calculations, for 2001 Italian general election, the percentage of 
seats for each party has been calculated by putting at the denominator 619 instead of 630, given 
the number of Italian MPs in the Lower House after the 2001 election was equal to 619; for 
Portuguese PCP, I have separately reported the number of seats obtained by the PCP and by the 
other small members of the Democratic Unity Coalition (within which the PCP has contested a 
number of general elections); furthermore, for the Portuguese PS, I have calculated the number 
of seats obtained by the party alone, thus excluding the small political formations that sometimes 




To build this variable, I have decided to separately treat Walloon and Flemish parties. This 
decision has been driven by the consideration that the Belgian party system is split into two 
separate parts, relatively similar with one another: in both cases, there is a Christian-Democratic 
party, a Socialist one, a Liberal one, a Green one, and so forth. It would have been risky to 
jointly consider all the Belgian parties for the contagion variable (given that the assumptions 
regarding the imitative patterns between Walloon and Flemish parties would have been too 
strong) and therefore, in order not to build an inflated variable for Belgian parties, I have 




6.1/6.2 The analysis of the dichotomous and the ordinal dependent variables 
 
As argued in Section 6.1, I have created two variables in order to declare my dataset to be 
time-series. More specifically, the two variables are Party ID and Legislature.  
The first variable groups party-legislature observations according to their organisational 
continuity. In other words, party-legislature observations which can be traced back to the same 
party organisation have received the same numerical ID. Let us give an example to make this 
concept more understandable: the Belgian PVV, VLD, and OVLD have received the same value 
for the variable Party ID, given that the second one can be safely considered as the heir of the 
first one, and, in turn, the third one is the heir of the second one. Moreover, a second criterion 
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has been that if there has been a split, the splinter party has received a new value for this 
variable, while the other party has received the same one of the ancestor party. For example, in 
1992 the PCI split into two parties: the smaller extreme-left-wing PRC and the leftist (but more 
moderate) PDS. The former has received a new ID, while the PDS has received the same ID of 
the PCI, following the logical – and empirically supported – idea that during party fissions, the 
resulting bigger party receives the lion’ share of the old party in terms of party membership, 
party branches, possibly also political personnel, and so forth. Obviously, if the smaller party has 
not reached the 5% threshold, has not been put into the dataset. Moreover, if there has been a 
merge, two possible situations might arise: the merge is between a party already existing in the 
dataset and an ‘external’ one; or the merge might involve two parties already present in my 
dataset. In the former case, it can be safely argued that if one of the two merging parties has 
never appeared in my dataset, it means that it has not reached the 5% threshold. Therefore, 
given the other party has indeed reached it – given it is present in the dataset – the party which is 
absent from the dataset can be considered as the smaller one among the two, and therefore the 
party resulting from the merge between these two political formations shall receive the ID of the 
bigger ancestor. The second case – a merge between two parties already existing in the dataset – 
is a trickier one. Given both parties have reached at least the 5% of votes – otherwise they would 
have not been included in the dataset – it can surely be argued that one of the two merging 
parties was bigger – more important – than the other one, but the evaluation would have been 
inevitably more driven by my personal interpretation. In order to play on the safe side and 
reduce possible bias-related problems, I have decided to give a new ID to these exceptional cases 
of parties resulting from a merging of two parties already present in my dataset (the PD in 2007, 
and the PDL in 2009).  
The second variable groups party-legislature observations in different time periods. More 
specifically, it is called Legislature and operationalises the legislature in which the specific party-
observation is related to. The variable ranges from 1 to N, where N is the progressive number 
attributed to the most recent legislature considered for each country (see more info in Appendix 
A). It has been necessary to create this variable in order to properly declare the dataset as a time-
series one. As a small final addendum, if a party comes into existence during a legislature, it has 
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